The Republic of Somalia, more commonly referred to as 'Somalia', is at the present time arguably the world’s number one failed state. A lack of effective government, almost complete breakdown in the rule of law, and volatile security situation has placed Somalia firmly in the ranks of countries in TravelSafe's 'extreme risk' category. In short, this translates into a recommendation that where possible travel to the country should be avoided. Among the risks taken into account in deriving this rating are threats of terrorism, banditry and kidnap for ransom.
Given these conditions, it is not surprising that ordinary Somalis are confronted with high levels of poverty, lack of basic state services, and multiple health hazards. Conditions in many parts of the country have taken on the proportions of a humanitarian crisis as the thinly deployed African Union peacekeeping force struggles to cope with the demands placed on it. Under the Obama administration the US has promised support for the transitional government of Somalia, whose mandate officially expires in 2011, but in reality the US and its Nato allies are unlikely to commit significant resources to Somalia while their attention remains focused on Afghanistan and Iraq.
From another perspective, however, the adage that one man's meat is another man's poison holds true in Somalia. For Al Qaeda and other militant groups, the prolonged political and humanitarian crisis in the country makes for ideal conditions. This has proven to be the case for the maritime pirates operating in the Indian Ocean waters off Somalia, for whom the sheer lawlessness of the country provides a safe haven from which to launch operations and hold hostages. Foreign warships may engage groups of pirates on the open seas; but under current conditions governments are far less likely to approve land operations to rescue hostages or dislodge the pirates. Similarly, Al Qaeda seems intent on exploiting conditions in Somalia to establish a foothold in a strategically advantageous region.
Al Qaeda's primary ally in Somalia is al-Shabaab, which currently controls Somalia's southern regions. Al-Shabaab itself is far from a unified organisation, representing more a coalition of clan leaders with a mixture of political, economic and ideological interests. Despite these potential fault lines within the movement, Al-Shabaab poses a formidable military threat to forces under the control of the Somali interim government. An intensive program aimed at bringing vital social and health services to areas under its control has also ensured that Al-Shabaab enjoys high levels of popular support – which in turn could provide al Qaeda with a useful pool of potential recruits.
 The exact links between Al-Shabaab and Al Qaeda remain somewhat diffuse, although Western intelligence agencies have been monitoring their growing relationship for some time. Although al-Shabaab does not appear to have much appetite for the global jihad advocated by Al Qaeda, the group has emphasised that the movements are ideologically symmetrical and that “the Horn of Africa jihad” is ultimately connected to the broader jihadist agenda put forward by Osama Bin Laden and his followers. This approach appeared to take shape in a January 2010 threat issued on Al-Shabaab's website to launch attacks against Kenya after the Kenyan government agreed to provide military training to Somali government forces. A spokesman for Al-Shabaab later denied that the movement had posted the threat at all, suggesting possibly that there was a difference of opinion within the organisation as to the wisdom of providing Kenya with a possible justification to pour troops into southern Somalia. Either way, there has been a significant build-up of Kenyan armed forces along the border with southern Somalia, as well as reports of Kenyan military aircraft flying over Al-Shabaab held towns. Apart from the fact that prolonged instability in its neighbour is unwelcome to Kenya's own security interests, there are commercial reasons too for Kenya's growing intervention in Somalia. Foremost among these is the fact that Kenyan businesses are having to foot the bill for additional security and insurance charges for shipping companies using the Horn of Africa route to transport consignments to and from Kenya.
Added to these concerns is the fact that Kenya has a sizeable Somali community which, according to well-placed Kenyan security sources, are showing increasing signs of support for the religious nationalism promoted by Al-Shabaab. This was demonstrated earlier this year, when Kenya's attempts to expel a radical Islamic cleric led to violent demonstrations in Eastleigh, a Nairobi suburb with a strong Somali population. As one high-level security source stated, “there appears to be more and more Al-Shabaab slogans and flags appearing in parts of Nairobi, so the threat of possible terrorist attacks by the leadership of Al-Shabaab is being taken very seriously”. Memories of the 1998 bombing of the US Embassy in Nairobi remain all too fresh in the Kenyan psyche.
All of this places the Kenyan authorities in something of a catch-22 position, according to one senior government official who does not wish to be named. On one hand, it may be tempting for the Kenyans to follow the route of Ethiopia, which launched a large-scale invasion of southern Somalia in 2006 to support the interim government against Islamic rebels, ostensibly to secure its own borders. On the other hand, the outcomes of the Ethiopian intervention remain hotly disputed and provide a sobering reality test for the Kenyan authorities. Like the Ethiopians, Kenya would certainly require the backing of the US and the African Union. Assuming that this is forthcoming, the country would still face the potential threat that direct and sustained action in Somalia could incite a wave of insurgent actions inside Kenya. Finally, there is at this stage little reason to assume that a Kenyan military move into Somalia would be any more successful than the Ethiopian intervention, which in the view of some observers actually ended up strengthening the position of Al-Shabaab.
Events in the coming weeks and months should determine the direction that Kenya takes. But either way, it is evident that Somalia will remain a long-term source of regional instability and, increasingly, a part of Al Qaeda's apparent strategy to decentralise its operations to counter Western military pressure in Afghanistan and northern Pakistan.
For companies operating in East Africa, these issues and potential developments have far more than academic significance. Apart from the escalating threat of terrorism, the risks of political violence, kidnap for political and financial motives, and a host of other operational risks are closely connected to what transpires in southern Somalia and Kenya's response to it. For now, the risk barometer is clearly on the rise
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