Tuesday, July 5, 2011

Somalia: The Case for Reforming UNPOS


by Liban Ahmad  terror free somalia

Reality check on ambassador Mahiga and his Friends’ update


Somalia Research Report


The United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) was formed in 1995 shortly after the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM ) had come to an end to an end1. Since then the UNPOS has played a significant role reconciliation efforts for Somalia. The UNPOS has made contribution to peace-making efforts in Somalia. Promoting Djibouti Peace Process that led to an agreement between the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and the former Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia (ARS) is one such example. Internally the agreement resulted in the pull-out of Ethiopian troops that backed the TFG, split the “resistance groups” into two—group supporting the agreement and another, Harakat Al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (HSM), opposing the agreement—the expansion of the Parliament to include members from the ARS, and election of Sharif Ahmed, former Chairman of ARS , as president of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia. Externally it has had positive impact on Somalia’s Diaspora groups who were divided on Ethiopia’s intervention but now agree on the need to need to prevent Somalia from turning into a haven for outlaws and terrorists. Before the year of 2010 when the former UN Special Representative for Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah,sided with the Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government president, Sheikh Sharif Ahmed who sacked his former prime minster, Omar Abdirashid A. Sharmarke Abdirashid but had reinstated after the former prime minister used the transitional charter to challenge the president’s decision, impartiality of the UNPOS had not been questioned. It is the main argument of this paper that reforming the UNPOS is an urgent task to address partiality, political misjudgement and misuse of the power of labelling with which the UNPOS has become associated. This does mean UNPOS is wholly or partly responsible for Somalia’s prolonged instability and absence of an effective central government. The UNPOS is one of major players collectively knows as the international community, and consults its partners such as troop-contributing countries ( Uganda and Burundi, part of African Union Mission in Somalia ) and Somalia neighbouring countries ( Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti) , the African Union and the Arab League. Rather promoting discussion on the direction of the reconciliation the UNPOS uses a policy that privileges a group of Somalia’s stake-holders over another. The evidence for UNPOS partiality comes in different forms: by supporting agreements that undermine the transitional federal charter and by taking sides in political disputes and by misreporting on events in Somalia.
Privileging some stake-holders over others
Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and Ahlu Sunna Waljama’a (ASWJ) signed in 2010 is another agreement the UNPOS regards as one of key building blocks of Djibouti Peace Process2. It is different from the TFG-ARS agreement in the sense that both TFG and AWSJ share common military goal to defeat Al Shabaab. Power-sharing aspect of the agreement was confined to ministerial, military and ambassadorial posts. The reasoning behind such a power-sharing agreement was that allocating Members of Parliament for ASWJ would upset the 4.5 power-sharing principle on which the expanded transitional parliament of Somalia is based.
Recognising the role of a well-organised group that took up arms against Al Shabaab in south central and south western Somalia regions and helping its forces integrate with the ‘ national army’ through agreement if was viewed as the right reconciliation- enhancing strategy but no effort was made to ensure that the agreement does not violate the charter. The language of the agreement alludes to the Transitional Federal Charter and commitment to making “ [Transitional Federal Institutions] TFIs effective both at the regional and national levels” but the outcome undermines the 4.5 power-sharing principle to which the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon in a 20073 report referred and to which the signatories of Kampala Accord4 are committed. Let us assume that all Somali stakeholders view the 4.5 power-sharing principles as an ideal power-sharing mechanism on which distribution of seats of transitional parliament and cabinet posts are based, is not the TFG-ASWJ agreement a violation of the 4.5 principle? Unlike former Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia (president Sharif Ahmed’ s wing) that agreed to distribute members of the expanded parliament on the basis of 4.5 principle, ASWJ did not specify how their members would distribute ministerial, military and ambassadorial posts under the agreement it signed with the TFG5. If a clause entitling Members of Parliament for ASWJ were included in the agreement the violation of the charter would have more glaring than it is now when one looks at the power-sharing arraignment the ASWJ- TFG agreement stipulates. Since former UNPOS chief, Ould-Abdallah signed the agreement as a witness, any stakeholder that challenged the legality of the agreement would have faced accusations for being a spoiler6.
“The disappointing experience of ASWJ in drawing modest financial and political support from the central government and the international donor community for the past two years, despite their remarkable success in defending their communities from the extremists, doesn’t inspire confidence and encourage others to follow7” argued Ahmed Abdisalam, former Deputy prime minister of Somalia who, criticised Somalia president Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, “for open violation of the power sharing arrangement between the TFG and ARS under Djibouti Peace Agreement, with the tacit consent of the international community.” Why should the TFG give ASWJ preferential political treatment over Puntland and Somaliland? Why should the two administrations take the work of UNPOS seriously if it is partial in its dealings with Somalia’s political actors by putting its imprimatur on agreements that upset power-sharing arrangements?
Biased UN reporting on Somalia
Bias in the work of the UNPOS manifests itself in the reports on Somalia by the United Nations. In his report of the on Somalia published on 28 April 2011,the United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon notes:
Both “Puntland” and “Somaliland” continued to consolidate the delivery of services to their respective populations. Tension between the two regions developed as a result of fighting between the “Somaliland” forces and militias belonging to Sool-Sanaag-Cayn, which were reportedly backed by neighbouring “Puntland8”.
The ‘militias’ to which the Secretary-General is referring come under Sool, Sanaag and Cayn Leadership Council , a splinter group that opposes Puntland’s claim over Sool, Sanaag and Cayn as a territory inhabited by pro-union clansmen, and Somaliland’s claim that Ex-British Somaliland territories are part of “ Somaliland Republic” regardless of people being pro-union or pro-secession. Last year Puntland administration dismissed three members of Puntland Parliament for supporting SSC Leadership Council9, criticised TFG for supporting SSC militias that Puntland regards as pro-Al Shabaab10 . The United Nations’ bias is in the use of the wordreportedly rather than allegedly. How does such bias affect the work of the UNPOS? According to the UN Secretary-General, “ … my Special Representative, the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator, and the Director of UNSOA finalized the framework through a consultative process with the wider United Nations system. They developed a common analysis of the situation in Somalia and established a shared vision of the five main strategic objectives and priority results for peace consolidation over the next 12 month11.” One of the strategic objectives is to support “governance structures to function more effectively to incentivize peace and social justice.” If this strategic objective is aimed at supporting administrations whose effort contribute to peace, Puntland will not get incentives (“carrots”) because it is identified as a spoiler.. The United Nations’Department of Political Affairs prides itself upon as having “ special legitimacy, impartiality and” being “… the universal organization that has no dog in these fights. It can also pull in the UN’s development, human rights and humanitarian machinery behind a peace agreement and lead in the follow-on peacebuilding effort12.”
Conclusion
The work of the UNPOS is still needed in Somalia, a country whose nascent political institutions can be put at risk by reckless politicians and warlords. Good intentions about ending the prolonged instability in Somalia ought not to be the benchmark used to assess the work of UNPOS. As events of the last two years have shown, the UNPOS can unwittingly take sides in political disputes or promote agreements that undermine power-sharing mechanisms or misreport on events in Somalia. By reviewing the work of UNPOS and publishing the UNPOS code of conduct for working with Somalia’s political stakeholders and running the Trust Funds in Support of the Somali Transitional Security Institutions, the United Nations will address key questions about UNPOS partiality and the unbridled powers the United Nations Political Office for Somalia whose one-time peace-maker role has transmuted into a spoiler.
Liban Ahmad
libahm@gmail.com



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1  “The mandate of UNPOS as per Security Council Resolution 1863 (2009):
  • Stresses the need to create conditions for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to continue to make progress on the political process;
  • Decides that UNPOS and the UNCT shall continue to promote a lasting peace and stability in Somalia through the implementation of the Djibouti Peace Agreement and to facilitate coordination of international support to the efforts;
  • Requests UNPOS, inter-alia, to assist, in conjunction with regional and international donors partners and other interested parties, in supporting the effective re-establishment, training and retention of inclusive Somali security forces, including military, police and judiciary, to hold donor conference to solicit contributions to establish a trust fund in support to these activities;
  • Requests his Special representative to coordinate all activities of the United Nations System in Somalia, to provide good offices and political support for the efforts to establish lasting peace and stability in Somalia and to mobilise resources and support from the international community for both immediate recovery and long-term economic development;
  • The Council also requestes the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative, to coordinate the activities of the UN in Somalia; and welcomes his proposals for enhancement of the UN Political Office in Somalia (UNPOS):http://unpos.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1912
2  Agreement between Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and Ahlu Sunna Waljama’a:http://unpos.unmissions.org/Portals/UNPOS/Repository%20UNPOS/100315%20-%20Agreement%20bet%20TFG%20&%20ASWJ.pdf
3  Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia 25 June 2007:
http://unpos.unmissions.org/Portals/UNPOS/Repository%20UNPOS/S-2007-381%20(June).pdf
5   Warsan Cismaan Saalax and Abdulaziz Ali Ibrahim ‘Xildhiban’ criticise the 4.5 principle:
“ Both Arta and the federal charter employed the ‘4.5’ power-sharing formula dividing Somali clans into four major ones and condensing all others into the remaining ‘0.5’. The formula masked the lack of support from the administrations in Somaliland and Puntland. Individuals from the predominant clans of these regions took part in the peace talks but were limited by their inability to represent their own regions on the basis of the 4.5 formula.” : Somali peace agreements: fuelling factionalism: http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/somalia/fuelling-factionalism.php
6  According to UN Peacemaker website “Different types of spoilers pose different problems for peace process. Limited Spoilers are those who have limited goals, such as security or a share of power, and can conceivably be included in peace process, if such demands can be accommodated. [Example: Renamo in the Mozambique case]. Greedy Spoilers are defined as those whose goals expand or contract based on their estimates of the costs and risk. If their goals are met and high costs constrain them from making added demands, they can also be included in peace process. [Example: UNITA in the Angola case] Different types of spoilers pose different problems for peace process. Limited Spoilers are those who have limited goals, such as security or a share of power, and can conceivably be included in peace process, if such demands can be accommodated. [Example: Renamo in the Mozambique case]. Greedy Spoilers are defined as those whose goals expand or contract based on their estimates of the costs and risk. If their goals are met and high costs constrain them from making added demands, they can also be included in peace process. [Example: UNITA in the Angola case] Total Spoilers are those who see the world in all-or-nothing terms and are irreconcilably opposed to any compromise for peace. [Example: Khmer Rouge in the Cambodia case]” : http://peacemaker.unlb.org/index1.php
7  Fixing the Transitional Process for Somalia (2000-2011) g the Transitional Process for Somalia (2000-2011):http://www.hiiraan.com/op2/2011/jun/fixing_the_transitional_process_for_somalia_2000_2011.aspx
12  Rediscovering Preventive Diplomacy: A View From The United Nations:http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/peacemaking_prevention


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