Key Drivers of Kenya’s 2011 Military Intervention in Somalia

Kenya’s insatiable greed for Somalia’s waters begun following when Woodside petroleum company ended its offshore oil and gas explorations in western coast of Kenya in 2007, citing it was unable to find hydrocarbons in its Pompoo well. 

Woodside petroleum disclosed in its press release issued on that day that according to satellite images it conducted on Somalia’s waters close to the border of Kenya and subsequent seismic tests found considerable traces of potential oil and gas deposits in the triangle area. With its deep knowledge of maritime laws, however, Woodside refused to take such risk of drilling oil and gas without the consent of Somali authorities.

Given this setback, in 2008 Kenya colluded with other multinational companies (MNCs) willing to steal Somalia’s resources with reduced costs, in the assumption that they can take unfair advantage of Somalia’s current circumstance and coerce its leaders to enter into dodgy bilateral agreement with Kenya, chipping away 100,000 square kilometres of Somalia’s maritime waters believed rich in oil and gas into Kenya.

To realise this strategic and economic objective and to build the confidence of MNCs investing in this area, Kenya launched the 2011 Operation Linda Chi and invaded Somalia on the premise of anticipatory self-defence, which is one of the reasons that the UN allows states to use force as set out under article 51 of the UN Charter: ‘Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member…’

Not only did the attacks and the kidnapping incidents that Kenya cited as grounds for her invasion in Somalia were nowhere near the threshold that could trigger such military action, but also did the perpetrators behind those incidents themselves were Kenyans reacting to ATPU’s heavy handed tactics and extrajudicial killings meted out to coastal communities.

It is widely held that the low intensity insurgency hitherto brewing in Kenya’s coastal areas arose from the fact tacit government policies aimed to de-populate coastal communities & to transplant them to ethnic Kikuyus & Luo so that the demographic makeup in that area is permanently altered.

Rather than addressing those local grievances, Kenya has opted to externalise her domestic issues and policy failures with a view of adding another layer of external conflict driven by economic imperatives.

Kenya’s stated strategic objectives of its military intervention in Somalia was to drive Al Shabab out of the border area; establish a buffer zone; install an administration that is complaint to Nairobi; and use it as a bargaining chip to coerce Mogadishu government to accept Kenya’s terms.

Despite this, UK and France scrambled to the United Nation and African Union HQ to include Kenya in AMISOM troop contributing countries to save face and provide her with legal cover and international funding to realise her strategic and economic objectives by which both countries are allegedly direct beneficiaries

Throughout this period, Kenya has been at loggerheads with three successive Somali Federal governments. The latest of which is current FGS, which has come under a lot of pressure from Kenya to withdraw the case from ICJ, however, refused to budge & upheld Somalia’s sovereignty & territorial integrity.

latest Sharmaake Follow on Twitter 1PolicyWonk ‘ @DailyJubba. Team Nabad iyo Nolol @SomalianFacts 

Villa Somalia weathered Rooble’s slow-motion coup hatched in Nairobi

 

The resurgence of Ahlu Sunna Wal Jameeca (ASWJ) that threw Galmudug (GM) State of Somalia into uncharted territory was not randomly isolated incident. It was a well thought out plot hatched in Nairobi by Prime Minister Rooble, Kenya and among other powerful actors whose primary purpose was to blast President Farmaajo out of the office by any means necessary well before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) hands down its verdict on the Somalia and Kenya maritime boundary delimitation.

The chain of events that followed after Rooble’s visit in Kenya included but not limited to; the dismissal of key govt officials who are believed to be close to President Farmaajo from critical infrastructures; the seizure of SNTV and Radio Mogadishu; the sustained attack against NISA (National Intelligence and Security Agency), which was disguised as seeking justice for the missing NISA agent Ikraan and now the events playing out in Galmudug are all interconnected.

NISA takeover was key to PM Rooble’s success or otherwise. Had Rooble’s assault on NISA be successful, we would have witnessed by now a different outcome. Rooble’s strategic objective of NISA was to use it as a staging ground to topple President Farmaajo’s political allies in GM and SWS. The latter, his intention was to release Muqtar Roobow from custody to stage insurrection and challenge Laftagareen’s authority in SWS.

While the original plot hatched in Nairobi faltered, according to credible sources following this situation very closely had confided in me, that had it been successfully executed, it could have seen massive violence to erupt in Mogadishu, Baidoa and Dhusamareb simultaneously. This would have overwhelmed Villa Somalia and as a consequence that would throw Somalia once again into the abyss.  

Unbeknown to Rooble and Co, Villa Somalia had an advance knowledge of his plot but acted in such a way that it was innocently unaware and resisted from taking rush impulsive decisions, that could have shifted the blame away from Rooble and exonerated him from any wrongdoing.  Rather, the Villa has put contingencies in place and measures to contain the situation that was set-in motion against it, with specific focus of meticulously putting off spot fires before becoming blazes and wherever possible diffusing each event at its source. In so doing and with the incredible patience demonstrated, this has finally paid off huge dividends for Villa Somalia. The final blow to Rooble’s slow motion coup was when President Farmaajo issued the decree that suspended his executive powers.

Through this approach, has the Villa succeeded to bring the public support on its side and gained complete control over the situation by bringing Rooble’s wrecking ball to a halt.

Where did it all begin? To understand this, it is imperative to step back and examine objectively at every political move Rooble has made since he returned from President Guelleh’s inauguration ceremony in Djibouti. The PM met President Uhuru on the sidelines and received an official invitation to meet him in Kenya a week later. This invitation has come at a time were diplomatic relations between the two countries was at its lowest point and had their ambassadors recalled for consultation and embassies closed shut.

Despite this, PM Rooble attempted to travel to Nairobi to meet with Kenyatta. However, Villa Somalia had blocked this planned visit to Nairobi by bringing it to the PM’s attention that under the current circumstance this was impossible and encouraged him to wait until diplomatic relations between the two nations were restored.

President Kenyatta – sensing that there was an opportunity to exploit – has dispatched his foreign minister to Mogadishu to expedite Rooble’s visit to Nairobi by restoring diplomatic relations. PM Rooble’s visit in Kenya was followed by a series of other diplomatic trips to countries whose relations with Somalia had been frozen over the last 4-years. His colourful Cairo trip and his dispatch of senior government officials to Abu Dhabi is just one case in point.

Returning now to events unfolding in Galmudug, it appears that PM Rooble has suffered further loses in his power base, which could bring his political ambition to an abrupt end. It was unthinkable just few weeks ago that Mahad Salad, Abdirahman Abdishakur, Abshir Bukhari and other staunch critics, would come to the President’s aid and be vocal supporters for any of his domestic policies. 

At least for now, they are all on the same page in an effort to stamp out ASWJ and restore law and order in Galmudug, the last spot fire left for Villa Somalia to deal with. After the smoke settles, Villa Somalia must acknowledge that there won’t be enough time for recriminations but to leave Rooble’s executive powers remain suspended and to use the looming elections as a means to exact revenge, by ending political careers.  

By Sharmaake Twitter  @1PolicyWonk —Nabad iyo Nolol Blog . Team Somali Patriot. member.— fallow me on Twitter @SomalianFacts 

Struggling government sparks concern in The West

Struggling Somali new government sparks concern in the west

   

Somali president Mohamed Farmajo and his prime minister, Hassan Ali Khaire,seem confronted by a whole range of complicated political and security dilemmas that they didn't initially expect to face. Formed in February, the government still needs to hammer out a clear-headed strategy to fight the Islamist fundamentalist movement AlShabaab as well as to build the foundations of a nation with limited resources and a central government that's still in the quest for legitimacy (ION 1450) And those challenges give rise to concern in the international community. 

The West fears

Mogadishu won't be able to handle all the issues in one go. In a meeting in early July with officials from Britain, Norway and the European Union in Hargeisa, Khaire admitted he found it highly complicated to fight against corruption and improve the country's tax receipts. He pointed the  finger at certain local businessmen who included 

Ahmed Mohamed Yusuf, boss of the Hormuud telecommunications 

Mohamed Yusuf Ahmed Alore, chief of  Salaam African Bank, and 

Abdirashid Duale, manager of Dahabshiil. 

He felt they were applying a brake to moves to beef up the government's capacity because doing so would make the tax system more efficient. In his outburst, the prime minister claimed the businessmen paid more tax to Al Shabaab than to Somalia's federal government.

He saw that as  tacit backing for Al Shabaab which, in working to destabilize the government,prevented it from establishing the rule of law. That, in turn, allowed the tycoons to duck out of paying their due to the state

One Navy SEAL Killed, 2 injured in during clashes between Al-Shabaab fighters & US Forces in Lower Shabelle region

WASHINGTON — An American Navy SEAL was killed on Thursday during a raid against the Islamic militant group known as the Shabab in Somalia, Pentagon officials said.

Defense Department officials said the service member was in Somalia as part of an advise-and-assist mission alongside members of the Somali National Army. He was killed in an operation near Barii, around 40 miles west of Mogadishu, according to a statement from the United States Africa Command.

Separately, a Defense Department official, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive matters regarding Special Operations forces, said that the service member killed was a Navy SEAL.

“We continue to support our Somali and regional partners to systematically dismantle this Qaeda affiliate, and help them to achieve stability and security throughout the region as part of the global counterterrorism effort,” Africa Command said in the statement.

The death of a Navy SEAL in Somalia comes as the American military’s campaign against the Shabab in Somalia has been expanding over the last several years. That Islamist group is complex, with some factions focused on controlling Somalia, while others want to participate in external terrorist operations in line with Al Qaeda’s global war.

In 2013, the group carried out the attack at the Westgate mall, in Nairobi, Kenya, that killed more than 60 people and wounded more than 175. Since then, it has adopted more sophisticated forms of terrorism, including nearly bringing down a Somali airliner in February with a bomb hidden in a laptop computer.

To counter the Shabab, the United States has increasingly used Special Operations forces, airstrikes, private contractors and African allies. Hundreds of American troops now rotate through makeshift bases in Somalia, the largest military presence since the United States pulled out of the country after the “Black Hawk Down” battle in 1993. They have served as trainers and advisers to African Union and

Somali government forces, and have sometimes participated directly in combat. Military officials said they believed this was the first American combat death in Somalia since the “Black Hawk Down” battle.

About 200 to 300 American Special Operations forces have been working with soldiers from Somalia and other African nations like Kenya and Uganda to carry out more than a half-dozen raids every month, according to senior American military officials. The Navy’s classified SEAL Team 6 has been heavily involved in many of these operations.

The Pentagon has acknowledged only a fraction of these missions. But even the publicly available information shows a marked increase in recent years. The Pentagon announced 13 ground raids and airstrikes in 2016, up from five in 2015, according to data compiled by New America, a Washington think tank. Those strikes killed about 25 civilians and 200 people suspected of being militants, the group found.

Source: NYTimes

Can there be a country with a worthless currency? The country of counterfeit notes

Can there be a country with a worthless currency? The history of Somalia is marked by it. But behind this monetary disorganization is a region punished by a fierce famine and an infinite civil war.

To this day, Somalia is enduring the worst drought of the last two decades. So serious is the situation that they estimate a balance of mortality even greater than that of 6 years ago, where the famine killed approximately 260,000 people.

Cash bags with money and hunger

The African country could be an imaginary world in a dramatic novel, but it is the reality of a hostile world. "Somali pirates with machine guns," a friend tells me when I name the region. But it is also  the place of fake bills. 

In Mogadishu, its capital, the buildings are skeletons: they have the chariots dressed in concrete and with huge holes that reveal that there is nothing inside. The civil war devastated the place. Through these streets, however, there are men and women who walk with bags full of money.

The Central Bank has not issued a single ticket for 25 years. Mogadishu circulates false and worthless silver. The papers emanate scent and break easily, disintegrate between the fingers. There, one dollar is 22,000 Somali shillings. Citizens, overwhelmed by hunger and burned by drought, change innumerable amounts of worthless bills for some bread.

Perpetual agony

Until 1991, Somali best president strongman Siad Barré presided over the country. When it was overthrown, the Somali institutions ceased to function. The country became institutionally sterile. From the decade of the 90 until today, several regions declared themselves autonomous.

The clans, who fought the territory with fierce civil wars, also took power. The power of the state, as Marxist theory would call it, was nobody's. That state does not exist. To this day, they call it failed.

Somalia is also the place of "warlords" and groups of Western mercenaries. The platform for chaos is propitious. Within this reality also the ethnic differences coexist. The inhabitants of Mogadishu live the second of their life in a limbo. There is nothing inhumane in the Somali context, everything comes from the humanism of man.

The country of counterfeit notes is also that of malnutrition, death, war, poverty, pirates and drought. In Somalia the agony is perpetual because it can not stop its escalation of decay, but also because nobody wants. If the world has erred its way, this is one of its results

NEW Minister of Finance: Abdirahman Bayle was swearing in office today. 

Abdirahman y warsame (Rahm)

You can always follow me  @terrorfreesomal

The White House gives the military a broader mandate offensive in Somali

Pentagon Pres Sec  US Department of Defense (Pentagon) The White House, the US Army awarded a broader mandate to strike in Somalia against the militant youth movement linked to al-Qaeda

The officials White House announced on Wednesday evening parts of Somalia , " the work of anactive combat zone" for at least 180 days.   
These parts do not include the capital Mogadishu.

 President of Somalia H:E Mohamed Abdullahi (Farmajo) and Somalia chief o8f Defense Somali National Army General Mohamed Adan Ahmed. Welcome expanding ops in Somalia to counter alqaeda linked AlShabaab 

General Twitter account  @ChiefOfDefence statement said we welcome DOD nnounces White House approved additional precision fires in support of AMISOM & Somali security forces ops to defeat alShabaab. 

Somali President His Excellency Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo IGAD summit speech



Federal Republic of Somalia
Statement by the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia
On Special Summit of IGAD Heads of States and Governments on Protection and Durable Solutions of Somali Refugees
Nairobi, 25 March 2017

Excellences and distinguished delegates:

Presidents, Prime Ministers and Vice Presidents of the IGAD Member States;
I would like to take this opportunity to thank H.E. President Uhuru Kenyatta, President of the Republic of Kenya for hosting this special Summit on Durable Solutions for Somali Refugees.

I would also like to thank the head of the UN High Commission for Refugees, H.E. Filippo Grandi and Ambassador Alex Rondos of the European Union for co-organizing this important event.

Most importantly, I want to express my deepest gratitude to the people and governments of IGAD member states and Yemen, who collectively host more than one million Somali refugees in their countries. Your generosity to my people at the time of their greatest need is immensely appreciated. On behalf of my people, we are eternally grateful to you.

Distinguished Guests; Ladies and Gentleman:

I take this opportunity to commend you for the commitment you have demonstrated by attending this important summit, which renews attention to the plight of Somali refugees and IDPs, considered to be one of the most protracted problems in the world.

This summit is the culmination of a series of meetings and side events intended to bring to the attention of the world, the magnitude and complexity of the Somali refugees and IDPs. I refer here to a few of those meetings:
The High Level Global Initiative on Somali Refugees in Geneva in 2013, followed by the one in Addis Ababa in August 2014 which resulted in the Addis Ababa Commitment by the countries in the region hosting Somali refugees.

These commitments were also highlighted at the High Level Partnership Forum held in Mogadishu between 29-30 July 2015, the High Level side event on Somalia held at the margins of the General Assembly in New York on 28 September 2015, the General Assembly meeting and September’s Commitment to Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) and its side event on Somali refugees, and lastly, the IGAD meeting held in Mogadishu on the 13th September 2016 and its resolution to hold this Special Summit.

These commitments and those entered into within the Tripartite Agreement of November 2013, and its six months extension, all are based on two crucial principles which are: To find sustainable and durable solutions to the problem of Somali displacement, and to preserve the institution of asylum.
Let me say at the outset that, it is my hope that we will be able to re-dedicate ourselves to the achievement of both these aspects for the benefit of the Somali displaced people.

Today, about two and half million Somali refugees and IDPs live in camps in and out of the country. Tragically, some have lived in these camps for 3 generations, all because the environment wasn’t conducive enough in Somalia for them to return. That said, many have voluntarily returned over the past few years, as conditions in their regions have improved gradually.
However, the current drought and the looming famine pose yet another challenge to voluntary return. We must not leave a stone unturned to avert another famine in Somalia.

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen:

The Federal Government of Somalia has made Durable Solutions for Refugees and IDPs a centerpiece of its resilience strategy. The basis of our strategy is the inherent believe that refugees and IDPs are deeply tired of being displaced and living on handouts in squalid camps. Moreover, it’s based on the principle that the overwhelming majority of them would rather live in dignity and self-reliance. Based on that, our strategy aims to unshackle them from the vicious cycle of displacement, and investing in their innate ability to reclaim their dignity. For far too long, we have been investing in the management of refugees and IDPs. Time has come for us to invest in their God-given ability to manage themselves.

Somalia: Countdown to AMISOM Withdrawal

Kampala — The swearing-in last week of Somalia's new President Mohamed Abdullahi "Farmajo" was greeted with a surge of optimism on the streets of Mogadishu that a new era of stability was on its way.

He won by a landslide, on a wave of nationalist fervour. But the fact that the ceremony took place in a highly secured airport zone, under the control of African Union peacekeepers, in a city repeatedly bombed by the jihadist group al-Shabab, betrays how huge the task confronting him is.

The International Crisis Group's latest report said Farmajo had benefited from being seen as the right leader "to build a robust Somali National Army (SNA), speed up the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)'s exit, stabilise security, curb interventions by neighbouring countries, and protect Somalia's dignity and sovereignty."

But this is an ambitious wish list and the path ahead is fraught with danger.

Countdown

Central to Somalia's security is the 22,000-strong AMISOM multinational force. It has been in Somalia for a decade, battling al-Shabab and helping slowly expand state authority.

AMISOM is due to start withdrawing its troops from October next year and is expected to be fully out of the country by December 2020, handing over to the SNA, which will probably number just 20,000.

"AMISOM alone cannot defeat al-Shabab," said a report last year by Mogadishu's Heritage Institute for Policy Studies (HIPS). "This can only happen if AMISOM can partner with a capable, legitimate and inclusive set of Somali security forces."

But the Somali National Army is a force beset with problems, particularly over corruption, capacity and its acceptance in regions beyond Mogadishu. At the moment, there are doubts it will be able to stand up to a degraded, but still dangerous, insurgency.

Francisco Madeira, AU special representative to Somalia, is painfully aware of that challenge. "Building the capacity of the Somali National Security Forces is something that is central to the mandate of AMISOM, and we are doing this to the best of our ability and within the available resources," he told IRIN

oo soon?

Given this, and the historically weak and divided nature of the Somali state, experts fear AMISOM's departure will be premature.

"It seems highly unlikely to me that the Somali army [and state institutions] would be ready in just three years, given the current state of the security situation," said Nina Wilen, a research fellow at Université Libre de Bruxelles.

"A withdrawal of AMISOM in 2020 will be untimely," agreed Christian Ani Ndubuisi, a researcher at the Institute for Security Studies. A more viable option, he believes, is for international donors to support a longer transition, of five to 10 years.

The challenge for AMISOM is that exiting Somalia with some honour hinges on several factors beyond its control. Crucially, it relies on international funding, and not enough has been forthcoming "to seriously degrade rather than simply displace al-Shabab", said the HIPS report.

AMISOM draws its main fighting forces from Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya and Burundi. Allowances for the troops are paid by the EU, and logistical support - from food to medical supplies - is provided by the UN. The attack helicopters it desperately needs have not been available.

There is also now trouble in the ranks of the troop-contributing nations, which have threatened to withdraw ever since the EU cut the monthly allowance paid to soldiers by 20 percent in January 2016, from $1,028 to $822.

While the AU argues that its soldiers bleed and the West provides only money, the EU counters that there are other peace operations on the continent deserving of its support, including Central African Republic, Mali and the Lake Chad crisis.

"AMISOM will celebrate its 10th year this year, and the main funder [the EU] does not see the light at the end of the tunnel," said Thierry Vircoulon, ICG project director for Central Africa. "It is not ready to fund another never-ending peacekeeping mission as the UN usually does."

Somalia: Countdown to AMISOM Withdrawal - Is Somalia Ready? - allAfrica.com