ONLF hideout (Kismayu City ): Why Ethiopia should back Barre Adan Shire Hirale in Kismayo and Establishment of Jubbaland State

update on Plans for a new state between the Juba River and the Kenyan border

 Jubbaland Top politician Barre Hirale arrives in kismayu  unnerving leaders of RasKaambooni clan militias

The headline across Somali media says: "Xiisad ka tagaan Magaalada Kismaayo, kaddib markii uu xalay halkaas gaaray Col. Barre Aadan Shire (Barre Hiiraale)" - which translates to: "Tensions high in Kismayo, after Colonel Barre Adan Shire (Barre Hirale) went there last night".

Most Ethiopians might not be aware but a new tribal war is about to re-erupt in Somalia (the south) and this one affects Ethiopia's own security directly more than ever

Two years ago, Kenya discovered large reserves of oil and gas on offshore area near these regions but a lot of this oil and gas are actually on the Somali side of the maritime border. Kenya wants to secure it and in such wants to set up a 'buffer zone' between her and the government in Mogadishu. It's policy makers came up with the idea of forming a myriad state inside southern Somalia called Azania but has since changed to Jubbaland, borrowing Somaliland's idea.

Are Kenyans seeking a buffer zone in Somalia?

As Kenya's troops continue their incursion into southern Somalia in pursuit of Islamist militants, the BBC's Will Ross considers the motives behind the deployment.

"I hope in three or four months, al-Shabab will have been removed from our region. Then one day I'll invite you to come to Kismayo to see what's going on," said Abdullahi Shafi, personal assistant to the governor of Somalia's Lower Juba region.

He is hopeful that with Kenyan military help, he can soon return home to a new semi-autonomous region in southern Somalia.

"We have been in hell for the last 20 years. We need a new Somalia," he said, wearing a T-shirt emblazoned with "Azania" - the name of the new region which comprises Gedo, Lower Juba and Middle Juba. Read more: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15499534

In 2011 Kenya was entertaining the idea of installing the former Somalia defense minister Mohamed Abdi Mohamed (Gandhi) as the region's president, who belongs to the Ogaden tribe.

But since its invasion, Kenya has been working with Sheikh Ahmed Madoobe, a former member of al Shabab who heads the so called Ras Kamboni Brigades militia. He now wants his Ogaden to elect him as the President and Gandhi has since disappeared.

These group is sympathetic and even aids ONLF and wants to eventually create a semi-autonomous region that not only houses and trains ONLF but also imports arms for them via Kismayo.

Ethiopia is closely following the development but it doesn't want to appear at odds with Kenya. Kenya does not care about ONLF and if they take over Southern Somalia as long as Kenya is guaranteed its oil and gas on the Somali border.

Below picture: ONLF member and former Al shabab member Sheikh Ahmed Mohamed Islam "Madoobe (black)" .

 

Ethiopia needs to support a third party that will eliminate ONLF and their sympathiers such as Madobe and Gandhi, who wants ONLF embedded into Somalia by taking over the southern regions with the help of Kenya.

Bare Adan Shire Hirale who belongs to the Marehan clan, one of the largest in Kismayo is opposed to the ONLF/al-Shabab group like the government in Mogadishu.

Hirale is an army colonel and the former Minister of Defense of the Somali Transitional Federal Government. He is one of the founding members of Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a, the main religious opposition group to al shabab. He follows the moderate Sufi doctrine unlike Gandhi and Madobe who were members of Al Shabab and believe in extremism.

Ethiopia has to swiftly aid Hirale against the alliance of Al Shabab (Madobe) and ONLF (Gandhi) in which Kenya has no clue about. Bare and his Marehan clan are allied to south Somalia's dominant Hawiye clan. The current president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is Hawiye and does not want ONLF and al Shabab to derail his government and will need Ethiopia's support, who have been there for Somalia more than Kenya in the last 20 years of struggle.

Today Hirale is in Kismayo with more than 100 soldiers and the town is tense. A war can break out at anytime and the Mogadishu government as refused to recognize the Madobe/Gandhi and Kenya's agenda. Somalia government knows war is imminent in Jubba regions and it will need Ethiopia's assistance to flush out al Shabab and ONLF remnants. Ethiopia must be prepared.

It would be strategic for Ethiopia to pullout its troops from Bay, Bakol and Hiiraan regions and instead deploy them in the Jubba regions to reinforce Somali National Army before ONLF establishes itself. Once ONLF gets there, it will be difficult to defeat because its Somalia's wettest and most jungle area.

Government will not recognize the outcome of Kismayo conference, says minister

Mogadishu (RBC) Somalia interior minister Abdikarin Hussein Guled has repeated government’s position against the ongoing Jubbaland “Kismayo” conference which the Federal Government of Somalia and local administration disagreed before.

“The Federal Government of Somalia has earlier made clear its position towards Kismayo conference and I am now replicating it, The government will not recognize the outcome of Kismayo conference.” interior minister Abdikarin Hussein Guled said on Friday during interview with state-run radio.

Word from a Somali diplomat:

Jubbaland has all the dangerous elements necessary to kick the stabilization plan like a sand castle. It has the armed militias, clan-lords and foreign intrusions of competing interests. And it is, by far, the most polarizing issue facing the nation today.
Jubaland Talks in Somalia Make Little Progress

 

Some background below

Sheikh Ahmed Madobe ex Hizbul Islam ,ex Al Shabaab

Somalia: The Show-Down in Jubbaland Begins
Justice and Reconciliation in Somalia is a Casualty due to Clan Morass
Somalia:A look back at What Has Gone Wrong in Jubbaland.-Goobaale Delegation: An Insult to People of Jubbaland
 

The Kenya tricky governance challenge in Kismayu. Kenya and Ethiopia Challenging In Jubba Regions.

The Kenya tricky governance challenge in Kismayu. Kenya and Ethiopia Challenging In Jubba Regions.

Somali army chief press conference in port kismayu

 

“He who controls Kismayu controls southern Somalia”, so goes a political maxim popular with the Somali clans in the Jubba Valley.

Objectively understood, the saying simply encapsulates a truism — the huge economic and political significance attached to the southern Somali port town.

Subjectively, it betrays the zero-sum game mindset that has disfigured politics in Somalia and is a key driver of the conflict. And it is this problematic issue which the allied forces and their policy makers need to address.

Since 1991, the idea of Kismayu as a space for contest, extraction and exclusion — or to use a Kenyanism, for one clan or group of clans to “eat” — has been the geostrategic calculus that has animated the bitter struggle over its control.

It is also the primary trigger of the numerous inter-factional and clan wars that have claimed tens of thousands of lives.

No other Somali city has been as contested and haggled over as Kismayu. And it is perhaps not too difficult to see why this tiny seaport, inhabited by some 200,000 people, is so intensely coveted.

The city has the busiest and most lucrative port in south-central Somalia — a veritable goldmine for any faction that controls it. It is estimated that the port — even when functioning at current capacity — can generate over $100 million dollars a year in revenue.

As the chief town of the fertile Jubba Valley — Somalia’s agricultural heartland — Kismayu port has historically been the most accessible and cheapest gateway for exporting agricultural produce such as bananas and tomatoes, besides livestock exports (to the gulf).

Of course, there is no meaningful agriculture to speak of in the Jubba Valley today and under Al-Shabaab, the port has morphed into a notorious hub of the “grey economy” — a major conduit for the export and import of illicit goods and commodities, principally charcoal and sugar.

But no one can discount the enormous potential of Kismayu in helping revive Somalia’s modest agricultural economy. However, the town’s economic importance as well as its heterogeneous and complex clan demographics has made it a notoriously difficult place to govern.

None of the bewildering array of factions – starting with the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) to the Jubba Valley Alliance (JVA) — managed to govern the city for any appreciable length of time.

It was only Al-Shabaab that did manage to break the “governance jinx” and achieve regime longevity, maintaining uninterrupted functional control of city since late 2006.

And there are several reasons Al-Shabaab succeeded where others failed. First, it was the best armed, relatively less fractious and organised of all armed formations in 2006. The power to out-coerce the rest allowed it to stamp its authority and achieve dominance.

Second, and as odd as it may sound, it demonstrated it was a better steward of the port than previous groups — quickly establishing a workable and broadly acceptable formula to distribute the port revenues to the clans.

Its functionaries were less corrupt. This allowed it to establish some form of credibility and legitimacy and allowed it to buy consent. This historical context is important in better analysing the events of Yesterday and the implications of Kismayu’s fall.

And a number of issues flow from such an understanding:

• the inhabitants of the city have been made by circumstances to be cautious pragmatists, distrustful of political factions, but not always hostile. They are tough political customers and are bound to care more about those that deliver the goods;
• a mechanism to equitably share power and key resources, such as the port, is the key to preventing a governance crisis.

 

Many people believe that the challenges in the Jubba regions is among the local clans, but its quite different; Kenya and Ethiopia are challenging each other on the issue of Kismayo or rather Jubba regions. The most important thing is that Ethiopia wants to use the seaport of Kismayo, and it fears Kenyan-backed Azania administration which is rumored to have close ties with Ethiopian opposition front, ONLF..

KDF and Kenyan govt is the only in the African countries who support a clan militia onlf, and create vendetta between Marehan & Ogaden clans.  least 11 dead in Kismayo clashes … Reflects historical, ongoing tensions between Ogaden and Marehan in port city

Rahm Warsame.  Follow me on Twitter  @terrorfreesomal

Clan feud kills 11 in Somali port. Clashes between rival Somali clan militias ,Ethiopia-backed Marehan militia (Jubbaland) and Kenyan backed Ogaden Clan ONLF(Azania )

MOGADISHU, Feb 23 – Clashes between rival Somali clan militias in Kismayu killed 11 on Saturday, witnesses said, in the worst unrest since Kenya-backed pro-government forces recaptured the southern port from Islamist insurgents last year.

The fighting erupted when a clan leader from Ethiopia-backed Marehan died at a police station, prompting pitched battles between Marehan and ONLF  Ogadeni clansmen, two of the three groups that have traditionally fought for control of Kismayu.

“I saw at least 11 people, especially fighters, killed in these battles,” a Kismayu elder, Mohamed Ga’al, told AFP.

“It’s the worst fighting since the Shabaab left the city, and even if the situation is calm now, the two sides continue to regroup,” Ga’al added by telephone from capital Mogadishu.

Another witness, Ali Moalim Suleman, said three of the people killed were civilians caught in the exchange of fire, adding that six other civilians were wounded and taken to hospital.

In a statement Saturday, Somali Prime Minister Abdi Said Shirdon called on the two clans to lay down their arms.

“We are shocked to learn that two fraternal clans are fighting and spilling innocent blood, while residents await the establishment of a regional government.”

Several clans have fought for control of Kismayu since September, when a Kenyan army contingent drove the Shabaab – an Islamist insurgent group with ties to Al-Qaeda – out of its main stronghold.

Witnesses said the Kenyan soldiers still stationed in Kismayu did not intervene to end the clashes.

Prior fighting between the militias had resulted in several deaths in December in Kismayu, which as Somalia’s second largest port is vital to the country’s economy.

The Kenyan troops, from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), drove out the Shabaab with backing from Somali forces, including the ONLF Ras Kamboni militia.

The militia, mainly made up of Kenyan backed  ONLF Ogaden clan members, is commanded by warlord Ahmed Madobe, who switched from supporting the Shabaab to fighting alongside the African Union

Other clan militias have since been deployed in Kismayu, with clan rivalries posing one of the greatest threats to a return to peace in Somalia since AMISOM significantly weakened the Shabaab.

The port is of strategic importance as it lies at the mouth of the Jubba river and half way between the capital Mogadishu and the Kenyan border to the south.

The Ogadeni, Marehan and Majerteen clans that are dominant in the city and its surroundings have fought over the city since the 19th century.

Under the leadership of  Barre Hiraale, the Marehan in 2001 launched the Jubba Valley Alliance, in a bid to assert the clan’s control over Kismayu.

Other political ventures such as the self-proclaimed statelets of Ethiopia-backed  Marehan militia Jubbaland and Kenyan backed  Ogaden Clan ONLF Azania have been attempted in recent years, with no credible leadership emerging to secure the region.

Justice and Reconciliation in Somalia is a Casualty due to Clan Morass

The setting up of local public administrations in the regions of Gedo, Lower Jubba and Middle Jubba which have yet to be entirely liberated from the Al Qaeda affiliated Al Shabaab has generated passionate debate for four reasons.

First, as result of clan based federalism, it stirred up the majority and minority struggles between communities in those regions at village, district and regional levels. Second, it brought to the front the divergent interests and goals of the multiple foreign, national and local actors claiming stakes in the process. Third, it represented a special significance for the federal government since it defines the values and meaning of the post-transition political dispensation and implementation of the Provisional Constitution (PC) on territorial jurisdiction and citizenship supremacy. Fourth, the ban by the UN Security Council on the export of charcoal in the area adversely affected the local economy.

Concomitantly, the debate has reignited clan grievances and repudiation of past reconciliation. Lies, clan scapegoating and foreign praise over fellow citizens filled the opinion articles published by certain respected Somali websites like Wardheernews (WDN). In some gatherings of the Somali Diaspora, there was a call for clarification and an appeal for a reality check.

(See Goobaale delegation, Somalia’s constitutional decomposition.)

The claims that General Mohamed Roble Jim’ale Gobale and General Yusuf Mohamed Siad Indha’adde were members or leaders of the delegation sent by the federal Government to Kismaio are deliberately fabricated lies with sinister objectives. The attack against them and their sub clan, the defunct Jubba Valley Alliance (JVA), at this juncture will not rectify any abuse suffered by certain individuals or groups. The infinite narration of grievances from all Somali groups constitutes the misfortune of Somalia.

The names of the FG delegation sent to Kismaio are the following:

1. Gen. Abdullahi Ali Anod – Somali National Army
2. Mr. Liban Abdulqadir Hiddig – Ministry of Finance
3. Mr. Hussein Abdi Shakul – Ministry of Interior
4. Mr. Ahmed Abdikarim Hussein – Port Authority
5. Mr. Hamza R – Civil Society
6. Mr. Abdishakur Ali Mire – Civil Society
7. Mr. Ali Yusuf Hersi – Expert
8. Miss Barlin Mohamed Ali – Environmental Activist
9. Mr. Salad Elmi Ahmed – Chamber of Commerce

The delegation was accompanied by the spokesman of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) Gen Osman Subagle, and a group of independent journalists. There were three unfulfilled objectives of the mission:

1. To discuss with the newly formed authority in Kismaio the process for establishing a permanent administration at district and regional levels.
2. To consult with the local authority, business community, traditional leaders and AMISOM officials about the charcoal available at the Kismaio port and surrounding areas.
3. To assess the support and cooperation needed to strengthen the security situation in the city and the region.

The crimes and abuses committed during the civil war have been discussed in the Somali peace and reconciliation conferences held in Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, New York, Egypt and other places by “faction cum clan” representatives. Some insist that the agreements reached in these conferences were not sufficient to redress the crimes committed. This group will probably be energized by the new book by Prof. Lidwein Kapteijins, Clan Cleansing in Somalia: The Ruinous Legacy of 1991. I’m looking forward to reading the book but I assume that the following excerpts of WardheerNews’ Editor’s note introducing an interview with the author summarize the book’s negative effects:

It [book] will no doubt bring back memories that many have buried away to move forward with their lives. Witnessing a country that is still divided along clan lines, we hope this book is the beginning of the dialogue needed to come to terms with the violence that has transpired the homeland.

Others argue that the reconciliation agreements were consensual collective decisions rooted in the Somali traditions, embraced since 2000 and key to moving forward the formation of transitional governments on behalf of the Somali people and the ratification of the new provisional constitution which symbolizes national unity in 2012. Most probably, many triggers of Somalia’s clan violence, which moved from rural to urban settlements, eludes the well-crafted definitions and explanations by scholars sucked in the clan maelstrom of Somalia. The sovereign coercive power of Government based on the rule of law for justice, fairness and accountability is the best tool for preventing and eliminating clan violence in Somalia.

                                                     all hawiye Hizbul Islam

Many warlords, former politicians and security officials accused of serious crimes participated in those reconciliations and became members of parliament and leaders of the successive national governments. During the formation of the current federal government in September 2012, the international sponsors of the roadmap process attempted to exclude former warlords and politicians suspected of crimes but at the end of the day those targeted have been absolved and sworn-in as members of the federal parliament. This fact must inform us that the debate over the the civil war crimes should be kept in perspective but should not destroy the goal of forming a national government which has to serve the present and future generations of Somalia.

          Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys                                                         Yusuf Indha’adde


A brief review of the surreal metamorphosis the leader of Raskamboni militia, Sheikh Ahmed Mohamed Islam (Ahmed Madobe) underwent in seven years provides an example of the complexity of the Somali problem. During the invasion and occupation of Ethiopia in Somalia in 2005, Sheikh Ahmed Madobe, General Mohamed Gobale and Yusuf Indha’adde were allies under the Islamic Court Union (ICU). The Raskamboni leader touts himself as one of the key founders of Al Shabaab in Mogadishu and became the Governor (Wali) of Al Shabaab in Kismaio. Later, he was wounded and captured as a terrorist and handed over to Ethiopia where he was treated and released to join the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) led by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. He then defected and joined Hizbul Islam led by Dr. Sheikh Omar Iman Abubakar and Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys who battled along side Al Shabaab against the TFG. Again, Sheikh Ahmed Madobe became leader in Kismaio before Al Shabab suspected him of disloyalty and chased him out of Kismaio.
 

                   Al  shabaab leader godane  with Sheikh Ahmed Madobe ex  Hizbul Islam ,ex Al Shabaab

When Hizbul Islam merged with Al Shabaab, Sheikh Ahmed Madobe left Hizbul Islam, entered a deal with Ethiopia and Kenya and declared war against Al Shabaab. Prof Mohamed Abdi Ghandi, president of Azania State-another name of the Jubba and Gedo regions, rejects Sheikh Ahmed Madobe’s leadership. In the face of this puzzling background, the local population must be granted the opportunity and structure to exercise their constitutional power for the selection/election of their leaders.

It is vile to fabricate lies or insult clans in order to criticize the performance or policy positions of the federal government or to tramp on the rights of citizens of Somalia. The following words of late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi quoted from his interview with Newsweek on April 9, 2008 must haunt forever the moral fiber of Somalis:

An oversupply of national sentiment is not the problem in Somalia. The problem is a lack of it. The problem is an oversupply of sub-sub-clannish attitude. Our efforts, together with the TFG, have been focused on bridging the gaps [between these] clans. As far as Islamist fervor is concerned, Ethiopia was not in Somalia when the Shabaab took control. Ethiopia was not in Somalia when the Shabaab declared jihad on Ethiopia. What Ethiopia did is [burst] the bubble of this Shabaab phenomenon.

The above statement must be the mirror to which every Somali must look every morning. As remainder, in Sura Ra’ad (13:11) Allah says:

Verily never will Allah change the condition of a people until they change it themselves (with their own souls). But when (once) Allah willeth a people’s punishment there can be no turning it back nor will they find besides Him any to protect

Thus, without commonly disproving the above characterization and adhering to Allah’s message, the future of Somalia is doomed.

 

via--Mohamud Uluso

Mohamud Uluso is a former Governor of the Central Bank of the Transitional Federal Government.

Briton stars in Somali terror videos

Terrorists in Somalia have produced a series of full-length documentaries featuring a masked narrator with a British accent as part of a publicity drive designed to attract Western recruits

The videos feature suicide bombers, the corpses of African peace keepers and describe military operations by the militant group al-Shabaab, which is closely linked to al-Qaeda. The footage is the latest addition to a well-oiled media machine which has attracted nearly 16,000 followers to its English-language Twitter account since it was set up last December. It is unclear whether the reporter is the same man behind the Twitter account and a press office that has churned out online press releases giving updates on battles and “martyred” fighters in recent months.

MI5 is concerned that the conflict has drawn in dozens of young Britons and last September Jonathan Evans, the director general of MI5, warned that it was “only a matter of time before we see terrorism on our streets inspired by those who are today fighting alongside al-Shabaab.” Earlier this year three men from East London were jailed for channeling thousands of pounds to three associates who are still with militants in the East African conflict zone.

Samantha Lewthwaite, the widow of 7/7 bomber Jermaine Lindsay, is also thought to be with al-Shabaab in Somalia. In the first 32-minute video released by al-Shabaab’s media arm, al-Kataib, last November, called “The Burundian Bloodbath” the reporter, dressed in army fatigues, visits the scene of a battle in which he claims 101 soldiers died. Carrying a microphone, he compares the battle at Dayniile with the “glorious battles that took place in the early days of Islam between truth and falsehood” and interviews al-Shabaab fighters who took part. Another 23-minute video called “Battlefront el-Wak - repelling the Kenyan proxies” was released in February. The film shows a battle on September 16 last year between al-Shabaab and the Kenyan backed Azania Militia in the border town of el-Wak before the full-scale invasion by Kenyan troops in October. The video is dedicated to the “martyr” Anwar al-Awlaki, one of the leaders of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsular (AQAP) who was killed in a drone attack in Yemen last September. In the latest 43-minute video, “In the Shade of the Shariah”, first released in May, the same reporter visits Baidoa, a city taken by al-Shabaab militants from Ethiopian soldiers in 2009 before its recapture in February. The video features a clip of a suicide bomber called Abu Ayoub from “Europe” who speaks in English. The reporter praises him as one of “dozens of young men who had left behind the comfort of their homes and families in Europe and the United States in order to take part in the jihad against the Ethiopian invaders.” The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) at King’s College London is to publish a report this week on al-Shabaab’s Western media strategy which highlights al-Kataib’s use of slick and professional production values to appeal to young men in the West and provide an alternative to mainstream media. The report says the videos “aim to present the group’s version of events, motivate recruits and establish an alternative narrative - where the mainstream media might report losses, al-Shabaab records victories.”

The authors say that a “combination of fortuity and ingenuity has allowed al-Shabaab to cultivate a highly potent message which has succeeded in helping to seduce scores of Western Muslims into supporting its cause.” Two shorter videos have featured young British men – a suicide video from 2007 featuring Ahmed Hussein Ahmed, and a video called ‘Inspire the Believers’ in 2010 which featured Abu Dujana calling for more recruits. A number of Americans have also traveled to Somalia to join al-Shabaab and one of their most powerful media assets has been a rapping propagandist called Omar Shafik Hammami, known as Abu Mansoor al-Amriki, who has appeared in a series of videos including a lengthy sermon last year called “Lessons learned.”  via
Telegraph

Meles Zenawi: An Obituary

Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has died aged 57 in a hospital "abroad", the government says.

Meles Zenawi, Ethiopia’s longtime dictator, died today after a two-month battle with terminal illness. He was 57. Hailemariam Desalegn, deputy prime minister and foreign minister; has been appointed as acting prime minister.

Legesse Zenawi Asras, alias Meles Zenawi Ares, was born in Adwa on the 8th of May, 1955. The name Meles was his name de guerre and was an honor to a revolutionary university student with the same name who was executed by the Mengisto regime. Meles graduated from Wingate Secondary School with distinction and won a scholarship to Addis-Ababa University. In 1975, after two years studying medicine, he interrupted his studies to join the Tigrean Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF).

He was the founder of the TPLF’s Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray. He gradually maneuvered himself to the top leadership of the TPLF; and became the chairperson of both the TPLF and the EPRDF and head of the executive committee, head of government, and commander –in- chief of the armed forces. Out of the 36 Executive Committee members of the EPRDF, his wife, Azeb Mesfin, is the only female member; however, it should be noted that she was a guerrilla fighter in her own right before their marriage. He was the prime minister from 1995 until his demise, and held the post of president from 1991 to 1995. He had MBA from the Open University in the UK, and MSC in economics from Erasmus University in the Netherlands. He was reported to be austere in his habits, and his capacity for work was unmatched. Moreover, he expected from his subordinates complete loyalty, dedication to the service of the people, and was perceived not to be corrupt. His accomplishments were impressive: he was the darling of the Western donors, and billions of aid dollars were poured into the country every year. Ethiopia is the biggest recipient of foreign aid in Sub-Saharan Africa; its annual growth is estimated to be 9%, which is the best growth in any non-oil producing country. Meles had hugely invested in the country's infrastructure, uplifted millions of his people from poverty; and raised his profile by being regularly invited to represent Africa at the G8 and G20 meetings of economically advanced countries of the world. He had promised to step down in 2015, but broke similar promise in 2010. Due to his pervasive dictatorial powers, the population of Ethiopia, which is estimated to be over 70 million, was not told the whereabouts of their Prime Minister, or what his state of health was? Meles had not been seen for the last two months, and he even missed the African Union (AU) summit held in his capital.

Who will emerge as the strong man in Addis Ababa is not clear. Potential successors are unlikely to fill the shoes of a giant like Meles, and Ethiopia may well experience power struggle and fragmentation worse than the one Somalia went through. The exception will be if the army and the security apparatus remain intact, impose order, take over the country, or put their decisive weight behind an individual successor.

Against strong opposition, Zenawi’s TPLF created ethnic-based federal system, claiming with justification, that it was the most sensible course of political dispensation appropriate to Ethiopia in order to eliminate the centuries old oppression by one ethnic group and its culture. He introduced the decentralization of the language system; so that each federal unit is able develop its culture. Amharic, though, still remains dominant as the medium of communication between federal components and the central government.

 Eritrean  President Afewarki

Farewell to Former Comrades in Arms

During the struggle against the Derg headed by Mengisto, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front [EPLF] and the Tigre Peoples Liberation Front [TPLF] were allies and coordinated their actions against their common enemy, the regime of Mengisto. A secret agreement was signed between the two liberation movements, headed by Isias Aferwarki and Meles Zenawi respectively, stipulating that, after the overthrow of the Derg regime, the TPLF would accept a referendum on the independence of Eritrea. Indeed, after the successful overthrow of the Derg, the referendum was held in Eritrea which obviously opted for independence, and Ethiopia under Zenawi recognized the independence of its former province. The two leaders, who were reported to be related, remained close until 1996 when Aferwarki, returning from a vacation in Kenya with his family and his inner entourage, stopped in Addis-Ababa and was offered by Zenawi to fly them back to Asmara in one of Meles’ helicopters. Aferwarki accepted the offer but while en route the chopper caught fire but managed to return to Addis Ababa and landed safely there. An angry Aferwarki was reported to have had told Meles to his face that the fire was an assassination attempt by Meles to eliminate him. Even though Meles supported the independence of Eritrea in 1993, but, within five years, the former allies were fighting a bloody conflict that lasted between 1998 and 2000 and resulted in nearly 100,000 deaths. Both were despots with inflated egos and couldn’t stand each other; however, Meles, with his guile and brilliance, had cultivated the West, as their indispensable man in the troublesome Horn of Africa region. Aferwarki, meanwhile, had been painted, with a considerable input from Meles, as the pariah of the Horn and has no supporters, regionally or internationally.

The border dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia remained unresolved due to the intransigence of Meles who was in collusion with the Western powers. The Ethiopian-Eritrean Boundary Commission awarded the Badame territorial dispute to Eritrea, but Meles Zenawi declined to enforce it; and Ethiopia continues to occupy and claim the disputed region.

Abdi Qassim Salad Hassan

The Undisputed Master of Ceremonies in Somalia

Since the implosion in Somalia, Meles had played a pivotal role in the affairs of his neighbor and traditional adversary. Until his death, no Transitional Federal Government (TFG) came to power in Somalia without his blessing, with the exception of Arta TFG. Meles shunned Abdi Qassim Salad Hassan PM Galydh's government because it came to existence without his input. It also showed, like previous Somali governments of yesteryears, signs of independence. He also persuaded his mentors in the West that Arta TFG was a government dominated by religious fanatics and; hence, should be shunned. This policy worked for Meles Zenawi well, as this TFG was unable to make any progress during its tenure. From then on, every reconciliation process for Somalia was sabotaged by Meles, as he financed and armed every Somali faction and warlord of any stripe. That resulted chaos and anarchy. Oddly, he was pursuing these deleterious policies while pretending to be an ardent supporter of Somalia’s central government. Meles had a strategic national agenda of his own. He discarded warlords and factions he created as soon as they ceased to serve his strategic agenda and, in turn, created new ones. He became a cunning master of how to manipulate Somali society with little effort and expenditure, because Meles found the weakest link: Clannism, an exploitable foible which had eluded his predecessors for centuries. No Somali leader of independent thought was able to effectively emerge so long Ethiopia exercised complete veto over the affairs of Somalia. Every Somali move was expected to be compatible with strategic agenda of Ethiopia. Under any guise, real or imagined, Ethiopian forces crossed the border all the time without the knowledge or the consent of the TFG, or the Security Council and repeatedly violated the existing arms embargo of the UN with impunity.

When the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) appeared to succeed in ridding the country of the scourge of warlords and armed factions, Meles persuaded his mentors in the West to foot the bill in the invasion of Somalia, in order to put an end to this potential, serious threat to the countries in the Horn of Africa. There were individuals within the Union of Islamic Courts who, by design or naivety, served the agenda of Ethiopia and it’s powerful backers and, hence, precipitated the invasion. Some of these clerics claimed, that they were on their way to hold the forthcoming Eid prayers in Addis-Ababa. Strangely, one of these figures held the defense portfolio of the UIC; but during the Ethiopian invasion he was nowhere to be found to defend the country, by mobilizing and leading his forces. He had suddenly left the country on the pretext of performing the Hajj. The invasion was brutal and caused huge destruction, displacement and about 10,000 deaths; and when the human rights organizations, including the UN suggested that a fact finding commission be formed to investigate the atrocities, the idea was nixed by the USA and its allies. When the political leadership of the UIC was forced to flee the country, it relocated to Asmara, Eritrea, Ethiopia’s mortal enemy. The move was exploited by Meles because he divided the UIC leadership into moderates and extremists, a classification the international community readily accepted without critical examination. Of course, the military wing of the UIC remained in the country to resist the Ethiopian invasion with the limited resources at its disposal but with the wide support of many Somalis in the Diaspora. It later became independent of the political wing of UIC in Asmara and took the name of Al-Shabab, and the rest is history.

The exception

The only time, in recent history, Meles opposed the fragmentation of the Somali state was in the case of Azania State, which was not his brainchild, but rather that of the Ogaden clan. His opposition was based on a far-sighted strategic reason: Azania is the creation of the Ogaden senior Kenyan Somali politicians, who consider themselves the dominant ethnic group in the area with the blessing of the Kenyan government, which sees it as a useful buffer state under its indirect control. Meles Zenawi saw the creation of Azania as a future destabilizing problem for Ethiopia, since it could be a source of support for the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), which has been involved in an on- going insurgency with the Ethiopian government. The opposition of Meles to Azania was partially assuaged, as the ethnic Somali politicians in Kenya had met several times with Meles and the ONLF, and promised to use their good offices to bring an end to the insurgency. Several meetings have already taken place in England between the two sides with the Kenyan Somalis in attendance.

Liquidating Domestic Opposition

Within the country, Meles did not tolerate opposition to his regime, even if it was constructive criticism within his party. He was believed to have eliminated his potential rivals by ousting them from their powerful positions in the party hierarchy or in the government, such as the founding military leader of the TPLF, Avegwi Berhi in 1980; the post- war Tigrean hero, Seeye Abraha in 2001. Serious questions remained unanswered as to the motive of the assassination of Kinfe Gebre Medhin, chief of security and immigration, in May 2001, who was shot and killed by major Tsehawe, as he entered the armed forces Officers Club in Addis. Tsehawe was tried, found guilty, and executed in August 2007. Kinfe backed Meles in a serious Central Committee party dispute in March 2001, which resulted in the expulsion of 12 senior members from the party. In any given time, there were a number of armed groups opposed to the Ethiopian government under Zenawi, the major ones being: the Oromo Liberation Front; the Ogaden Liberation Front; the Afar Liberation Front; and the United Western Somali Liberation Front. The latter, which was a rival of the Ogaden Liberation Front, ended its two decades of armed struggle in August 2010, and signed a peace accord with the government. All these fronts, to be effective in their struggle, must have bases to recoup, regroup, train, take care of their injured, and receive fresh supplies; and the ideal and often -sought bases were in Somalia. The two countries were, from time immemorial, traditional adversaries. .These bases have dried up, since Meles’ Ethiopia has had the final say in every part of Somalia. It was common for Somalia’s regional governments in handing over suspected liberation members to the Ethiopian authorities; or even the Ethiopians themselves crossing the border and picking up the suspects. Meles’ forces carried out scorched earth counter insurgency measures, which were rarely condemned by world powers that matter, in spite of the repeated reports by human rights organizations. It appeared that there was a colluded silence on the part of world powers about the atrocities of Ethiopia in Somalia and within Ethiopia; the repeated violation of territorial integrity of Somalia and the UN arms embargo which it repeatedly ignored with impunity.

The Marginalization of Ethiopia’s own Muslims

The presence of people of the Muslim faith in Ethiopia is recorded as far back as 615 AD when some of the early Muslims sought refuge in Axum, Tegrean province, which was then the seat of the King of Ethiopia, the Negashi, after they were persecuted by the Qureish of Mecca for their newly acquired faith of Islam. According to the latest 2007 census, Islam is the second most widely practiced religion in Ethiopia, after Christianity. The Muslim population in Ethiopia is officially recorded as about 30%, but the real figure is believed to be about 50% or more. Successive Ethiopian governments long held Muslims as agents of foreign powers and marginalized them. The Muslims, on the other hand, were reluctant to enroll their children in government schools, as the head of education in Ethiopia, for a long time, was the Abuna, the Pope, whose primary objective was to ensure that the Christian faith is only practiced in schools. The Flasha, who claimed to be of the Jewish faith, and one of the lost tribes of Israel that lived in Ethiopia from time immemorial were forced to convert to orthodox Christianity in the 19th century; many are now reported recanting their Christian faith and reverting to Judaism, in order to be eligible to emigrate to Israel.

The Meles Zenawi government had nominated a Muslim Sect by the name of Ahbash to be in charge of the religious affairs of the Ethiopian Muslims. This sect was founded by an Ethiopian-- Lebanese scholar by the name of Sheikh Abdulla Al-Harari. The government controls and manipulates the Islamic Supreme Council, which implements the policies of the ruling party. There have been no elections for the membership of the council for 13 years. Ahbash is seen by the West as a friendly alternative to Wahhabi ideology which is seen as militant. Muslims have been restive in recent years, because they have been marginalized and discriminated against; they have not been allowed to build mosques or madrasas for their community; and recently 17 prominent Muslims leaders were arrested and are now in custody, in order to nip in the bud any Muslim agitation for equality with their peers. Amnesty International is protesting their prolonged detention and demanded they be released or charged with specific offence. .Up to now, the protests of Muslims have been peaceful, but no one can predict the future.

In Search of Dependable Sea Access

Meles Zenawi, in his all- encompassing strategy, had not neglected in seriously exploring his best options in having secure and dependable outlets to the sea. This is the reason he was partially financing the construction of a deep port at Tajoura, an Afar country, which is part of the Republic of Djibouti. This outlet to the sea will serve his home town, which lost access to the sea through the port of Assab, as a result of the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia. This new port will be a competitor to the port of Djibouti in the long run, and by extension between those of Somali ancestry and those of Afar ancestry. He was also pushing for the realization of the huge port project in Lamu, Kenya, where the construction of a multi- billion port is being planned to serve as a sea access for South Sudan, Ethiopia and Kenya. This huge port project is being financed by the Chinese, and it is intended to provide a non-Muslim controlled sea for these countries.

Emasculating Somalia’s Leaders

In recent years, Somalia is repeatedly being humiliated by its neighbors with important members of the International Community in concert, because it lacked credible leadership with the necessary caliber, commitment, competence, stature and patriotism. These leaders, in the majority of cases, were imposed on the Somali people by the IC. Spearheaded by Ethiopia, as a strategy of balkanization and internecine conflict was/is being implemented. Somalis were/are oblivious to what was happening to their country as they were/are consumed by clannish and parochial conflicts fueled from without. It became the fate of Somali political leaders, under Zenawi, to be frequently summoned to Addis and be read the riot act whenever they were perceived to be deviating unwritten mandate. On the other hand, Somali leaders appeared to be competing for the ears and the favors of Zenawi and the IC. and had lost confidence in themselves and their people, having mistakenly concluded that Zenawi was the only Sheriff in town who could make them or break them.

It is ironic that Meles Zenawi died one day after Somalia was set to end the term of the Transitional Federal Government. Somalia’s expected election of new government coincided with Meles’ own demise. Of course, Ethiopia’s policy and design on Somalia is bigger than one man.

Ahmed Jama serve as political analysts Terror Free Somalia Foundation


Ahmed Jama E-Mail:dhoobay@yahoo.com

SOMALIA ON THE VERGE OF REVERTING TO THE 1991 BLOODY SITUATION PART TWO.Profiling Tribal Entities, Forecasting The Next Big Somali War

Terror Free Somalia investigates the impact of the establishment of mini-states on the country’s fragile stability.

 Part #1  SOMALIA ON THE VERGE OF REVERTING TO THE 1991 BLOODY SITUATION 

In many ways, Somalia appears to be slowly recovering from two decades of civil war. One long-standing obstacle to the recovery process has been all but eliminated with the dramatic decline in the popularity of the al-Shabaab terrorist organization. As Somalia makes territorial gains against al-Shabaab and plans for national elections in August, many predict that Somalia is close to returning as a viable state. But for Ahmed Sheikh Ali, a lawyer and a former president of Somalia’s Court of Appeal, the country is far from standing on its own two feet. He is skeptical about the increasing semi-state phenomenon, describing it as "a war in waiting."

Mr. Ali, a veteran judge, is extremely frustrated by the increasing development of the system of mini-states in Somalia, which was introduced in the 2004 National Charter of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Based on his extensive experience with the Somali cultural and judiciary systems, Sheikh Ali said the union of mini-states cannot bring Somalia peace, offering his opinion that “the mini-state style of government will reignite hidden clan conflagrations.”

His observations on this matter have indeed become increasingly clear. At least thirty semi-regional states have been announced in Somalia since 2006. They all have self-nominated presidents mand many go so far as appointing foreign, interior and defense ministers. They are also increasingly creating their own identities, to include flags, state anthems and websites. Former Prime Minister of Somalia Ali Khalif Galaydh said such culture was recently in practice when Somalia President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed visited Puntland. According to Mr. Galaydh, “There are often different national anthems, flags, protocols and in some ways, for outside observers, it appears these are two governments, two states that are meeting." The most negative aspect of this development is that the mini-state appears superior to the central government, as in the case of Somalia’s TFG and Puntland, semi-autonomous, potentially complicating national reunification.

The mini-state phenomena in Somalia has become a rare window of political opportunity for power-hungry politicians and businessmen and women who organize the establishment of mini-states in as cities across Europe, United States, and in some Arab and African states, though not in Somalia, according to Mr. Ali. The majority of these self-proclaimed mini-state "presidents" are part of various Somali diaspora living internationally though most, unfortunately, cannot return to the areas they claiming to govern. Some of these officials paid their flight ticket back to Somalia with contributions from the Somali communities in the West.

“It could be understood as a shortcut of becoming a president by mobilizing kinsmen,” said Mr. Ali. Mohamed Ali, a researcher and analyst in Mogadishu, believes that the increasing phenomena of mini-states in Somalia could jeopardize national unity. “It could even lead to confrontations among Somalia’s mini-states and the federal government, particularly among the mini-states themselves who could have confrontations on the borders dividing them," Mohamed Ali told terror free somalia   .

“Every single clan and even sub clan will proclaim a mini-state and then may try to claim their share of the resources and power in the federal government. This could be further exacerbated by hundreds of sub-clans,” he explained.

Proclaiming a mini-state and then going to Mogadishu is now becoming a way for individuals to quickly appear on the national stage. “Just go to your clan elders and convince them that you are lobbying for your clan’s political rights in the federal system and they will accept. The government should stop this practice because it adds more fuel to the ongoing Somali conflict and no one will be able to stop it,” he warned.

Dalmar Haji, a Ph.D. candidate in Peace and Conflict Resolution and Somali National Party member, expressed concern about the existence of more than fifty mini-states in a small country like Somalia. He says that it could a big obstacle in bring Somalis together or even under one central government. “It can increase a clan conflict among clans in same region and even border conflict between the mini-states,” said Mr. Dalmar.

Despite the warnings, the TFG showed no signs of abandoning the recognition of mini-states. Somali President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed officially recognized the newly formed state of Khatumo, formerly part of the breakaway region of Somaliland. Somaliland, whose forces fought against militias loyal to Khatumo state in Buuhoodle, rejected the offer from the TFG to legitimize Khatumo, accusing President Ahmed of conspiring against “unity of Somaliland."

In Mogadishu this March, TFG security forces disbanded a meeting by the Ex-Banadir state for the establishment of a parliament of the state citing that the meeting was illegal and was not approved by the TFG Interior Ministry. “We have sent the Interior Ministry a request letter for holding the meeting but they replied with refusal and we cannot accept this because all other clans had their own states and nobody discarded it," said Salah Fuleyl, member of the organizers of the meeting.

Hassan Isak, a member of parliament, he said that although the National Charter allows the formation of the mini-states, he disagrees with the interpretation of it. “It was not formed in a good way and could lead to further conflicts. It does not lead to a solid federal system, but to a less fragile one than we imagined,” he added. Isak calls for the TFG to end the process of recognizing of the mini-states. “Just as greediness cannot be not be tolerated, the TFG should restrict it,” he commented.

The concern is not only about the increasing mini-states, said PhD candidate Dalmar Haji. “It is all about ratifying the draft federal constitution of Somalia because the federal government is not suitable to solve conflicts in Somalia, but instead it refuels the conflict,” he said.

Dalmar says power struggle among clans is negatively contributing to the civil war in Somalia. He stated that “now the federal system is immediately and unexpectedly creating and reemerging clan conflicts in the country. Look at what is happening in Galgadud, Hiiraan, Jubba and everywhere in Somalia. Clans within same regions each have a president of their own semi-autonomous state.”

Former Prime Minister of Somalia Ali Khalif Galaydh (who also advises for the newly founded Khatumo state), however, sees the increasing number of mini-states as potentially positively because it could produce local credible leadership and also contribute to the reemergence of Somalia. “These are all attempts to get out of the mess. At the same time it is out of frustration when things don’t happen in Mogadishu. I mean people are just fed up with the chaos and lack of movement or motion out of the center, the capital,” said Mr. Galaydh. “It could be of course more of an obstacle than facilitating or helping the mechanism."

About the draft federal constitution. Mr. Galaydh says it is a technical document that requires the attention of the Somali people. “What was needed and is still needed is for the Somali people to be aware of the draft and to be on board in terms of what it outlines. The Somali input in this whole exercise is not up to the government and the population will be unhappy with their lack of input,” he added.

Like Ahmed Sheikh Ali and Dalmar Haji, many Somalis are worrying the increasing number of mini-states in Somalia could be the beginning of land grab in Somalia. “This could be a lose-lose land grab for all Somalis,” said Ahmed Sheikh Ali, “If the TFG can't exercise its authority over all the mini-states and clan militias, it could end up with another horrific twenty years and possibly more - a 'war is in waiting' since some mini-states would try to form their militias which could weaken any agendas of rebuilding national army in Somalia," he stated.

The following list is intended to provide an accounting of many of the mini-states located throughout Somalia.

Mini-states in Galmudug  just a tribal enclave of hawiye.

Profiling New Face of  hawiye criminal warlords

Galmudug, which claims to run a combination of the Mudug and Galgadud regions, was first to test this theory of mini-state in 2006. Since that time, it has become a kind of role model for many mini-states claiming to govern areas over which they actually have they have little or no control.For detailed report please see  about "  Galmudug 

Himan and Heeb just a tribal enclave of hawiye.
was established in 2008 and mainly covers parts of the Galgudud regions. One of the oldest of the regional states proclaimed in Somalia, it is dominated by the Saleeban sub clan of Habar Gidir. Himan and Heeb was presumably a direct answer to the Sa’ad dominated Galmdug administration. The two homogenous clans of Galmudug and Himan and Heeb are the most influential and had some permanent presence in Galkacyo and Addado, and a technical presence beyond these two towns. Officials from both Galmudug and Himan and Heeb made efforts to unite the two administrations but failed as neither leader wanted to lose his government position. Mohamed Abdulahi Ticey serves as president.

Gal-Hiran and Haradhere wants control of Galgudud region and parts of Hiran. Its supporters are mainly part of the Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jaama (ASWJ) and the main cities in this state include Dhusamareeb, Guri-cel, Marer Gur and Haradhere town which are considered to important pirate strongholds. Abdilqadid Mohamed Bahdoon is the president of the state, which is dominated by Ayr, a sub clan of Habargidir. The state was founded on September 23, 2010 and has relations with the TFG.

El-Bur State was created in London on June 5, 2011 to run the El-Bur district in the Galgagud region of Somalia. El-Bur was formerly the capital of the Galgaduud region and once served as a local commercial hub. Abdillahi Malim Asparo is the president of El-Bur state, though al-Shababa and Ahlu Sunna are currently fighting over El-Bur. It is located approximately 375km north of Mogadishu.

Mareeg is a region in Galgadud based on the Ajuuran sultanate in the Middle Ages. It was established in April 2011 and exists in the Galgudud and Mudug regions. Its main administrative area is between Haradhere and Budbud towns and includes approximately 250km of seashore. Dayib Mohamed Sheikh serves as president of Mareeg. Its leaders have called on Somali businessmen to build a new port and roads linking the state with the other parts of Somalia, with the purpose of encouraging regional development.

Somali Central state was established in 2011 and claims control over parts of Galgudud and Mudug regions and has links with Himan and Heeb. The center of the regional state is Abudwak and is dominated by the Mareehan clan. It does not yield much political power and has been overshadowed by disagreements with ASWJ, which is currently the most powerful force in Abdudwak. Mohamed Hashi Abdi is the president. He was arrested in Abdudwaq by ASWJ militia forces.

Galgaduud state was formed in Dubai in April 2011. Its goal is to run the entire Galgadud region, despite the fact that the states of Galmudug, Himan and Heeb, Mareeg, El-Bur, Gal-Hiiran and Somali Central state all intend to run their own regions. Abdirashid Mohamed Dirir is the president of Galgaduud state.

Waax and Waadi was established in Bristol, Britain in March 2011 to govern Harardhere, Mareeg, El-Dher, Masagawa and Galad in Galgadud and the Juba Valley, particularly Turdho and Kowsar. Nor Ali Omar akas Dubad is the president of this administration.

Dooxo state was reportedly established in 2011. Its goal is to govern parts of Galgadud and possibly the Mudug regions. Bashir Abdulahi Abshir is the president of Dooxo. Little is known about this state.

Bila Quban state was created in April 2011. It wants to govern the area from Fah, located 30km from Haradhere district, north to the Hurow, which is located 1km from the Hilawe Gab village in southern Somalia.

Mini-states in Jubba

Azania was established on March 20, 2011 in Kenya and is supported by Kenya, which is interested helping develop a regional administration and establish a buffer zone against threats from al-Shabaab. Azania state is led by Mohamed Abdi Gandhi, a former Somalia defense minister. He is an educated man who has personal contacts with the governments of both Ethiopia and Kenya. The regional state works in Gedo and Lower Jubba regions, and its capital is Bu'aale town.

There are significant disagreements between Gandhi and Ahmed Madobe, leader of the Ras Kamboni group, and Hizb al Islam a pro-government militia supported and trained by Kenya. Ethiopia, however, supports ASWJ and is unhappy about the Azanai initiative. This is due to the possible threat from the Ras Kamboni group dominated by Ogeden fighters who could support Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) fighting against the Ethiopian government over the disputed Ogaden region. President Gandhi enjoys close contact with government military officers since most of the Somali in the area were trained under Gandhi's authorization in Kenya when he was minister of defense.
Jubbaland  was established in January 2012 is considered a rival regional to the state of Azania. Jubbaland desires to rule Lower Jubba, Gedo and Middle Jubba. Mohamed Farah Du'aaleh is the president, but is not as well known as Mohamed Abdi Gandhi, the leader of Azania, who has links with Ethiopia and Kenya. Jubbaland has no direct contact with these countries who support pro-government militias including the ASWJ and Ras Kamboni fighting against al-Shabaab in lower Jubba and Middle Jubba. Unlike Azania, Jubbaland has the support of the local people in the regions who are reportedly suspicious of Azania's links with Kenya.
Jubba and Shabelle was founded on July 5, 2011. It wants control of the Jubba regions in the south and parts of the Bay region. The supporters of this regional state are the Somali Bantu or Jareerweyne commnunity and those of Digil and Mirifle. Abdi Osman Omar is the president of this regional state.
Jubba-Ras was created January 8, 2011 in Scandinavia. It claims to have a legitimate right to govern the Lower and Middle Jubba regions of Somalia. The supporters of this administration are the Biyo-maal community. Abdi Qadir Mohamud Yusuf is the president of Jubba-Ras state of Somalia. Little is known of Mr. Yusuf other than he is young and calls himself "Engineer" (though it is not known if he has earned this nickname through legitimate academic studies, or if he simply prefers the name).
Jubba-Jasiira's formal founding date is unknown; however, the Nairobi-based community from Shiiqaal held a welcoming party for Jubba-Jasiira's president Abdi Ahmed Osman on January 3, 2011. It wants to administrate the Jubba regions in south Somalia.
Greenland state was founded in Kenya’s little Mogadishu district of Eastliegh in Nairobi in November 21, 2010. Like Jubba-Jasiira, Greenland state wants to rule in Jubba regions of Somalia. Dr. Mohamed Ibrahim Afkule is the president of this administration.
Dooxada Cagaaran state was created in Mogadishu in May 8, 2011. Ali Mohamed Ibrahim is the president of this administration, which, like the two states described above, also wants to control Jubba regions of Somalia.
Udubland state was established on February 17, 2011 by President Ibrahim Abdullahi Addo. It claims to represent the communities of Lower Shabelle and the two Jubba regions and wants to govern these three combined regions.
Shabelle-Jubba state was formed in Columbus, Ohio on April 6, 2012 by Dr. Abdikadir Noor Awo. It appears this state wishes to govern more than six regions (Shabeelaha Hoose, Jubada Dhexe, Jubada Hoose, Gedo, Bay and Bakool) though each of these already has its own mini-state.
South West state was initially formed in November 2002 in Baidoa (capital of the South West state) to govern Bay and Bakool regions but it is renewed in April 2011. It currently wants to control the Gedo, Bay, Bakool, Middle Juba, Lower Juba and lower Shabelle regions in southwest Somalia. Sayid Ali Sheikh Mohamed is the president of this administration.
Koofur-Galbeed - During the course of this research, Somalia Report discovered another South West state, called Koofur-Galbeed also claiming to adminster the same area of Sheikh Mohamed’s South West state. The president of this administration is Dr. Ali Abdi Baab. It is unclear whether one replaced the other but it is possible they are independent.

Mini-states in Hiran.. just a tribal enclave of hawiye.

Hiran (Hiiraan) state was established on August 10, 2010 and seeks to rule the entire Hiran region. This region has a strategic significance as it links southern regions to central Somalia. It is also of strategic importance to Ethiopia, which wants to use the region as a buffer zone to control the movements of the radical Islamists of al-Shabaab and ONLF. Hiran state is led by Mohamed Abdi Gab and is set against Gal-Hiran state and Shabelle Valley Administration (SVA) which also claim to be the legitimate states in the region.
Dooxada Shabelle or Shabelle Valley Administration (SVA) wants control of the central regions and Hiran and maintains an unspecified number of armed militia. It was founded on April 13, 2011, apparently in reaction to the establishment of Hiran state in September 2010, which is dominated by the Hawadle and Jijeele clans, including Gaal Jecel, while some of Gaal Jecel are opposed to this new state. Abdifitah Hassan Afhrah is the president of SVA and recently rejected the TFG’s plans for creating an administration in Beledweyne after a bitter disagreement between ASWJ and SVA over the control of Hiran region. This comes after Ethiopian troops backed by SVA forces and ASWJ seized Beledweyne from al-Shabaab forces in December 2011. It should be noted that the Somali government nominated Abdifatah Hassan Afrah to be governor of Hiiran region.
Hiranland state was founded in September 2010. It maintains no armed militia and its influence has been overshadowed by armed conflict and the power struggle between the SVA and ASWJ. The group is led by diaspora including its president Mukhtar Sheikh Abdirisak.
Hiiraan and Midland state was established June 2010 in London. Abdiqadir Adan Abdi is the founder and the president of this administration.

Mini-states in Shabelle and Banadir just a tribal enclave of hawiye.

Shabeelaha Dhexe state or Middle Shabelle state was formed in January 2009. It wants to manage the Middle Shabelle region in Somalia. Ali Madahey Jawle is the president of this mini-state.

Banadir was established in 2011 and represents the minority Banadiri community, which is made up of mainly Arabs from Oman and Yemen. The supporters of this regional state do not belong to the armed clans and are considered to the "others" group who receive half due the power sharing formula of 4.5. Banadir state could have influence on supporters living mainly in the districts of Hammerwein, Shingani districts of Mogadishu and in Marka and Brava in Lower Shabelle region. Abba Awow Haji is the president of Banadir.

Ex-Banadir state of Somalia was also created in Mogadishu in March 2012 to run the Banaadir, Middle Shabelle, and Lower Shabelle regions. Somalia government soldiers intervened and stopped the formation party of this administration but its president Mohamed Abdirahman Ali claims a legal right to manage the three regions of Somalia. The Banadir region “Mogadishu” has already has a TFG-formed administration. Mogadishu will be the headquarters for the administration.

Jiin-webi was founded on October 1, 2011 and is supported by the Somali Bantu or Jareerweyne communities, a minority group that descended from tribes in East and central Africa. These communities include the Wagosha communities and are discriminated against by tother Somali clans. This group is mainly made up of peasants living Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle, Lower Jubba, Middle Jubba and Hiran. They joined with the .5 of the 4.5 clan sharing formula in parliament; therefore, they are not well represented. Mohamed Ahmed Hussein is its president.

Banaadirland was established in Nairobi, Kenya, in December 2011. It wants to run the Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle and Banadir regions. Engineer Abdulle Hassan Nurrow is the president of Banaadirland administration. Mogadishu will be headquarters for the administration. Xamar iyo Xamr daye state wants to run Mogadishu’s Banadir region and middle Shabelle. This administration is established in Nairobi on May 15, 2011. Jibril Haji Mohamud is the president of this administration.

Wargaadhi State was formed May 2011 in Nairobi. It seeks to run the Middle Shabelle region. Yusuf Hundubay is the president of Wargaadhi State of Somalia.

Hir iyo Maanyo was established in 2011. It wants to administrate the Lower and Middle Shabelle regions of Somalia. Engineer Ahmed Bajuu is the president of this administration.

Abweyn State was formed in September 2011. Its goal is to rule the Banadir, Lower and Middle Shabelle regions of Somalia. Abdullahi Abdi Mohamed is the president of this administration.

Mini-states in One-Clan secessionist Enclave. aka Somaliland  aka  isaaq clan

Saylac and Lughaye state of Somalia was formed on February 7, 2012 to govern parts of Somaliland as a member of the federal government in Somalia. Mahad Abib Mohamud is the president of this administration, which includes clans from Somaliland, Saylac, and Lughaye located northwestern of Somalia. Somaliland has been controlling itself since its breakaway.

Awdal is clan based division based on a 16th century sultanate in the westernmost region between Somaliland and Djibouti inhabited by Gadabursi subclan of the Dir. Somaliland and Adwalland are vying for control of this region. Awdal State of Somalia wants to be part of a federal government of Somalia. Its second anniversary took place in Switzerland on March, 20, 2012. The closest that Rashid Aw Nor Hirsi, the president of Awdal State of Somalia, can travel is Mogadishu and the areas where Somaliland army have no presence.

Khaatumo was announced in January 2012 after a meeting in Taleh town of Sool and it comprises the Sool, Sanaag and Eyn regions. Khatumo was established during a conference known as Khatumo2 and supports TFG rather than Somaliland. The Dhulbahante clan, a sub clan of Darod clan, is dominant in the regions of Sool, Sanag and Eyn and has maintains the SSC militia fighters who fought against Somaliland in Buuhoodle. Major politicians including Ali Khalif Galeyr, a former Somali prime minister and lecturer at US universities, backed the conference. The Khatumo state of Somalia will have three presidents, rotating on a six month basis, and a supreme council comprising of three members, and a cabinet of six members. The three routine presidents are: Ahmed Elmi Osman (Amed Karash), Mohmaed Yusuf Jama (Indhasheeel) and Nur Elmi (Biindhe). In March of this year, the TFG officially recognized Khatumo. In March 2012, the TFG recognized the state, but rescinded this few days a later.

For a more detailed look at Khatumo, please see  Khatumo?".

Mini-states in Puntland

PUNTLAND: SOMALIA’S PIRATE STATE

Ras-Aseyr state was established on April 17, 2011 and is dominated by the Siwaqroon clan in the Bari region of Puntland. It was founded in Bargaal, the capital of Bari region and its president is Mohamed Farah Doxa-joog. This regional state has contacts with Maakhir, Mareeg, ASWJ, the TFG, and Khatumo, but almost has no contact with Puntland authorities. Ras-Aseyr claims they were forced to declare their own state, which lies within Puntland borders, after Puntland failed to develop their area and even neglected the needs of its people. Puntland, furious over its formation, has battled with the group for control of Bargaal, an eastern coastal area of Puntland driven by the Siwaqroon sub clan of the Majerteen.

Karkaar state shares its name with the mountain rage which runs through it and is mainly the southern area of Bari region of Puntland.

Maakhir was established in June 2009 after a dispute with Puntland authorities over a range of issues, including mining and oil resources. The biggest cities in the Maakhir state are Las Qoray, Badhan, Hadaaftimo Hingalol and Erigavo. Maakhir state was established by the Warsengeli sub clan of Darood and is not recognized by the government of Puntland. Jibril Ali Salad is the president of Maakhir state and maintains a parliament and a cabinet of ministers.

Dark Day .history of Somalia .January 26, 1991.Collapse of the somali nation( Key Players )