All nations go through a period of tumultuous turmoil and testing times and Somalia is no different. Wars are universal and fundamental in man’s nature throughout his existence. However the Somali crisis during early 1980s reflected a moment of crucial decision in the face of an acute difficulty or danger of collapse. For all practical purposes, nonetheless, that did not yet mean or signify “being in throes of death”. From the perspective of saving the nation, it signified that a turning point where a road to recovery had to be explored if an irrecoverable descent into oblivious was to be avoided, and such challenge has presented itself for the Somalis to deal with in Unisom. It should have behooved us to accept and take responsibility for our roles in the war in our collective interests. To do so would focus our attention where it needed to be; saving our people, our country and protecting our sovereignty. That we failed collectively. For if we are to understand more fully what drives our people to an aggressive behavior, which often leads to an unending violence of an inevitable war, we should go deeper into all dimensions of war. We, however, failed to seriously examine the roots of our problems and it has been haunting us for the last 20 some years. It has been a way overdue to study factors that contributed to the Somali wars. It is encouraging that much has been written already and many more are yet to come to address the Somali question. Hind side diagnosis of the causes of the collapse of the Somali state is a 20/20 vision, of course; however, in the heart of it lie a danger when one uses the “Klan-Pen” to rewrite history with the intent of destroying the historical significance of our independence of 1960.
In his new book titled “ Politics of Cain 1”, Dr. Bulhan starts his argument with his own pre-assumed “conclusion” that the southerners were mainly responsible for the collapse of the Somali state. “-the clan distribution of SYL founders was a precursor for the bad things to come”, he asserts. He argues that there existed some kind of pathological clan policy upon which the original idea of nation and unity was inherently built on; and such policy was later employed by certain clan intellectual apparatus in southern Somalia (former Italian Somaliland- the Qaabiil brother) in order to oppress their younger brother from the north (former Somaliland- Haabiil brother). However, in my opinion, such simplistic view of what otherwise needed more critical analysis does not add any new scholarly tested hyperbole to address the Somali problem; rather an attempt to stoke up a flame on the already existing vicious circularity dialogue between the secessionists and the unionists. Events that took place1940s and their rationale can only be viewed in their own terms of time and space to understand their historical significance.
Dr. Bulhan tries to convince his readers that the findings of his work actually agree with his pre-assumed conclusion that the southerners had already had a plan in place to oppress the northerners long before the unification. He presents some ghastly details on how the Europeans introduced “colonial systems” that created a “flawed state”--the union; and how “Klan-elites” of Darood and Hawiye, particularly the founding fathers of the SYL, dominated the government posts from the get go, which consequently killed it even before its was out of the gate. When referring to the young thirteen members who organized a non-political association of Somali Youth League (SYL) in March 15, 1943, the author immediately draws a table and a graphical presentation showing the names and the clan association of these young nationalists. He alleges that their nationalistic slogans were nothing more than an empty nationalism built on clan loyalties; thus becoming a precursor for the clan dominance that followed the creation of the union.
We all know that there is a difference between government policy and political maneuvers in all political society, but the author did not present hard evidence of government policy or hidden plan that implicates the SYL founders to the charges he slaps them. The implication that these young men were only thinking about their clan and used the SYL to gain power over other clans is really disturbing to hear from a learned man. Any attempt to blame yesterday’s nationalists for our collective madness of today, echoes nothing more than the author’s cynicism and his crusade of pillorying the past in trying to tarnish or completely bury the symbols that once stood for Somali nationalism and unity. His view supports the inevitable faith of malaise that has befallen on the Somali people since the collapse of the union.
Dr. Bulhan seems to have introduced a yet another new phenomena, “Klan-Pen Witch Hunt”, to the dialogue where one uses the “pen” to destroy the fabric or the goodness of what little we knew about the founders of the union; our Somali nationalists men who started the struggle to free their people from the hard grips of colonization and humiliation. However, the good doctor wants you to believe that there was a giant clannish conspiracy plan embedded in the minds of the 13 members of the SYL founders.
“They imposed their constitution and their flag”, he argues. “In effect, the SYL became the dictator of all political parties”, he continued.
He argues that the Darood and Hawiye clans had long planned to dominate other smaller Somali clans. Not surprisingly, the author says nothing about the clan composition of the few nationalists from the British Protectorate that he knew their names, which is in fact a good thing. A nationalist movement started the under the British Protectorate in the north to fight for freedom, a movement that later gained strength under the Somali national league (SNL) was dominated by Isaaq clan. Did that make them clanists? My answer is No. They will always remain pure Somali nationalist in my book and nothing less should be reserved for the founders of SYL also.
Of Sayid Mohamed Abulle Hassan, the author accuses him for being a tribal man during his jihad against powerful infidels in early 19th century. “Clan politics deeply infected the Derwish leader even while he claimed to wage a jihad whose goals transcend clan politics”, he writes.
The good doctor underestimates the contribution of Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan to the conscience of those who came after him. Sayid Mohamed crisscrossed the country, both in the south and north, appealing to the people, regardless of their clan, to join the struggle. His courageous struggle was an awakening message to those who had some level of understanding of what the colonizers have taken away from their people—freedom. Sayid Mohamed has shown how a society could organize itself for its own self defense in the face of a pervasive external threat of colonization and slavery. It has been observed that even primitive man, when he could, managed his warlike instincts primarily through ritual. This was particularly true of Sayid Mohamed’s small army whose numbers could not sustain constant attrition through war lest they face extinction. The Sayid appealed to many Somali clans to join the struggle and his courageous and unmasked nationalism was the precursor for the nationalist movements that came after him.
Nationalists like Farah Omaar, Michael Mariano, Sh. Bashir in the north and the SYL founders in the south were all following the footsteps of the Sayid to fight for freedom. We should never try to find a motive as to why they fought for freedom. They unified us and gave us a reason to dream freedom, intensified our pride as people, and gave us a nation. We should reserve our respect for the visionary few that this land ever produced, and should never blame them for the inherent clannish power struggle that came after the independence. I strongly believe that one’s own nationalistic pride, aspirations and dreams, are completely different from clan lineage; either you have it or you do not. I believe that the euphoric nationalism feelings that people shared from 1940 to mid 1970s were real and still exist. I strongly believe that our heroes had something good in heart for all Somalis when they fought Somali independence, unlike today’s clan enclaves. Let us all preserve our history the way have inherited ---pristine, virgin and innocent.
Clearly, at least from what I read in his book, the author presents a view that resents the unification of the British Somali land and the Italian Somali land in 1960; a clearly anti-nationalistic view.
“ .. Somalis in former Protectorate threw themselves into unity...... a unity without condition turned out to be unity on unequal terms”, he laments.
He hastily heavies anger towards the non-Isaaq clans in the former British Protectorate who formed the United Somali Party (USP) and pushed hard to join the union, lest they be dominated by Isaaq. He asserts that the break up of the union started 1960 and expresses his euphoric support for the disintegration of the union, while explicitly entailing his unconditional support for the emergence of the Somali National Movement (SNM), a movement he whole hearted supported as he claims.
“Somaliland’s reclamation of independence on May 18, 1991 was the culmination of a process of a drift that started soon after independence of 1960”, he writes.
In an incident in 1962 where some business people in Hargeisa expressed their displeasure with high taxation, he writes the following: “the southern president nor the prime minister tried to understand the source of the anger. The Isaaq elders insisted that Somaliland will secede”, he continued.
Here again the “southern president” that the author is referring to was president Adan Abdulle Osman. His anger towards anything southern, including the former president of the republic, is clearly unabashed. But he also wants you to believe that it was only the Isaaq elders that have articulated these grievances; even though Hargeisa was the second biggest city in the nation at the time and had business people of different clan affiliations residing in the city. Among the other incidents of Isaaq grievances that he reports is the story of young army officers who did not get the promotions that they thought they deserved. The author alleges here again that it was because clan discrimination that denied the young officers of their promotion. Maybe so; surprisingly, however, these were the same officers who later helped Mohamed Siyad Barre to stage a successful coup against the civilian government of Mohamed Ibrahim Egaal (from Isaaq clan himself). We could argue whether this one was for the clan or whether it was an ambitious opportunity for the officers from the north to rise to power.
As cited by the author, the three clans that dominated the political system in Somalia during 1960-1990 were Darood, Hawiye and Isaaq, of course, at the expenses of many other clans who did not get their share of the pie, and at the end, have been marginalized or shut out from government posts. These injustices have peaked to their climax towards the end of the collapse of the union under Mohamed Siyad Barre.
To examine the extent and which clan became the dominant creature- Qabiil brother, the author presents detailed figures and graphical representation of clan and sub-clan distribution and composition in multiple government organs. When examined the clan and sub-clan distribution of 112 civilian ministerial posts (1960 -1969), the author reports the following:
Darood 36 posts (32%), Hawiye 33 post (29%), Isaaq 20 (18%), Raxanweyn 10 (9%) and the rest of the clans were insignificant. Just for the sake of argument, let test one possible scenario of equity. If the 112 posts were to be equally divided among the seven clans the author listed, each clan would have received 16 ministerial posts. It is clear from this simple arithmetic estimates that the three clans that have taken more than their share were Darood, Hawiye and Isaaq. Thus, they were the Qabiil brother or more appropriately “Klan elites”, an adjective term that the author reserves only for “southern elites”.
During the military regime of 1969 to 1990, the same three clans dominated the composition of 456 cabinet posts. Darood 180 (39%), Hawiye 92 (20%) and Isaaq 82 (18%). Again all other clans were marginalized. If, just for the sake of argument, we did divide the 456 posts among the 12 clans the author listed on the table, then each clan would have received 38 cabinet posts. This again indicates that the same three clans dominated the cabinet seats, making them the Qabiil brother of the Somali clans; making the rest Somali clans, we can argue, the Habiil-or more appropriately the victim; a fact that Dr. Bulhan either intentionally ignored to mention or was simply an innocent miss by the “Klan-Pen”.
I am not sure whether this approach of equal distribution of the ministerial and cabinet posts among the clans is the right way to deal with problem or whether using clan-based census of the Somali population is the right method to divide the government posts. Whether all clans should have been given equal number of seats or whether the three Qaabiil clans should have equal number of seats remains among themselves will be left for others to decide. But it really does not matter any way.
The point here is that any clan, given the chance, can become the Qabiil brother to seek dominance and a power to kill his Haabiil brother. However, contrary to the author’s claim that the Isaaq clan was victimized and marginalized under the union, I argue that, if the above figures tell us any truth (and these are Dr. Bulhan’s numbers by the way), the Isaaq clan had more than its share both in the civilian governments and under Siyad Barre’s military regime as presented above, while the other clans from the north (Gadaboursi, Dhulbahante, Warsengali and others-the Habiils brother) were not so lucky. The irony here is that these three non-Isaaq clans formed the USP party long before the union and campaigned effortlessly to join their brothers in Italian Somaliland. Their rationale, then, was that they did not want to be dominated by Isaaq if the British Protectorate remained as a separate country. Disastrously and much to their chagrin, the same is true today after almost 50 years.
No clan is immune to this vicious and deceptive clan system where the end justifies the means. Somali clanism has over the years, especially after the independence, evolved into greed-driven clan politics, an unshackled creature that has broken all the traditional boundaries (Xeer). Such clan politicking used all that at its disposal to achieve power of dominance in the government posts. The Somali “elites”, business people, community elders and religious men were all used as a vehicle for clan power and dominance. There is no denial that tribal politics became the norm at all government levels in both the civilian government and the military rule under Mohamed Siyaad Barre. To the extent that these clans wanted to manipulate the system, Siyaad Barre, the master of clan politics, pitted these clans against each other.
Nepotism was rampant in all government ministries and civil servant offices. Human rights violations, executions of innocent people and bombardments of cities by the government have become common practices, which gave birth to clannish movements under the disguise of freedom fighters. However, with no concrete agenda or agreed upon vision other than fighting Barre’s regime, these tribe-based gorilla fighters (SSDF, SNM, USC and others) were not well unorganized. Shifting loyalties and opportune alliances were made among and across clan lines to rally support for each other when need be. Ultimately, they imprudently turned their guns to their neighbors and to each other to settle their internal clan revelries. And it was, mainly, their lack of collective vision for the country and void of nationalistic sentiments or agenda that destroyed the nation. In a situation in which an established government no longer there, armed militia of one kind or another gained access to critical national resources and were fighting among themselves over the loot and committing an onslaught criminal acts. They were responsible for what has happened after Siyaad Barre’s departure, and they should be held accountable for their roles in setting the cities on fire and chasing innocent people out of their country. Vision is like a map that guides you through bewilderment and in any complex decision-making process. Vision helps you to focus on your goals. In the absence of vision, you are lost and that is what has happened to these tribe-based gorilla fighters.
Little has been done since to help rebuild a strong government and to bring back law and order in the country. Furthermore, clan dominance has gained more momentum in all regions. Today the Darood clan commands their majority in Puntland, the Hawiye clan dominates the TFG in Southern Somalia and the former USP prediction of 1950s had become a reality today in Somaliland where a conservative estimate of above 60% of the parliament and government ministries are taken up by the Isaaq clan, when all other clans combined (Gadaboursi, Dhulbanhante, Warsangali and others) have less than 30% of the government posts. This will make Dr. Bulhan very happy, I believe.
Surprisingly, the Gadaboursi clan is still split and debating on the question of whether to support the secession that has been in place for more than twenty years now. The Dhulbahante and the Warsangali are fighting for their rights to be free from Somaliland occupation. It is a colonial mentality that is hung up with those illegal and imaginary borders introduced by the colonizers in late 1800s; the illegal actions of the white men who have designed the partitioning of the land without the consent or the knowledge of its inhabitants-the Somalis. From the colonizers original justification, occupation and colonization of other territories were their way of finding wealth, food and fuel for their own people back home in Europe; which had none whatsoever to do with helping the people they colonized in Somalia. Therefore, to dishonor the divide and rule of the colonizers, the boundaries and borders they have put in place without our consent have been nullified and demolished after the colonizers left us and the north united with the south. The unification of British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland brought to an end of these artificial borders between the two Somali sisters. It has no legal binding on the Somalis today if they refuse not to join or take part in any group who wants to secede, just as we witness today in Sool, Sanaag and Cain (SSC). I hope the good doctor will address this issue and justifiably should err on the side of justice.
Obviously Dr. Bulhan does not see anything wrong with all these injustice in these new Qaabiil-Haabiil alignments since he ignored to talk about them in his book. Maybe this is what the doctor is prescribing for us as a remedy for peace and a panacea for success; however, in my humble opinion, I believe history will test us tomorrow and could teach us, once again, that we have been heading the wrong direction. Worse yet, I suspect that kinship conflicts and “Klan-Pen” conflicts will continue, where many will be tempted by the great ideas of re-writing the Somali history, many of them not in an objective analytical way, but from their kinship perspective. Some have already made the claim that even “Egaal Shiidaad”, the legendary and somewhat mythical character in the Somali folklore stories, belonged to their own clan. Let us all hope for otherwise. Many Somalis have already written and many will follow, taking different perspectives of telling the Somali story, which is a good thing and a noble endeavor, but we should keep it honest.
Dr. Bulhan tries to convince his readers that the findings of his work actually agree with his pre-assumed conclusion that the southerners had already had a plan in place to oppress the northerners long before the unification. He presents some ghastly details on how the Europeans introduced “colonial systems” that created a “flawed state”--the union; and how “Klan-elites” of Darood and Hawiye, particularly the founding fathers of the SYL, dominated the government posts from the get go, which consequently killed it even before its was out of the gate. When referring to the young thirteen members who organized a non-political association of Somali Youth League (SYL) in March 15, 1943, the author immediately draws a table and a graphical presentation showing the names and the clan association of these young nationalists. He alleges that their nationalistic slogans were nothing more than an empty nationalism built on clan loyalties; thus becoming a precursor for the clan dominance that followed the creation of the union.
We all know that there is a difference between government policy and political maneuvers in all political society, but the author did not present hard evidence of government policy or hidden plan that implicates the SYL founders to the charges he slaps them. The implication that these young men were only thinking about their clan and used the SYL to gain power over other clans is really disturbing to hear from a learned man. Any attempt to blame yesterday’s nationalists for our collective madness of today, echoes nothing more than the author’s cynicism and his crusade of pillorying the past in trying to tarnish or completely bury the symbols that once stood for Somali nationalism and unity. His view supports the inevitable faith of malaise that has befallen on the Somali people since the collapse of the union.
Dr. Bulhan seems to have introduced a yet another new phenomena, “Klan-Pen Witch Hunt”, to the dialogue where one uses the “pen” to destroy the fabric or the goodness of what little we knew about the founders of the union; our Somali nationalists men who started the struggle to free their people from the hard grips of colonization and humiliation. However, the good doctor wants you to believe that there was a giant clannish conspiracy plan embedded in the minds of the 13 members of the SYL founders.
“They imposed their constitution and their flag”, he argues. “In effect, the SYL became the dictator of all political parties”, he continued.
He argues that the Darood and Hawiye clans had long planned to dominate other smaller Somali clans. Not surprisingly, the author says nothing about the clan composition of the few nationalists from the British Protectorate that he knew their names, which is in fact a good thing. A nationalist movement started the under the British Protectorate in the north to fight for freedom, a movement that later gained strength under the Somali national league (SNL) was dominated by Isaaq clan. Did that make them clanists? My answer is No. They will always remain pure Somali nationalist in my book and nothing less should be reserved for the founders of SYL also.
Of Sayid Mohamed Abulle Hassan, the author accuses him for being a tribal man during his jihad against powerful infidels in early 19th century. “Clan politics deeply infected the Derwish leader even while he claimed to wage a jihad whose goals transcend clan politics”, he writes.
The good doctor underestimates the contribution of Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan to the conscience of those who came after him. Sayid Mohamed crisscrossed the country, both in the south and north, appealing to the people, regardless of their clan, to join the struggle. His courageous struggle was an awakening message to those who had some level of understanding of what the colonizers have taken away from their people—freedom. Sayid Mohamed has shown how a society could organize itself for its own self defense in the face of a pervasive external threat of colonization and slavery. It has been observed that even primitive man, when he could, managed his warlike instincts primarily through ritual. This was particularly true of Sayid Mohamed’s small army whose numbers could not sustain constant attrition through war lest they face extinction. The Sayid appealed to many Somali clans to join the struggle and his courageous and unmasked nationalism was the precursor for the nationalist movements that came after him.
Nationalists like Farah Omaar, Michael Mariano, Sh. Bashir in the north and the SYL founders in the south were all following the footsteps of the Sayid to fight for freedom. We should never try to find a motive as to why they fought for freedom. They unified us and gave us a reason to dream freedom, intensified our pride as people, and gave us a nation. We should reserve our respect for the visionary few that this land ever produced, and should never blame them for the inherent clannish power struggle that came after the independence. I strongly believe that one’s own nationalistic pride, aspirations and dreams, are completely different from clan lineage; either you have it or you do not. I believe that the euphoric nationalism feelings that people shared from 1940 to mid 1970s were real and still exist. I strongly believe that our heroes had something good in heart for all Somalis when they fought Somali independence, unlike today’s clan enclaves. Let us all preserve our history the way have inherited ---pristine, virgin and innocent.
Clearly, at least from what I read in his book, the author presents a view that resents the unification of the British Somali land and the Italian Somali land in 1960; a clearly anti-nationalistic view.
“ .. Somalis in former Protectorate threw themselves into unity...... a unity without condition turned out to be unity on unequal terms”, he laments.
He hastily heavies anger towards the non-Isaaq clans in the former British Protectorate who formed the United Somali Party (USP) and pushed hard to join the union, lest they be dominated by Isaaq. He asserts that the break up of the union started 1960 and expresses his euphoric support for the disintegration of the union, while explicitly entailing his unconditional support for the emergence of the Somali National Movement (SNM), a movement he whole hearted supported as he claims.
“Somaliland’s reclamation of independence on May 18, 1991 was the culmination of a process of a drift that started soon after independence of 1960”, he writes.
In an incident in 1962 where some business people in Hargeisa expressed their displeasure with high taxation, he writes the following: “the southern president nor the prime minister tried to understand the source of the anger. The Isaaq elders insisted that Somaliland will secede”, he continued.
Here again the “southern president” that the author is referring to was president Adan Abdulle Osman. His anger towards anything southern, including the former president of the republic, is clearly unabashed. But he also wants you to believe that it was only the Isaaq elders that have articulated these grievances; even though Hargeisa was the second biggest city in the nation at the time and had business people of different clan affiliations residing in the city. Among the other incidents of Isaaq grievances that he reports is the story of young army officers who did not get the promotions that they thought they deserved. The author alleges here again that it was because clan discrimination that denied the young officers of their promotion. Maybe so; surprisingly, however, these were the same officers who later helped Mohamed Siyad Barre to stage a successful coup against the civilian government of Mohamed Ibrahim Egaal (from Isaaq clan himself). We could argue whether this one was for the clan or whether it was an ambitious opportunity for the officers from the north to rise to power.
As cited by the author, the three clans that dominated the political system in Somalia during 1960-1990 were Darood, Hawiye and Isaaq, of course, at the expenses of many other clans who did not get their share of the pie, and at the end, have been marginalized or shut out from government posts. These injustices have peaked to their climax towards the end of the collapse of the union under Mohamed Siyad Barre.
To examine the extent and which clan became the dominant creature- Qabiil brother, the author presents detailed figures and graphical representation of clan and sub-clan distribution and composition in multiple government organs. When examined the clan and sub-clan distribution of 112 civilian ministerial posts (1960 -1969), the author reports the following:
Darood 36 posts (32%), Hawiye 33 post (29%), Isaaq 20 (18%), Raxanweyn 10 (9%) and the rest of the clans were insignificant. Just for the sake of argument, let test one possible scenario of equity. If the 112 posts were to be equally divided among the seven clans the author listed, each clan would have received 16 ministerial posts. It is clear from this simple arithmetic estimates that the three clans that have taken more than their share were Darood, Hawiye and Isaaq. Thus, they were the Qabiil brother or more appropriately “Klan elites”, an adjective term that the author reserves only for “southern elites”.
During the military regime of 1969 to 1990, the same three clans dominated the composition of 456 cabinet posts. Darood 180 (39%), Hawiye 92 (20%) and Isaaq 82 (18%). Again all other clans were marginalized. If, just for the sake of argument, we did divide the 456 posts among the 12 clans the author listed on the table, then each clan would have received 38 cabinet posts. This again indicates that the same three clans dominated the cabinet seats, making them the Qabiil brother of the Somali clans; making the rest Somali clans, we can argue, the Habiil-or more appropriately the victim; a fact that Dr. Bulhan either intentionally ignored to mention or was simply an innocent miss by the “Klan-Pen”.
I am not sure whether this approach of equal distribution of the ministerial and cabinet posts among the clans is the right way to deal with problem or whether using clan-based census of the Somali population is the right method to divide the government posts. Whether all clans should have been given equal number of seats or whether the three Qaabiil clans should have equal number of seats remains among themselves will be left for others to decide. But it really does not matter any way.
The point here is that any clan, given the chance, can become the Qabiil brother to seek dominance and a power to kill his Haabiil brother. However, contrary to the author’s claim that the Isaaq clan was victimized and marginalized under the union, I argue that, if the above figures tell us any truth (and these are Dr. Bulhan’s numbers by the way), the Isaaq clan had more than its share both in the civilian governments and under Siyad Barre’s military regime as presented above, while the other clans from the north (Gadaboursi, Dhulbahante, Warsengali and others-the Habiils brother) were not so lucky. The irony here is that these three non-Isaaq clans formed the USP party long before the union and campaigned effortlessly to join their brothers in Italian Somaliland. Their rationale, then, was that they did not want to be dominated by Isaaq if the British Protectorate remained as a separate country. Disastrously and much to their chagrin, the same is true today after almost 50 years.
No clan is immune to this vicious and deceptive clan system where the end justifies the means. Somali clanism has over the years, especially after the independence, evolved into greed-driven clan politics, an unshackled creature that has broken all the traditional boundaries (Xeer). Such clan politicking used all that at its disposal to achieve power of dominance in the government posts. The Somali “elites”, business people, community elders and religious men were all used as a vehicle for clan power and dominance. There is no denial that tribal politics became the norm at all government levels in both the civilian government and the military rule under Mohamed Siyaad Barre. To the extent that these clans wanted to manipulate the system, Siyaad Barre, the master of clan politics, pitted these clans against each other.
Nepotism was rampant in all government ministries and civil servant offices. Human rights violations, executions of innocent people and bombardments of cities by the government have become common practices, which gave birth to clannish movements under the disguise of freedom fighters. However, with no concrete agenda or agreed upon vision other than fighting Barre’s regime, these tribe-based gorilla fighters (SSDF, SNM, USC and others) were not well unorganized. Shifting loyalties and opportune alliances were made among and across clan lines to rally support for each other when need be. Ultimately, they imprudently turned their guns to their neighbors and to each other to settle their internal clan revelries. And it was, mainly, their lack of collective vision for the country and void of nationalistic sentiments or agenda that destroyed the nation. In a situation in which an established government no longer there, armed militia of one kind or another gained access to critical national resources and were fighting among themselves over the loot and committing an onslaught criminal acts. They were responsible for what has happened after Siyaad Barre’s departure, and they should be held accountable for their roles in setting the cities on fire and chasing innocent people out of their country. Vision is like a map that guides you through bewilderment and in any complex decision-making process. Vision helps you to focus on your goals. In the absence of vision, you are lost and that is what has happened to these tribe-based gorilla fighters.
Little has been done since to help rebuild a strong government and to bring back law and order in the country. Furthermore, clan dominance has gained more momentum in all regions. Today the Darood clan commands their majority in Puntland, the Hawiye clan dominates the TFG in Southern Somalia and the former USP prediction of 1950s had become a reality today in Somaliland where a conservative estimate of above 60% of the parliament and government ministries are taken up by the Isaaq clan, when all other clans combined (Gadaboursi, Dhulbanhante, Warsangali and others) have less than 30% of the government posts. This will make Dr. Bulhan very happy, I believe.
Surprisingly, the Gadaboursi clan is still split and debating on the question of whether to support the secession that has been in place for more than twenty years now. The Dhulbahante and the Warsangali are fighting for their rights to be free from Somaliland occupation. It is a colonial mentality that is hung up with those illegal and imaginary borders introduced by the colonizers in late 1800s; the illegal actions of the white men who have designed the partitioning of the land without the consent or the knowledge of its inhabitants-the Somalis. From the colonizers original justification, occupation and colonization of other territories were their way of finding wealth, food and fuel for their own people back home in Europe; which had none whatsoever to do with helping the people they colonized in Somalia. Therefore, to dishonor the divide and rule of the colonizers, the boundaries and borders they have put in place without our consent have been nullified and demolished after the colonizers left us and the north united with the south. The unification of British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland brought to an end of these artificial borders between the two Somali sisters. It has no legal binding on the Somalis today if they refuse not to join or take part in any group who wants to secede, just as we witness today in Sool, Sanaag and Cain (SSC). I hope the good doctor will address this issue and justifiably should err on the side of justice.
Obviously Dr. Bulhan does not see anything wrong with all these injustice in these new Qaabiil-Haabiil alignments since he ignored to talk about them in his book. Maybe this is what the doctor is prescribing for us as a remedy for peace and a panacea for success; however, in my humble opinion, I believe history will test us tomorrow and could teach us, once again, that we have been heading the wrong direction. Worse yet, I suspect that kinship conflicts and “Klan-Pen” conflicts will continue, where many will be tempted by the great ideas of re-writing the Somali history, many of them not in an objective analytical way, but from their kinship perspective. Some have already made the claim that even “Egaal Shiidaad”, the legendary and somewhat mythical character in the Somali folklore stories, belonged to their own clan. Let us all hope for otherwise. Many Somalis have already written and many will follow, taking different perspectives of telling the Somali story, which is a good thing and a noble endeavor, but we should keep it honest.
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In her new novel titled “Nomad Diaries 2 ”, Yasmeen Maxamuud grabs us by the hand and shows us how any Somali story of desperation and the despair that faces one Somali family, anywhere in the world, tells or reflects the same desperation that millions of other Somalis are faced with in dealing with their own individual and family struggle in different places of the world today. Dislocation, unfathomable violations of rape and humiliation, unnecessary death in the family, lost of dignity and cultural values in foreign countries coupled with destitution and poverty, are all telling the Somali story. This struggle is just a Somali tragedy and has no clan affiliation. No Somali family escaped this tragedy, and where you see one family’s struggle there are millions more. That is why Yasmeen gives us a story of unforgiving tragedy, full of injustices and with excruciating gut-reeking feeling-- no happy ending. I have enjoyed reading it and I recommend others to read.
In conclusion, as the cliché goes the more things change the more they stay the same. Obviously clan dominance did not change much for the last 50 years but has just made a regional shift since the collapse of the union. The situation is much disastrous for all Somalis. Corruption, authoritarianism, endemic poverty, clan favoritism, and poor social services are very common. This should give rise to our moral consciousness on the destruction-generating process of war and its cost---a nation. Focus not on the self-serving meaningless short gain of clan dominance. In deed, the cost of war should overrule our ego for power and should put our guest for clan dominance in service towards its own end; that is if we want to turn things around.
“Conflicts of interests dominate the short run, but conflicts of vision dominate history”.
Thomas Sowell.
Contrast what we lost to today’s Somalia that has disintegrated into much deeper abyss of clan interest and clannish associations, which ultimately gave birth to a demoralized and stateless society that has no recognized and respected nation. In today’s Somalia, warfare is increasingly tied to achievements of materialistic goals; acquisition of land and properties, in and itself, became a primary rationalization for war. It became separated from the rituals that had previously governed the primitive warrior, and the rituals themselves have either been replaced by extreme radicalism or completely atrophied; thus a circle of continuous wars and destruction. Today’s wars became an increasingly a destructive implement without cause in the hands of materialistic men; nothing to do with nationalism. These were the wars that the 1980s movements of SSDF, SNM, USC and others implemented and they are still burning; a far cry from the nationalistic freedom movements of SYL, SNL,NUF, USP, SNC, just to mention a few, that were implemented by Somali nationalists before the independence.
There are two major obvious dangers threatening today’s “clan-enclaves’ existing in what once was known as Somali democratic republic. They cannot preserve their borders from the Ethiopian and Al-qaeda attack; and they cannot provide the people within their respective control with adequate welfare and comfort. Thus is the fallacy in their claims of being independent states. The same politically savvy actors who have worked for the previous governments still remained in the upper political apparatus in these clan enclaves. Nothing has been done to alleviate the despair and to improve the lives of the people over all. This underscores the fact that change really has a lot to do with vision than it is to do with number of seats in the government that clan X or clan Y has. There is no study shown an association between the number of seats a clan has in the government and the progress the region of that clan attained. Furthermore, no study shown that a particular clan will be better suited to run the country without exercising nepotism and corruption. Let us think outside the box and get serious. Let us not just take a simplistic view of the complexity of clan politics. Nothing is wrong with belonging to a clan because you will be, regardless. However, I rather have a few of my state representatives, regardless of their clan, working hard to help his/her state to achieve prosperity than having 20 representatives lobbying in the name of clan just to fatten their wallets, and doing nothing for their people or clans.
What they should be doing is empowering the local and state governments (regional governments), decentralizing the power that has been concentrated only in the big cities. States and local governments should be able to run their governance without too much depending on federal government. States are responsible for the welfare of their citizens and are better suited to know their needs and their resources. The progress a state attains is a function of its resources if managed responsibly. They should provide their citizens education, health, hospitals, clean water, transportation, security and so on. There is no need for the central government dictating to the states on how to run their state affairs. The federal (central) government should be exclusively responsible for national defense, foreign policy, postal services, building roads that connect states and other cost-sharing projects with the states. State constitutions take precedence over the state law, but they are sub-ordinate to the constitution and the laws of the nation.
No one ever said that building a nation is easy. Many nations went through similar turmoil but sought a way out nonetheless. The United States of America, for example, after defeating Great Britain and winning the war, faced a hard fact that winning a war had been easier than governing their new country. Their crusade against Britain united poor and rich, abolitionists and slave owners, clergy and godless. Yet the Articles of confederation, their first experiment at unity, had not helped them through easily to peace treaty. With their common enemy gone, the states were proving to be fatally suspicious and envious of one another, just like what happened to the Somalis today. However, unlike the Somalis, the states had a focus and a reason that helped them through these testing times. In order to take their place among the world’s great powers, Americans needed to turn their infant republic into a mature nation. That was the driving force, the common interest that, above all other differences that they had, bond them together in pursue of an enduring union.
Should we, then, continue blaming Mohamed Siyaad Barre and the SYL founders on our today’s non-compromising, hard to satisfy destructive clan politics or should accept our responsibilities, take our losses and collect ourselves from the ashes? How ironic to think that Mohamed Siyaad Barre, with all his merciless dictatorial ways and bloody iron fist, was the last one to have spoken about Somali unity and defended its sovereignty and borders from Ethiopian aggression! But it is true. Talk to any Ethiopian you may know and you will find out that the mention of Mohamed Siyaad Barre scared the hell out of his contemporary Ethiopian dictators. Not in today’s Somalia. They all spy for Ethiopia.
Thomas Sowell.
Contrast what we lost to today’s Somalia that has disintegrated into much deeper abyss of clan interest and clannish associations, which ultimately gave birth to a demoralized and stateless society that has no recognized and respected nation. In today’s Somalia, warfare is increasingly tied to achievements of materialistic goals; acquisition of land and properties, in and itself, became a primary rationalization for war. It became separated from the rituals that had previously governed the primitive warrior, and the rituals themselves have either been replaced by extreme radicalism or completely atrophied; thus a circle of continuous wars and destruction. Today’s wars became an increasingly a destructive implement without cause in the hands of materialistic men; nothing to do with nationalism. These were the wars that the 1980s movements of SSDF, SNM, USC and others implemented and they are still burning; a far cry from the nationalistic freedom movements of SYL, SNL,NUF, USP, SNC, just to mention a few, that were implemented by Somali nationalists before the independence.
There are two major obvious dangers threatening today’s “clan-enclaves’ existing in what once was known as Somali democratic republic. They cannot preserve their borders from the Ethiopian and Al-qaeda attack; and they cannot provide the people within their respective control with adequate welfare and comfort. Thus is the fallacy in their claims of being independent states. The same politically savvy actors who have worked for the previous governments still remained in the upper political apparatus in these clan enclaves. Nothing has been done to alleviate the despair and to improve the lives of the people over all. This underscores the fact that change really has a lot to do with vision than it is to do with number of seats in the government that clan X or clan Y has. There is no study shown an association between the number of seats a clan has in the government and the progress the region of that clan attained. Furthermore, no study shown that a particular clan will be better suited to run the country without exercising nepotism and corruption. Let us think outside the box and get serious. Let us not just take a simplistic view of the complexity of clan politics. Nothing is wrong with belonging to a clan because you will be, regardless. However, I rather have a few of my state representatives, regardless of their clan, working hard to help his/her state to achieve prosperity than having 20 representatives lobbying in the name of clan just to fatten their wallets, and doing nothing for their people or clans.
What they should be doing is empowering the local and state governments (regional governments), decentralizing the power that has been concentrated only in the big cities. States and local governments should be able to run their governance without too much depending on federal government. States are responsible for the welfare of their citizens and are better suited to know their needs and their resources. The progress a state attains is a function of its resources if managed responsibly. They should provide their citizens education, health, hospitals, clean water, transportation, security and so on. There is no need for the central government dictating to the states on how to run their state affairs. The federal (central) government should be exclusively responsible for national defense, foreign policy, postal services, building roads that connect states and other cost-sharing projects with the states. State constitutions take precedence over the state law, but they are sub-ordinate to the constitution and the laws of the nation.
No one ever said that building a nation is easy. Many nations went through similar turmoil but sought a way out nonetheless. The United States of America, for example, after defeating Great Britain and winning the war, faced a hard fact that winning a war had been easier than governing their new country. Their crusade against Britain united poor and rich, abolitionists and slave owners, clergy and godless. Yet the Articles of confederation, their first experiment at unity, had not helped them through easily to peace treaty. With their common enemy gone, the states were proving to be fatally suspicious and envious of one another, just like what happened to the Somalis today. However, unlike the Somalis, the states had a focus and a reason that helped them through these testing times. In order to take their place among the world’s great powers, Americans needed to turn their infant republic into a mature nation. That was the driving force, the common interest that, above all other differences that they had, bond them together in pursue of an enduring union.
Should we, then, continue blaming Mohamed Siyaad Barre and the SYL founders on our today’s non-compromising, hard to satisfy destructive clan politics or should accept our responsibilities, take our losses and collect ourselves from the ashes? How ironic to think that Mohamed Siyaad Barre, with all his merciless dictatorial ways and bloody iron fist, was the last one to have spoken about Somali unity and defended its sovereignty and borders from Ethiopian aggression! But it is true. Talk to any Ethiopian you may know and you will find out that the mention of Mohamed Siyaad Barre scared the hell out of his contemporary Ethiopian dictators. Not in today’s Somalia. They all spy for Ethiopia.
Lastly, Dr. Bulhan has done a wonderful work in his use of Somali poems in some instance to help his readers understand better the gist of his argument. I have definitely enjoyed and I thank him for taking us back to revisit such refreshingly rich and moving poems of our yesterday’s nationalists. What I found difficult to reason with, nonetheless, is how on earth the author mistakenly misrepresented the composer of our infamous nationalistic song, the mother of all Somali songs, “Soomaaliyee Toosoo”, a song that almost every Somali is proud to sing and cherish. I was told sometime way back in my childhood and school days, and I even very recently reaffirmed that the composer of this song was Honorable Ali Mirre, man who is still alive and well. I wish the author has checked this mistake.
No ill intended towards the author, Dr. Bulhan, or towards any member or clan that I have mentioned in the article for the sake of clarity. It is just my personal observation and I apologize for any unintended offense that one may feel about my comment.
Ali Bahar By Dr. Ali Bahar January 16, 2010
E-Mail:abahar57@gmail.com
References:
1. Bulhan, H.A. (2008) Politics of Cain: One Hundred Years of Crisis in Somali Politics and Society. Bethesda, Maryland : Tayosan International Publishing.2. Yasmeen Maxamuud (2009): Nomad Diaries. NomadHouse Publishing. Encinitas, CA
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