Mr. President, we should be appalled at this situation, but we should also be concerned because of the direct ramifications for our national security. Al Shebaab’s leadership has links to al Qaeda, and it has indicated, through public statements, that it intends to provide support to al Qaeda affiliates in Yemen. Even more disconcerting, it has recruited a number of Americans to travel to the region and fight with it. In October 2008, a Somali-American blew himself up in Somalia as part of a coordinated attack by al Shebaab, reportedly becoming the first-known suicide bomber with U.S. citizenship. The Justice Department has since brought terrorist charges against over a dozen people for recruiting and raising funds for Americans to fight with al Shebaab. Last September, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center Michael Leiter testified that “the potential for al-Qaeda operatives in Somalia to commission Americans to return to the United States and launch attacks against the Homeland remains of significant concern.” Earlier this year, The New York Times reported that an American from Alabama, Omar Hammami, has become a key figure in al Shebaab. Just this past weekend, two other Americans, neither with family ties in Somalia, were arrested in New Jersey for allegedly planning to fight in Somalia with al Shebaab. This is very troublesome news and brings home the implications of Somalia’s ongoing crisis.
The Obama administration has been right to refocus attention on Somalia – and to consider regional dynamics at the same time. I am also pleased that the administration has been clear in its support for the Djibouti peace process. I am, however, concerned that this process – as currently constituted – is not sufficient to unite Somalis and mitigate the ongoing crisis. As the situation there turns more dreadful, I worry that the process is becoming increasingly detached from events on the ground. Furthermore, we must acknowledge that while the administration continues to provide assistance – both materiel and diplomatic – to the TFG, we still do not have an overarching strategy for Somalia that ties our programs and policies together. As a result, we appear to be grasping at straws to “do something” while our national security increasingly hangs in the balance.
Under the previous administration, our approach toward Somalia lacked coherence and was short-sighted. This discord gave rise to conflicting agendas that undermined each other and our credibility. Without clear policy guidance, the current administration’s efforts– however well intentioned – may fall into the same trap. There is great risk that by focusing too narrowly on tactical decisions we will continue to operate without a larger strategy.
Now, Mr. President, I understand in the early months of the administration there was an interagency effort to review our policy toward Somalia and the Horn of Africa. However, it is also my understanding that no overarching policy was established. Now is the time to renew such an effort and as part of this initiative, we need some way to measure whether we are making progress. The administration has rightly pressed the TFG to broaden its appeal and strength, but we have seen no major improvement on that front. With the exception of its agreement with Ahlu Sunna wal Jama, the TFG has done little to expand its reach and undercut its opposition. The TFG has not become more inclusive and it has not projected an attractive political vision to counter that of armed opposition groups. As a result, it is not becoming more legitimate in the eyes of Somalis.
Going forward, we need clear guidance on what we expect to achieve with our support for the TFG, the Djibouti Process, and our efforts to weaken al Shebaab and provide humanitarian assistance. Without such a coordinated and measurable approach, we run the risk of continuing to fund the same initiatives with little progress made. Such an assessment is important not only so that American taxpayers know their money is being well spent, but also so we know our safety and security are being enhanced.
There are some thoughtful observers who believe that the best option for the United States might be to just disengage altogether and let this crisis play out. The stakes, Mr. President, are too high to do that. However, these observers are right that a continuation of the status quo will only further entrench the crisis. The current efforts by the United States and the international community are insufficient to change the fundamental dynamics of the situation. We need to go back to the drawing board and develop a strategy with measurable goals and a clear plan of how we will reach them.
We also need to consider whether appointing a Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, to help create and drive policy, is once again appropriate. For years I have called for the creation of such a position – at a very senior level – but to no avail. I do believe that now is the time for this position to be considered particularly because of the direct national security implications, but also because the crisis in Somalia requires a regional approach. We need a senior official to regularly connect the dots between a number of countries in the region including Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, and Yemen in order to develop an effective strategy. In addition, having a senior envoy focused on addressing this crisis can help show the people of Somalia that we’re finally serious about helping their efforts to achieve a future free of terror and conflict.
In thinking about how we fit counterterrorism concerns into a broader strategy, we must be practical. Mr. President, tactical operations against individuals and networks may be justified in some cases, especially if the targets have clear ties to al Qaeda and pose a direct threat to the United States. But we need to think hard about the strategic implications and potential risks of these operations because at the same time we need to reach out to, work with and support all Somalis who seek a more stable and secure country. The perception that the United States is only interested in tactical counter-terrorism operations in Somalia has generated suspicion among Somalis and fueled anti-Americanism. Not taking that into account when planning or authorizing any tactical operations is counter-productive.
Equally as important to our counterterrorism goals is the need to continue pressing for an inclusive and functional system of governance that can enforce the rule of law and provide security. In addition to supporting the TFG, we should look for creative ways to work with other governments and non-governmental actors to encourage political consensus and reconciliation among different groups in Somalia. We need to look at the grassroots and local level and see how they can be bolstered and expanded. Helping Somalis to come together around a shared political vision and to translate that vision into a political system that makes a tangible difference in people’s lives is the surest way to address our national security concerns over the long term.
Achieving stability and restoring the rule of law in Somalia will not be easy or quick—nearly two decades of dysfunction have made sure of that – but we must have a strategy in place if we are to proceed. We cannot respond in an uncoordinated and ad hoc manner to the conditions that breed and empower terrorist organizations and we cannot address them on the cheap. Our national security, the fa
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