Question: The Ethiopian defence Forces are in Somalia to help the Somalia government ensure sustainable peace and stability. What are the achievements in this regard? When will Ethiopia withdraw its army from Somalia?
PM Meles: Our army had two major missions in Somalia. The first one was to deal with extremist groups there, who cause clear and present danger to Ethiopia and overtly declared a holy war (Jihad) against our country. This mission of our army was accomplished within few weeks.
The second mission was supporting the Somalia government to ensure lasting peace and stability in that country. In addition, the Ethiopian army shouldered a lofty responsibility of building durable peace in Ethiopia and the Horn as a whole by shuttering the backbone of the subversive groups in Somalia. We were not alone in breaking the backbone of extremists. We had allies and partners. The Somalia transitional government and its allies were with us. We cannot say "goodbye" to these allies leaving them alone without helping them to be self-sufficient in taking care of their problems. This is not only the question of morality, but it also sends a bad signal to other allies not to take us as trustworthy partners in the future. Thus, we had to support our allies in our capacity.
International organizations including the African Union (AU) as well as the people of Somalia had wholeheartedly supported our intervention in Somalia. Especially AU's unreserved support in this regard should not be taken lightly. Both AU and the United Nations told us not to withdraw our army hastily risking the safety and security of Somalia and its people. They asked us to stay there until they send their peacekeeping missions to Somalia. We could not turn a deaf ear to such requests of the AU, which always stands by the noble causes of Ethiopia. We stayed in Somalia up to now for the aforementioned three major reasons.
Only staying in Somalia does not bring about the desired result. We don't also believe that war is the sole option. We have three strategies to ensure sustainable peace and stability in Somalia.
The first strategy is political solution both inside and outside Somalia. By inside solution, I mean solving clan disputes in every locality of Somalia. The Somali people themselves held a national conference in Mogadishu to solve clan-based conflicts at a national level. They moved encouraging stride in this regard. Resolving disputes among clans residing in the outskirts of Mogadishu is a key to ensure durable peace in the City. Thus, we have put in place a clear strategy that promotes peace talks, negotiations and reconciliation among the various Somali clans. On the other hand, there are jihadists under the umbrella of the so-called Union of Islamic Courts outside Somalia. There are also devotee religious groups that could jeopardize the security of the Horn. Distinguishing the pious groups from the jihadists and drawing them to the peace track is part of our strategy. Hence, we had been exerting efforts to ensure peace inside Somalia and in the neighborhood.
The second strategy was rebuilding the Somali government. By the time we intervened in Somalia, the government had not even a police force and an effective army. There was not a legally established tax collecting institute. It was the thugs who were gathering taxes. Thus, we had to rebuild Somalia's army, police force and tax collecting organizations to enable the Somalis be self-reliant in ensuring their own peace and security.
Our third strategy is exerting utmost efforts to convince the international community to back up the decision of the African Union and take over the responsibility of bringing peace and stability in Somalia through the United Nations.
Our three strategies achieved various results. If we take, for instance, the case of negotiations, currently the Mogadishu negotiation has moved an encouraging distance. The negotiation envisaged to be held in Kisemayu has failed. Concerning peace negotiations held outside Somalia, several factions that split from the self-styled Al-Shebab terrorist group have already started peace talks with the transitional government and signed a first round agreement. This, indeed, is a huge stride.
With regard to rebuilding the Somalia transitional government, we trained a significant number of members of the Somali police and defence forces. They are building their capacity step-by-step. But, we cannot say that the task of rebuilding the Somalia transitional government has gone with the required pace.
Successful diplomatic activities were also undertaken to convincing the international community to take over the responsibility of bringing peace and stability in Somalia. Peacekeeping troops of Burundi and Uganda are already in Somalia. However, the required number of peacekeepers that should be deployed to Somalia is 8,000. The contingent deployed so far is not more than 1/4th of the required number. The United Nations is extending support to Somalia in various forms including relief assistance.
As to when the Ethiopian troops leave Somalia, first we had to foil the Jihad launched against Ethiopia. We accomplished this within three weeks. The reason that we stayed in Somalia, after we accomplished this mission has to do with ensuring durable peace in Somalia and the Horn in general. Staying there is not a must. We can pull out our army anytime we like and station it along the border to protect ourselves. But, as I mentioned earlier we have several commitments. We are responsible to the African Union and the United Nations. We are responsible to the people of Somalia. We should beat the challenges and show in practice to our Somalia allies that we are there for them in time of need. We will evaluate the pros and cons of staying in Somalia regularly. Our decision for withdrawal will be based on such evaluations. We can't set abrupt deadline now. Our decision will take into account existing objective realities.
Question: Some international media exaggerate minor problems in Somalia and present distorted news stories. What is your comment on this issue?
PM Meles: The problem is not only exaggerated reporting. Exaggeration could be made only on existent phenomena. For example, reporting the death of two people as the massacre of 20 could be labeled as an exaggeration. But, reporting the death of 40 people in a situation where a single shot has not been fired is not exaggeration. It is rather fabrication. When we examine why some Western media are engaged in fabrication, the answer is that they don't have a reporter on the spot. In such situations, these media resort to depend on the extremists and their spokespersons as a source of information and simply put the news on air without bothering to filter it out and check for its accuracy. On the other hand, there are some media outlets which have a hidden political agenda behind such fabrications. These are elements that hate to see the stabilization of the Horn following Ethiopia's intervention. One of these groups is the Eritrean regime, which is publicly involved in such defamation activities against Ethiopia. There are also other groups that are covertly working and wishing for the destabilization of the region. These elements are now using their media as a tool to realize their hidden political agenda.
Question: Many predicted that war was imminent between Ethiopia and Eritrea after the withdrawal of the United Nations peacekeeping mission from the Ethio-Eritrea border areas. Why did not the Eritrean government launch a war of aggression against Ethiopia after the pull-out of the peacekeepers?
PM Meles: Because it can't! On the first place, war did not occur along the Ethio-Eritrean border line for two reasons. The first is that the Eritrean government clearly knows the deadly reprisal if it tries to invade Ethiopia again. It is well aware that it does not have the capacity to go ahead with its intention of invasion. That is why Eritrea did not launch a war of aggression. On the Ethiopian side, although we are capable of doing it, we are not interested in it. We want peace. In short, war did not flare up because the Ethiopian defence force is not interested and the Eritrean army is not capable. If this status quo goes on and unless the Eritrean army brings about a radical change overnight, I don't think there will be war in the region. What Eritrea chose in this regard is a proxy war. We have a strategy to thwart such destabilizing approaches.
PM Meles: Our army had two major missions in Somalia. The first one was to deal with extremist groups there, who cause clear and present danger to Ethiopia and overtly declared a holy war (Jihad) against our country. This mission of our army was accomplished within few weeks.
The second mission was supporting the Somalia government to ensure lasting peace and stability in that country. In addition, the Ethiopian army shouldered a lofty responsibility of building durable peace in Ethiopia and the Horn as a whole by shuttering the backbone of the subversive groups in Somalia. We were not alone in breaking the backbone of extremists. We had allies and partners. The Somalia transitional government and its allies were with us. We cannot say "goodbye" to these allies leaving them alone without helping them to be self-sufficient in taking care of their problems. This is not only the question of morality, but it also sends a bad signal to other allies not to take us as trustworthy partners in the future. Thus, we had to support our allies in our capacity.
International organizations including the African Union (AU) as well as the people of Somalia had wholeheartedly supported our intervention in Somalia. Especially AU's unreserved support in this regard should not be taken lightly. Both AU and the United Nations told us not to withdraw our army hastily risking the safety and security of Somalia and its people. They asked us to stay there until they send their peacekeeping missions to Somalia. We could not turn a deaf ear to such requests of the AU, which always stands by the noble causes of Ethiopia. We stayed in Somalia up to now for the aforementioned three major reasons.
Only staying in Somalia does not bring about the desired result. We don't also believe that war is the sole option. We have three strategies to ensure sustainable peace and stability in Somalia.
The first strategy is political solution both inside and outside Somalia. By inside solution, I mean solving clan disputes in every locality of Somalia. The Somali people themselves held a national conference in Mogadishu to solve clan-based conflicts at a national level. They moved encouraging stride in this regard. Resolving disputes among clans residing in the outskirts of Mogadishu is a key to ensure durable peace in the City. Thus, we have put in place a clear strategy that promotes peace talks, negotiations and reconciliation among the various Somali clans. On the other hand, there are jihadists under the umbrella of the so-called Union of Islamic Courts outside Somalia. There are also devotee religious groups that could jeopardize the security of the Horn. Distinguishing the pious groups from the jihadists and drawing them to the peace track is part of our strategy. Hence, we had been exerting efforts to ensure peace inside Somalia and in the neighborhood.
The second strategy was rebuilding the Somali government. By the time we intervened in Somalia, the government had not even a police force and an effective army. There was not a legally established tax collecting institute. It was the thugs who were gathering taxes. Thus, we had to rebuild Somalia's army, police force and tax collecting organizations to enable the Somalis be self-reliant in ensuring their own peace and security.
Our third strategy is exerting utmost efforts to convince the international community to back up the decision of the African Union and take over the responsibility of bringing peace and stability in Somalia through the United Nations.
Our three strategies achieved various results. If we take, for instance, the case of negotiations, currently the Mogadishu negotiation has moved an encouraging distance. The negotiation envisaged to be held in Kisemayu has failed. Concerning peace negotiations held outside Somalia, several factions that split from the self-styled Al-Shebab terrorist group have already started peace talks with the transitional government and signed a first round agreement. This, indeed, is a huge stride.
With regard to rebuilding the Somalia transitional government, we trained a significant number of members of the Somali police and defence forces. They are building their capacity step-by-step. But, we cannot say that the task of rebuilding the Somalia transitional government has gone with the required pace.
Successful diplomatic activities were also undertaken to convincing the international community to take over the responsibility of bringing peace and stability in Somalia. Peacekeeping troops of Burundi and Uganda are already in Somalia. However, the required number of peacekeepers that should be deployed to Somalia is 8,000. The contingent deployed so far is not more than 1/4th of the required number. The United Nations is extending support to Somalia in various forms including relief assistance.
As to when the Ethiopian troops leave Somalia, first we had to foil the Jihad launched against Ethiopia. We accomplished this within three weeks. The reason that we stayed in Somalia, after we accomplished this mission has to do with ensuring durable peace in Somalia and the Horn in general. Staying there is not a must. We can pull out our army anytime we like and station it along the border to protect ourselves. But, as I mentioned earlier we have several commitments. We are responsible to the African Union and the United Nations. We are responsible to the people of Somalia. We should beat the challenges and show in practice to our Somalia allies that we are there for them in time of need. We will evaluate the pros and cons of staying in Somalia regularly. Our decision for withdrawal will be based on such evaluations. We can't set abrupt deadline now. Our decision will take into account existing objective realities.
Question: Some international media exaggerate minor problems in Somalia and present distorted news stories. What is your comment on this issue?
PM Meles: The problem is not only exaggerated reporting. Exaggeration could be made only on existent phenomena. For example, reporting the death of two people as the massacre of 20 could be labeled as an exaggeration. But, reporting the death of 40 people in a situation where a single shot has not been fired is not exaggeration. It is rather fabrication. When we examine why some Western media are engaged in fabrication, the answer is that they don't have a reporter on the spot. In such situations, these media resort to depend on the extremists and their spokespersons as a source of information and simply put the news on air without bothering to filter it out and check for its accuracy. On the other hand, there are some media outlets which have a hidden political agenda behind such fabrications. These are elements that hate to see the stabilization of the Horn following Ethiopia's intervention. One of these groups is the Eritrean regime, which is publicly involved in such defamation activities against Ethiopia. There are also other groups that are covertly working and wishing for the destabilization of the region. These elements are now using their media as a tool to realize their hidden political agenda.
Question: Many predicted that war was imminent between Ethiopia and Eritrea after the withdrawal of the United Nations peacekeeping mission from the Ethio-Eritrea border areas. Why did not the Eritrean government launch a war of aggression against Ethiopia after the pull-out of the peacekeepers?
PM Meles: Because it can't! On the first place, war did not occur along the Ethio-Eritrean border line for two reasons. The first is that the Eritrean government clearly knows the deadly reprisal if it tries to invade Ethiopia again. It is well aware that it does not have the capacity to go ahead with its intention of invasion. That is why Eritrea did not launch a war of aggression. On the Ethiopian side, although we are capable of doing it, we are not interested in it. We want peace. In short, war did not flare up because the Ethiopian defence force is not interested and the Eritrean army is not capable. If this status quo goes on and unless the Eritrean army brings about a radical change overnight, I don't think there will be war in the region. What Eritrea chose in this regard is a proxy war. We have a strategy to thwart such destabilizing approaches.
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