Draft Constitution: An instrument for balkanization and brutalization of Somalia

The people of Somalia face the looming dreadful reality of becoming a vanished nation/country because of the Draft Constitution soon to be rubber stamped through fraudulent political and legal process. As usual, the International Community and the media will join force to publicize the new constitution as a success story for Somalia. In contrast, the Draft Constitution is an instrument for balkanization and brutalization of Somalia on basis of the following reasons:

 It repeals the 1960 constitution in force which represents the legal and political foundation or the birth certificate of the Somali State/nation. The 1960 constitution embodies the basis for the admission of independent Somalia to the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, World Bank and the Organization of African Unity. It partitions the country into three territories-Somaliland, Puntland and South Central. In accordance with article 172, it binds specifically the South Central Somalia, while Somaliland and Puntland adopted separate constitutions drafted with the help of the International community. For this reason, the Draft Constitution omitted the demarcation of the national borders of Somalia, while the constitutional demarcation of national borders is imperative at this historical moment. It is not ending the transitional period extended after August 2012 for four more years during the Garowe Conferences. Also, it has nothing to do with the political dispensation for the establishment of new parliament and the election of national leaders. It introduces ideas, culture and values that could intensify the social and political tension within the Somali society. It weakens the commonality and amplifies the diversity among the Somali communities. It embeds multiple sources of conflict and confusion detrimental to the governance of Somalia so that the latter will vanish as a nation and country. It ignores the need for soul searching national reconciliation before drafting national constitution. A national consensus on the causes and effects of the civil war and the collapse of the Somali State is paramount for enduring peace in Somalia. It is immoral and political crime to draft a new constitution under the prevailing political and security conditions in Somalia.It fails to articulate a national vision and a workable national and local system of governance. There is strong belief that instead of federalism decentralization suits best Somalia’s needs for democratic and efficient governance. What is crucial for the Somali people is to negotiate in good faith a workable and hierarchical system of national and local governance that is accountable, trustworthy, sustainable, equitable and self sufficient. It lacks clarity, simplicity and practicability. It is written as a policy diktat paper. It devalues the Somali Citizenship and Somali Nationalism. It is not prepared in adherence to the provisions of the Transitional Federal Charter and in accordance with the required constitution-making process which is completely different from the process of making a law. The critical evaluation of the timing, the role of the international actors, the legitimacy of the process and persons responsible for drafting the constitution, the genuineness of public participation, and the role of the national authority is an important condition for the acceptance or rejection of a constitution. Particularly, the case for Somalia as a failed State requires high attention to legitimacy, stakeholders, participation, and transparency. Prof. Abdiwahid SheikhOsman Qalinle put it eloquently when he said, “Normally, the constitution-making process is a jealously guarded national treasure everywhere else but Somalia.” Unfortunately, International actors controlled the entire process.

For the above reasons and others, the overwhelming majority of the people of the “South Central Somalia (90%)” oppose the Draft Constitution. Similarly, the majority of the participants in the consultation draft constitution organized for the Somali Diaspora living in Minneapolis and Columbus expressed their objections to the Draft Constitution. The feedback from the consultations in Europe is the same. In general, the public questioned the motives behind the campaign for a new constitution.The participation of personalities from Puntland and Somaliland in the upcoming Constituency Assembly or new parliament serves only the purpose of muddling the Somali political situation. The agenda for outreach, unity, power-resource sharing on the basis of citizenship cannot go along with the agenda for separation, stand alone under Regional States or total independence pursued by Puntland and Somaliland with the collaboration of the international community.On April 24, President Sheikh Sharif of TFG has publicly repudiated the validity of the Transitional Federal Charter and consequently the legitimacy of the Transitional Federal Parliament after electing lawfully new Speaker (President’s Speech). The President belittled the role of the MPs and threatened anyone opposing his propaganda agenda. TFG leaders seem confident about the replay of 2008 Djibouti process by handpicking 225 new members of parliament under the protection and diplomatic support of AMISOM and Ethiopian forces, and with the financial support of donors.On his part, the Prime Minister Prof Abdiweli M. Ali announced the completion of the draft constitution and dismissed the opponents’ views by arguing that 99 % of the critics did not read the constitution. He has yet to publish the final draft of the constitution for transparency and public comment. I bet that TFG leaders did not read the Draft Constitution either. Otherwise they would not have released the unedited first draft of July 2010 for public consultation in March 2012.The rules of engagement of the AMISOM forces, the Kampala Accord and the Ethiopia’s forces have deprived the Somali Citizens including the MPs of their right to challenge their notorious incompetent and corrupt leaders. A corrupt political system of governance has taken root in “South Central Somalia” with the complicity of the international community. The leaders of Al Shabab and TFG are now using the same threatening language to gain power over the Somali people.It is plainly wrong to believe that the Draft Constitution will secure the actual transition from the transitional government to a permanent one possessing international privileges. Dropping the word “Transitional” will not graduate Somalia from failed state to credible international partner with the right of entering into international agreements or directly receiving bilateral and multilateral foreign aid. Any literate Somali Citizen who wants to believe such claim is someone whose understanding about the legal, diplomatic and economic foundations for international relations and cooperation is limited.

In reality, the Draft Constitution has distracted the people of Somalia from addressing systematically and passionately the causes and solutions of the real problems devastating their country. Today, about half of the Somali population is facing famine, malnourishment and insecurity inside and outside Somalia. The fraudulent approval of the Draft Constitution will be another calamity on Somalia. It is the responsibility of every Somali citizen to avoid the happening of that calamity with all legitimate means.

DR . Mohamud M. Uluso serves as Senior Political and National Security Analyst at Terror Free Somalia Foundation

mohamuduluso@gmail.com

Somalia: On Federalism and Constitutionality in Somalia - Difficulties of 'Post-Transitional' Institution Building Remain

Analysis

 

 

Somalia is at a turning point in its modern history, particularly in the capital and large swathes of the south. The period following the collapse of Mohamed Siad Barre's regime in 1991 is often referred to as 'two decades' of anarchy, occasionally with the qualifier 'especially in the south.' It is perhaps more useful, however, to consider Somalia's recent past in terms of three 'decades'.

 

Rather than drawing a line at 1991, the first 'decade' to consider is a period of intense violence from the mid-1980s - as insurgent movements picked up intensity along with the government's reprisals - to the mid-1990s, by when the explosion of clan-linked violence had dwindled considerably.

In the northwest and northeast, the mid-to-late 1990s marked a turning point, with political entities emerging - Somaliland and Puntland - that have continued since then to consolidate and deepen their political institutions.

 

 

Even in southern and central Somalia, the period from the mid-1990s until about 2004/05 - our second 'decade' - saw fairly stable control established by various militia groups in different parts of the country. Not uncontested, not without violence, but certainly of a lower order than the violent convulsions of the preceding decade.

 

 

However, from 2005, violent conflict escalated dramatically again in southern and central Somalia, as the government created by the 2004 Transitional Federal Charter attempted to establish itself in Mogadishu - amid an escalating conflict between warlords and Islamists for control.

 

 

The emergence of the Islamic Courts Union administration in the capital led to the forceful intervention of Ethiopia to remove it and ensconce the Transitional Federal Government - triggering the insurgency of al-Shabaab, a radical militia within the Islamic Courts fold which chose not to flee the Ethiopian offensive. With violence continuing into the present, this period has been our third 'decade'.

 

 

When the mandate of the TFG was brought to close in August 2012, amid intense regional and international pressure, many perceived a potential shift in the country's fortunes - both inside and outside Somalia.

 

 

The heady optimism of the initial 'Somalia rising' moment was fairly swiftly re-injected with weight and challenges of political reality. Nevertheless, there remained, and still remains, a sense that for southern and central Somalia, a different trajectory is possible.

 

 

Because of this sense of prospective opportunity, it is all the more important to move away from a view of Somalia as emerging from 'two decades of conflict,' and instead to put in the context of a longer view of Somali history the choices facing the authorities in Mogadishu and the range of sub-state political entities in the rest of Somalia - from the various clan militia, nascent local administrations, and emerging and aspirant regional states, to the established governments in Puntland and (even) Somaliland. Even the administration of al-Shabaab is ultimately a part of the political calculus.

 

 

And the question at the root of the Somali political project is now the question of federalism.

In seeking answers, Somalis are viewing not only the past two decades since the collapse of the state, but also looking back to the experience of the previous Somali state itself. Somalis are seeking not merely to 'restore' institutions, but rather to build a new set of institutions.

A pervasive sense of distrust in a strong central government, the legacy of the Barre era, informs the political negotiations - although this is magnified for many in a 'regional' context, and subdued for many directly linked to the administration in Mogadishu.

 

 

Politics versus institutions

 

 

For most participants in the political processes in Somalia, the shape of the debate over the country's future boils down to two terms: 'federalism' and 'constitutionality.'

However, it is clear from the experience of the first Somali Federal Government -- under recently ejected Prime Minister Farah Abdi Shirdon - that neither term is consistently defined.

In large part, this is because the current political dispensation in Mogadishu is not the result of a natural process, but rather of a chaotic and sometimes half-hearted attempt by the international community to fix Somalia through support of transitional governments from the year 2000.

The basis for Somalia's problems was recognised as clans' competition for political power; therefore starting in the year 2000, the basis for the Somali parliament and the cabinet became clan formations: 4 parts for the 4 large clan families and a half share for all the minority clans - this became known as the 4.5 formula.

 

 

It is worth noting that the Somali provisional constitution mentions the term 'clan' only once: in Article 11, which concerns equality of all citizens. In effect, this renders unconstitutional the 4.5 formula.

 

 

However, without a constitutional court, this formula will continue to be used by Somalia's government. This is a reflection of the continued primacy of political logic over any ideological commitment to 'institution-building', for its own sake.

 

 

While prone to abuse and despite evidence of large-scale selling of parliamentary seats by Somali elders, the 4.5 formula has proved the only way to create a representative government - i.e., a government in which a range of clan interests feel sufficiently represented to participate.

This logic was most recently manifested in Puntland, where the groundwork for direct elections was abandoned in mid-2013, leading to a relatively stable process for selecting a parliament, which in early January selected a new president for the state.

 

quandaries

 

However, returning to the federal level - at this stage, with the new government of Prime Minister Abdiweli Sheikh Ahmed having held its first cabinet meeting in late January, it is hoped that the federal government will now begin to make forward progress on its mandate for finalising the constitution and making the preparations necessary for general elections in 2016.

Even if expectations that direct elections will be feasible by then are low, the first 18 months of the four year parliamentary and presidential term have seen little progress on the general process of finalising the constitution, and putting it to a national referendum.

It is worth drawing attention to a range of constitutional issues facing politicians in Mogadishu and nationally, which are related to the relationship between Mogadishu and Somalia's 18 regions and federal states.

 

 

The constitution as currently understood creates a contradictory framework which has stymied, and could continue to undermine, progress on the national political project.

 

 

Problems with parliamentary structure

 

 

The Somali Federal Parliament is divided into two: the Upper House of Parliament, and the House of The People of the Federal Parliament. Currently, only the latter one exists; it is highly unlikely that the former will come into existence in the foreseeable future due to the current political climate.

This is because the members of the Upper House are supposed to be elected from the 18 regions of Somalia, and from the Federal Member States - whose formation is ongoing. To make matters more complicated, all Federal Member States must have the exact same number of representatives in the Upper House.

This issue will be a problem for years to come, as some states may feel disadvantaged. For example, a state comprising 4 regions could well complain that a state of only 2 regions has the same representation in the Upper House.

Why does this matter? While the current parliament will continue to legislate, all the laws it passes may be challenged when and if elections do take place in 2016 and a truly representative government is in place. Without the existence of an Upper House of Parliament, the House of The People of Federal Parliament cannot pass a draft law according to Article 82 of the draft constitution.

 

 

Federal Member States

 

 

The Somali constitution allows the creation of federal member states, but applies stringent requirements that are extremely difficult for state builders to meet. For example, only two or more Somali regions uniting can form a Federal Member State.

 

While not seemingly problematic, consider the fact that very few clans are the sole occupants of one region, let alone in two or more regions. It would take tremendous amount of reconciliation to create states that transcend clan boundaries.

 

 

One such future problem lies in central Somalia, in Galgadud, where there are many competing rival clans who can barely agree on an administration for their region, let alone uniting with another region to form a state.

 

Regions that do not join a state are to be administered by the federal government for a maximum of two years, according to Article 48 (clause 2) of the constitution. This raises a question: what happens after two years if a region does not merge into a federal member state? With two years approaching since the constitution was provisionally adopted, the answer to this question is particularly important.

 

 

Problems with state creation

 

 

Even when multiple regions are almost homogenous and state creation is technically feasible, there are problems with the state creation process, caused in part by constitutional ambiguity.

 

 

The first clause of Article 49 of the constitution stipulates that it is the House of the People (the existing lower house of parliament) that shall determine the number and boundaries of the Federal Member States; however, clause 6 of the same article stipulates that two or more regions may voluntarily merge to form a Federal Member State.

 

In effect, it is saying two things: the first is that it is the federal government that has the power to draw the boundaries of federal member states; and secondly, that any two regions can unite and form a state.

 

 

This lack of clarity in who can form a state has contributed to a rush to create federal member states by politicians in southern Somalia.

In mid-2013, representatives from the three Jubba river valley regions (Lower and Middle Jubba, and Gedo) met in Kismayo and declared a Jubbaland state. They met with strong opposition from the federal government and some clan elders, Jubbaland reached a compromise deal with the federal government.

 

 

In Baidoa, there are currently two competing camps trying to create a South Western Somalia state. One camp wants to create a more technically feasible state comprised of Bay, Bakool, and Lower Shabelle regions; the other camp wants to add Gedo, Middle Jubba, and Lower Jubba and make SWS a 6-region state.

While this confusion is rooted in local politicians' desire for power, the constitutional ambiguity and the federal government's mild participation in federal state building has exacerbated the problem.

 

 

Sharing of natural resources

 

 

The only currently existing state that mostly fulfils the constitutional requirements for statehood is Puntland. While Puntland played a major role in the constitutional consultative process, its relations with the federal government worsened significantly since the adoption of the constitution.

The Puntland administration has signed contracts with foreign oil companies, and believes that it has a right to do so; on the other hand, the federal government maintains that it has the sole authority to award concessions for oil exploration.

The constitution does not help answer the question of how natural resources are to be shared, let alone who has the power to sign oil contracts. It does, however require that both sides negotiate a deal between them.

Article 44 of the constitution stipulates that "the allocation of natural resources of the Federal Republic of Somalia shall be negotiated by, and agreed upon, by the Federal Government and the Federal Member States in accordance with this constitution".

However, even if Puntland and the federal government were to agree on how to share natural resources, the question of which regions are actually part of Puntland may in the future threaten any such deal.

For instance, Puntland lays claims to parts of Sool and Sanaag, and to a lesser extent, parts of Togdheer in the form of the Puntland-created Ayn region (people in Ayn have multiple loyalties: to Puntland, Khatumo, and Somaliland).

Areas claimed by Puntland are also claimed by Somaliland and Khatumo state. Any deal signed between Puntland and the federal government will be challenged by the latter two.

 

 

Conclusion

 

 

In essence, problems with the constitution and its implementation reflect the top down approach of institution building in Mogadishu - an approach adopted of necessity by the international community which bankrolled the TFG and constitutional drafting process. This 'centralised' support is hitting up against the reality that local and regional political processes are more substantive.

The messy and violent way that the Jubbaland state was first formed, then came into conflict with Mogadishu and was eventually pushed into a compromise with the federal government under Ethiopian mediation has established an important precedent.

That process underlines both the fact that Mogadishu does not have the capacity to drive state formation, and the fact that some kind of political compromise will be needed between the federal government and future Member States, as well.

 

 

The federal government has to recognise the existing problems with the constitution and take steps to fix them. Not doing so now will lead to continued problems with federal state creation, which may ultimately lead to a return of hostilities between rival states that have overlapping territories.

Mohamed Mubarak, a political and security analyst, is the founder of anti-corruption NGO Marqaati (Marqaati.org), based in Mogadishu @somalianalyst

Jason Mosley is a Research Associate at the African Studies Centre, Oxford University @africaupdate

Interview with Honourable Prof Ali Khalif Galayr, Former Prime Minister of Somalia about The current political status of Somaliland, Puntland, Khatumo

Prof Ali Khalif Galayr, Former Prime Minister of Somalia

The conflict that arose in the Somaliland-Puntland disputed regions of Sool, Sanaag, and Eyn (Cayn) led the Dhulbahante clan to establish its own mini-state, Khatumo, independent from Somaliland and part of the federal government of Somalia.

Former prime minister of Somalia and retired Professor Ali Khalif Galeyr, a member of the Dhulbahante clan, is elder and advocate for Khatumo state. Somalia Report’s Muhyadin Ahmed Roble met with Prof. Galeyr in Nairobi to interview him about Khatumo's plans was well as its conflict with Somaliland.

You have been largely absent from the Somali political stage since 2001. What made you return?

I have been taking part in a number of meetings since that time, including during the Ethiopian intervention, but primarily I have participated from locations outside Somalia, usually over the telephone. I have traveled to Somalia only twice since 2001, once to Mogadishu during the Islamic Union's period, and once to the north of the country. Somali Politics is not a profession; events determine whether one participates or not. For me, it is the events that made me come back.

What was your role during Ethiopia’s occupation in Somalia?

My role was primarily participation in a number of peaceful demonstrations against the Ethiopian occupation. These took place in Washington, London, and Minneapolis. I was also engaged in writing petitions and giving media interviews.

So, what has changed, if anything, since the occupation?

There is a new face of Ethiopia intervention, mostly in southwest and central regions. I believe they are in the Gedo, Bay, and Bakool regions and even in Hiiraan and may be moving towards Galmudug but I think it is different kind of intervention. What they are doing now has the blessings of IGAD, the African Union and the United Nations, so it is different sort of involvement in terms of intervention. I hope it will be also different in terms of mandate and the exit scenarios of not only the Ethiopians but also the Kenyans who are also in the country, mostly in the Juba Valley. Initially, they went in to pursue their own self-interests and to counter what have been perceived as a threat from al-Shabaab but I heard now that Kenyan forces are very much under the command of AMISOM.

Some critics believe that Ethiopia still plays a role in Somali politics. Is that true?

Ethiopia is a neighbor and probably the most important player in regional politics. Kenya is becoming more engaged diplomatically and politically but as I said earlier, maintaining troops in the Juba Valley and are formally part of AMISOM. Ethiopia’s history with Somalia has been very troubled, dating back hundreds of years. But more recently, I think there has been a change in the way the two countries relate to each other. Yes, Somalis will still see foreign troops in Somalia negatively and not in the long time interest of the Somali people. But there is a change in the perception of this issues and Ethiopia it is more of now Ethiopia being more actually engaging the whole range of activities. They have a significant presence in Somaliland, Puntland and definitely in Mogadishu. That presence is an example of Ethiopia leveraging their regional influence but I think it is not outright antagonism, as many have suggested. Also, Ethiopia has legitimate concerns about its own border security, particularly with regard to the presence of guerilla groups there. Also, Ethiopia is a legitimate part of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the African Union and the United Nations, which are all trying to bring about peace in Somalia. So, understand the difference between the previous Ethiopia intervention and current one in Somalia one has to look closely whether the different initiatives and engagements of this foreign troops it all add up and lead to effective and beneficial engagement. While they do need to be watch closely, Ethiopia appears not to be here solely to pursue its own agenda, but rather as part of the overall effort to stabilize Somalia and to bring about and maintain peace.

Since the formation of Khatumo, there has been armed violence with Somaliland in SSC regions; is there any process of engaging talks between Khatumo and Somaliland?

There are a number of people who tried to talk to Somaliland and us, some of them governments and as I said earlier, the Ethiopian government has really tried very hard to bring us together. Ethiopia invited Somaliland President Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud to come Addis Ababa and to sit down with us, and see if we can sort out things. Unfortunately, the president declined the invitation, and his justification was that he was planning to attend London meeting last February, and only after he attends that meeting will he have position on whether to sit down with Khatuma or not.

I heard other governments, European and North America, who also attempt to convince him in talks. There are also Somalis, some of them from that part of Somalia (Somaliland), others from other parts of the country who have genuinely try to use their own networks and talk to the president but to this day he has not accepted the invitation either for meditation or for direct talks with Khatumo.

So, in your view, what has made Somaliland refuse to engage talks with Khatumo?

I think there are two main issues. The first one is public opinion in Somaliland because the people for the last twenty some years have been bombarded with the idea that we are going to be a separate state, that we are very close to being recognized, but there is still the old sentiment that we remain part of Somalia. So, I think there is fear or at least apprehension on the part of the administration or members of the administration are that public opinion is against our state being granted autonomy. I don’t share that sentiment, of course, but I think that there is a place for leadership and that is Somaliland and the whole of Somalia are in serious historic moment - one that will require leadership. I find Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud, president of Somaliland, to be a highly intelligent, experienced fellow and I think there is a desperate need for somebody like him to take the lead and to make sure to address the real roots of conflicts among clans in Somaliland as well as misunderstanding among Somaliland and Somalia.

The second issue is that it seems to me that the moment is just not right at the moment. There are no serious partners in Mogadishu and therefore I think that is outright miscalculation to believe the time is right for talks. There is no way under the presence circumstances, including the occupation of Las Anod, the very large number of troops which are lined up close to Buhoodle, that I don’t think that the Khatumo state will go back to fault if there were such fault before. I think it is the expectation or at least the idea that President Mohamoud will be able to win over some traditional elders or other important personalities in Khatumo state, which, in my opinion, is highly, highly unlikely. The traditional elders, of whom there are thirteen, and the members of the administration of Khatumo have the full confidence of the Sool, Sanaag and Eyn people, and I don’t think one of them would dare betray this united front of the people of our state.

If public opinion is against the Khatumo state, what can Somaliland politicians do?

Somaliland leadership has a very strong influence in terms of molding public opinion and I think public opinion in Somaliland, especially among the Isaq clan, has been evolving. I feel public opinion, on the one hand, puts pressure on leaders to make sure that their stated positions are maintained, but at same time the leaders have the responsibility to try and change public opinion at critical times such as this.

After twenty-one years or so no government has recognized Somaliland, nor do I think this will happen simply because the Isaq clan is a small ethnic group in broader Somali picture. I don’t think public opinion in Africa or in the neighboring areas are supportive of secession, which is why Somaliland has not been recognized. I doubt very much it will be recognized unless there was unanimity among the five ethnic groups or clans in Somaliland, which is not currently the situation. Four of the other major clans of Somaliland are opposed, either openly or covertly, against secession. There are individuals from the Esse, the Gudbibiirse, the Warsengeli, and the Dhulbahante who hold administrative positions but that do not accurately represent the public opinion in Borama or in Seyla, or Las Anod, buhoodle, Eyrgabo or Las Qoray.

So, the idea of secession is held by only one of five ethnic groups, which seriously undermines the idea of secession. Yes, they deserve the claim. They did not have a fair share in terms of political positions, development, nor the exploitation of natural resources being utilized in Somaliland. Nonetheless, I don’t think the neighboring countries or the whole of Africa, nor the UN or IGAD will approve secession, which why is I don’t think Somaliland is going to be recognized. The Somaliland administration is also weakening their own positions tremendously by being aggressive and trying by force to claim that Sool, Sanaag and Eyn is their territory, which groups like the UN do not view as a productive method of gaining support for secession and recognition.

isaaq  clan   had experienced from somali government in the past. Isn’t that enough justification to stand independently?

It was a brutal administration. I was part of that administration until 1982. I saw what was happening and I imagined what was just appearing in the horizon and that why I parted company with that administration. Yes, people of Somaliland have every right to complain about the atrocities that took place. My view is even before those things happened, in late 1980’s; they were people from Somaliland who were part of that very administration until the last days. They were prime ministers, they were ministers in cabinets, they were senior military officers, police force, civil servants, diplomatic core, etc. Therefore, the idea that the people of Somaliland were targeted as one large ethnic group, however, is largely incorrect and inaccurate and it is perhaps not the best idea to raise those claims as being justification for the secession of the entire Somaliland region. The important thing today is: what Somaliland is doing right now to the people of Sool, Sanaag and Eyn.

What is being done in Las Anod?

In Las Anod, school children who demonstrated and threw stones against the Isaq or Somaliland whatever you know them were laid down, shot, and killed.There are also a large number of young primary school students who are in Somaliland jails. This is not secret and something everyone knows. It is something Somaliland itself knows. They were simply killed and arrested because of their demonstration against the military occupation, because they say we don’t want that Isaq or Somaliland troops to occupy Law Anod against our will or to forcibly occupy the water wells of Hagoogane, Karshaale, Miigaagle and Soo Joogte. These wells are the lifeline of Somali nomads, a pastoral people who has been using these wells traditionally for hundreds of years. Today, Somaliland forces now are occupying those wells.

So, Somaliland is exactly doing what they are accusing that Siad Barre has done to them, and in fact are using the same tactics of the Siad Barre regime against the poor and unarmed people of Sool, Sanaad and Eyn, and in some cases they are even going beyond that. I heard and read statements made by the current foreign minister of Somaliland in which he says Somaliland is one, its borders are known, and if the people of Sool, Sanaag and Eyn don’t want be part of that, they can leave. I mean that is incredible statement to make; that is exactly taking a leaf from that horrific book authored by Milosevic of Yugoslavia, the Serbian leader who believed the only ways Yugoslavia could be held together is to engage in what has been called ethnic cleansing, and that is exactly what the young foreign minister of Somaliland is suggesting.

Khatumo MapThe people of Khatumo state have been part of Somaliland a long time, so why do you want to break away now?

We were part of supposedly former British Somaliland. The five ethnic groups that are the population of Somaliland, three or four of them signed friendship agreements with the British before they colonized the area. Khatumo or the people of Sool, Sanaag and Eyn never signed an agreement with British. On the contrary, they fought the British for over twenty years to resist the colonization. Yes, from the 1920s to 1960s during that thirty, forty years we were part of what was called British Somaliland. What we shared with the people you are saying now we were part of that was only colonial administration. There was a colonial governor and that is what constituted British Somaliland.

Traditionally, we were one people before and during the colonization and even now. We share grazing and wells and we also intermarry. We are people who have that historic cultural and social and political relationship traditionally. The difference arises when you try to replace the colonial administration with an administration that is Isaq-based. I don’t belong to them and they don’t belong to us. We can only come together voluntarily of sharing things. Unfortunately, Somalia everything is based on 4.5. It is based on ethnic relations, and no ethnic group can force the others to be part of their imagination. Somaliland or Isaq clan cannot overwhelm the people of Sool, Sanaag and Eyn even if they win couple of battles. This would cause long term pain for both sides, and both sides would lose.

There is win-win vision, however, and that is for both sides to sit down together. They are not moving out of neighborhood nor are we. It is in our common interest to come together and talk and agree on what will be of mutual benefits. But if they think they can force us to accept their dominance and through force, I don’t think that is something acceptable and we have every right to defend ourselves. This would be a justified war for us, though our strong preference is that neither side would fight the other. We don’t want to fight. We have been saying this publically and privately and will continue saying it but there is a limit to how far we can restrain our people.

From that point of view, does the federalism system seem to create division among Somalis, clans and central and regional government?

Yes and no. In the absence of central authority, whoever comes out and say, “I am autonomous and I have my own administrative and political arrangements in place,” they can have their flag, they can have their national anthem so long as that there is no sufficient reason to doubt their aim of getting its own flag and national anthem. Somaliland clearly says, “I am not part of Somalia." Puntland is the only one that leverages its position. The leadership of Puntland, started from Abdullahi Yusuf, the founder of Puntland, came to the meeting in Embakasi in Kenya, and Abdullahi gave his speeches of candidacy for the presidency of Somalia. Fine, he has every right to run for president but the problem was that everybody knew his true position was, "either I become president of Somalia or we will just walk out." I think Mr. Farole, the current president of Puntland, has that in his mind also - "either I will get what I want (from all appearances he wants to be next president of Somalia), or I will walk out."

But to come back to your question, if there are administrations like Himan and Heeb, Galmudug, Khatumo and others that emerging and are moving forward administratively, I believe that to be positive because those little administrations may produce credible local leadership which can then take part in reconstituting the reemergence of Somalia. So, it is positive, therefore, because if someone wants to say something about Himan and Heeb, there is local leadership there who are already in place. So, it makes the reemergence of Somalia that much easier. There are going to be political difficulties, but that is what politics is all about. There are different ambitions, different tactics, and strategic considerations that local leadership will be coming up with. I prefer that then imposing something in Mogadishu and saying here is the national government, without the requested support of different districts and regions.

The draft constitution reads that only two or more regions could form semi-autonomous states, but we see the emerging of mini-state phenomena whereby each clan-district became a base for mini-state. What are the positive aspects of such clan-based mini-states, if any?

The draft constitution, which has not been ratified, states that the federating units are going to be two or more regions of the old 18 regions of the last years of Barre regime in 1990s. So either two or more of those will constitute a federal unit. That is what is in the draft constitution. We shouldn’t jump the gun. I mean we have to wait for its endorsement. If we have many administrations, I really don’t see them in negative terms. I think they can contribute to the bringing everybody back home, back to the national framework.

In Galmudug, the old Mudug, there may be three or four administrations; in Hiiraan there may be three or four different little administrations. These are all attempts to get out of the mess due the lack of a central authority. I imagine, on the one hand, there is political ambition whether personal or one the part of an entire ethnic group to constitute and curve out their own little administration, but the same time it is out of frustration when things don’t happen in Mogadishu and we are getting beyond what can be tolerated. I mean people are just fed up with the chaos and the lack of movement or motion out of the center, the capital. So, the efforts, I think, are worthwhile if people go to their districts and regions and think through and spend time in conversing support in forming their little regional administrations. That is really positive.

If you read the draft federal constitution, what did you find out?

I read and I am familiar with a lot of papers that were represented before and even reactions to some of the drafts and competing ideas of some of the articles. I think the draft federal constitution is fine but it is technical document. What was needed and still needed is: are the Somali people aware of this, on board in terms of what the draft constitution provides. However, it is a draft, which one can see good aspects and good articles particularly in the attempts of dealing with the issues of human rights, civil liberties, and the issues of building democratic institutions. But what is missing and is very troubling is that some of these issues still require a great deal of discussion and debate. These are very controversial, decisive issues and you can’t just have a technical solution to some of these issues, it has to have the backing of the people.

We were talking earlier about federal setup and in fact the current interim transition government is a federal system and constitution talks about a federal system, there are differential orientation to what this is about. I meant there is more support for federation in a place like Baidoa or Garowe than there is in Mogadishu itself or I imagine Balad Weyne or Kismayo. And that issue should have been brought to the attention of those drafting of constitution: how do we address these critical issues? How do we make sure that we are consulting amongst government officials and with the people and are taking into the account of the serious differences among regions or among ethnic groups? Only when you come to a measure of the understanding and compromising, can you then draft a constitution or address some of these crucial points that will make or break the reemergence of Somalia.

As I stated, I don’t think there has been that sufficient political discussion and political discourse. It appears, in terms of ratifying the constitution that we are still relying on technical mechanisms. Some of the regions in Somalia or some of ethnic groups have more established traditional leaderships or authorities, others don’t. So, it will be a mixed bag. I mean when you talk traditional elders, yes for some areas you will find it is heritage the traditional leaders, it goes back many, many years and there will be no any contestation as to who are the traditional leaders of these places. Since the Siad Barre administration, it should be noted, there has been creation of new Caqils, new traditional leaders. There has been inflationary trend in the creation of those and most politicians - especially those who will try to fix the game - will say we have our own traditional elders also, and properly will announce brand new ones for the occasion. This is very serious and it will be will be very challenging. The idea now is to divide them up to the usual 4.5, so what you do with some of the constituent parts that don’t have traditional elders. That is one aspect.

The other more serious aspect is the 825 who are going to be constituted by 4.5 clans of Somalia. I understand perfectly well the notion of the constituent assembly. Before you even have a referendum for the whole country to come up with an arrangement, which can substitute for the general referendum but the 825 and the time they are going to be given, is very short. Even how you are selecting members of the constituent is more important issue than their number. This is deciding the destiny of the whole of the country and its people and to take Somalia out of ongoing multiple conflicts. I don’t think sufficient times have been allotted for this 825 to deliberate and to discuss.

I think the third concern is the perception is that Somali input in this whole exercise is not up to power; it is not to the level that no Somalis will be comfortable with. We need desperately international input, we need desperately for people of good will who even in some cases putting their own lives at risk to have an input on this. But how do you come up with what the average Somali will feel comfortable and will be supportive of? The Minister of Constitution, Hon. Abdirahman Hosh, and the Hon. Abdillahi Goodah Barre the other day convened a meeting in Nairobi and they gave good presentation of how they are taking to the account the opposition or reservation of the Somali people groups and ethnic groups. I welcomed that and congratulated them for convening that meeting the other day. But I don’t that is sufficient; I think we need more of that. I understand perfectly well Mogadishu is not very secure, though it is becoming relatively more peaceful, but you can curry support through local media and there are traditional Somali ways of even bringing the 16 districts of Mogadishu together for discussions or for having public meetings beyond Mogadishu in other regions and districts. Therefore, what I am suggesting is that a simple referendum is not sufficient, what is important is coming up with ways to present this draft document to the public for their input and approval.

SOMALIA ON THE VERGE OF REVERTING TO THE 1991 BLOODY SITUATION

The Garowe principles 1 and 2, and Galkayo agreements were not inclusive nor had they acquired legal status because they were not having executive formulated to take the form of decree law, or administrative social will to be submitted to parliament to obtain legal status, or to be acted upon on a precedence of administrative act which gives the government the right to acquire the prevailing social situation on the different districts and regions.

The signatories of both Garowe principles and Galkayo agreements had violated the charter and the country laws where by the President and the prime Minister abused their powers by making themselves equal to the authorities of the President of Punt land, the President of Galmoudug and the Movement of Sunna Walgamaha.It is ridiculous that the UN and the international community accepted and endorsed such illegal actions by the higher authorities of Somalia Transitional Federal institutions.Most of the Somali population is obsessed and taken by surprise by the international community on why they encouraged six persons to represent Somalia while the action of the international community violates the charters of the UN regional organizations and sub regional organizations, as well as the sovereignty of Somalia.the current volatile situation of Somalia which caused the bomb assassination of the Prime Minister reveals a serious security lapse and created accusations and counter accusations in the security apparatus of Somalia, and it is quite apparent that the above mentioned principals and agreements would return the Horn of Africa nation to the civil strife of 1991 where there was a green line in Mogadishu.

Without any complications and not undergoing any hustling and creation of conflicts, the process of changing the current authorities could have been done by making amendments in the charter.This could have been possible by amending the articles of the charter which stipulates that the current parliament will be replaced by an elected parliament.Instead of this, the current parliament will be replaced 275 Members of parliament selected by traditional leaders based on the 4.5 clan formula.What is more frustrating is the Somali president who is the custodian of then charter but who has failed to act upon it.

THE DRAFT OF THE CONSTITUTION

Somalis feel that the drafting of the constitution was not under their guidance and ownership. They regard the process as unacceptable in terms of expenditure and formulation of the text of the draft of the constitution.This is tedious process could have been tackled by taking the Somali constitution 1960 as a base and in addition the draft Constitution 1989 and the current charter.As the constitution is a social contract, the input of the Somali people is inevitable, for the constitution carries the aspirations, hopes, correction of injustices, preservation of the rights of individuals and the whole population of Somalia irrespective of being Somalis or foreigners.At present, accessibility to most districts and regions is impossible, hence the draft of the constitution should be left to the incoming parliament and government and the amendment of the charter is enough to establish the subsequent government and parliament.The current crisis in Somalia warrants immediate intervention of correcting the aftermath of Garowe and Galkayo Accords and the drafting of the constitution. via The American Chronicle,

Somalia: Five Reasons to remove President Hassan from Pos

President Hassan Sheikh is unfit for the position 5 Reasons to remove him

Every sane citizen in our troubled nation knew the job ahead was anything but easy task for one man or small group to shoulder it. People ignored and looked the other way to question the process that ascended Mr. Hassan to the Presidency. Everyone hurried to cut the cord to the dreaded "TRANSITION", ignoring the unparallel amount of corruption introduced by candidate Hassan and his minders to the already polluted Somali political race discourse.

We all hoped once the T word is behind us. Everything will fall in its place. Clannism, cronyism and corruption performers will be ashamed in the public view. A new united Somalia, shared and owned by all would emerge from the shadows led by a local veteran who knew the ills and have the ability to find the cure.

Boy, if the smile and the hand wave can deceive; cleverly he did to us.

5 reasons to remove President Hassan:

1. President Hassan sworn to protect and uphold the Federal Constitution of Somalia. The provincial constitution draft needed to be completed in time so the federal states of Somalia would have been formed on the basis of the federal law. President Hassan oppose Federal system to be implemented in Somalia during his tenure as President. The deliberate delay led by the President in the implementation and review of the constitution had caused more damage to the Somali political map. For example, Lower Shabelle region is forcibly married to four other competing regional states such as 3 regions state, 6 regions state, 2 Shabelle state and Banadir state. All this happened deliberately under his nose and without any attempt to stop this polarization. This means more damage and confusion to the state formation process caused by President's ill towards Federalism. Deliberate reckless that is brewing anew rounds of civil wars. For this I call the President' removal.

2. Failure to build cohesive National Army: An interview given by President Hassan to his second day on the job. He measured his number one priority to be a) Security b) Security c) Security. The weakness in the security apparatus is so evident that shabab attacked, entered and murdered people in the country's top three institutions among other targets:

a) 14 April 2013, Alshabab terrorist captured Banadir Court and Supreme Court premises killing scores of innocent people.

b) 21 February 2014, Alshabab terrorist group captured part of Villa Somalia killing number of people including senior government officials. Putting apparent danger to the President, his family and aides.

c) 24 May, 2014, Alshabab terrorists captured Somali Parliament killing dozens of Somali and AMISOM soldiers. 

These high profile attacks highlight Alshabab's increased strength during Hassan's reign. Whereas, Somali national forces remained weakened with no ability to foil nor detect Shabab attacks before it's too late. Mind you, this is just 3 out of the hundreds of attacks committed by Alshabab in the last two years. It is very evident that President Hassan failed to be our commander-in chief. For this I call the President's removal.

3. Corruption and Cronyism: All knew President Hassan and his minders paid more dollar per vote than any other candidate in the Somali vote buying-scheme history. His was unseen before. Qatar, Zam Zam foundation, Alkheyr Company, Wacaysle businessmen contributed to Hassan's vote bidding spree. People ignored the process but accepted the result and the winner. Sadly, Hassan never moved with his people. Today, the Alkheyr Company, co-owned by the President is the most active enterprise in the nation. Alkheyr Company is managed by Mr. Ismail Wardhere, cousin and close confidante to the President. Alkheyr Company is either part contractor or fully contractor to almost every project currently under way in Mogadishu including:

a) Contract with TIKA for Mogadishu road construction and renovation

b) Food Aid delivery by Turkish aid agencies (distribution & transport)

c) Mogadishu port logistics and management

d) Mogadishu airport fuel supply

e) AMISOM logistics supply management

f) Food aid supply to all the major hospitals and government institutions

g) Majority of government procurement is handled by Alkheyr or its affiliates

Basically, every second wheel rolling in Mogadishu's streets are either co-owned, co-contracted or fully contracted by Alkheyr Company. For this chronic malfeasance I call President's removal.

4. Decision making dwarfism and weak leadership: Except its effort to aid corruption and cronyism no other decision is made at Villa Somalia on fashionable time. A nation that is behind every developmental index scale can't afford self imposed indecisiveness. A good example is the plethora of duly sanctioned duties by the constitution to be implemented on clearly marked set of dates. Clearly, it was the President who willingly hijacked the nation's entire executive functions to no tangible results. People close to him attribute the excessive delay due to lack of decision making. Worse, not trusting anyone to carry own assignment without his unproductive prerogative. Arrogance, egoism and blind pride may have prevented him to seek advice.

The US government and the biggest donor in the Somali security sector have already made their assessment on President Hassan. Mr James Clapper, US Chief intelligent described Hassan's leadership" The credibility and effectiveness of the young Somali government will be further threatened by persistent political infighting, weak leadership from President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, ill-equipped government institutions and pervasive technical, political and administrative shortfalls," Mr Clapper declared.

Therefore, it's prudent to ask this question. Can this nation afford another 2 or more years of weak leadership and decision making dwarfism? NO! For this I call the President to be removed.

5. Clannish President: No Somali learned or unlearned can escape from the clan label. But this President is exceptional demonstrating his bias towards certain tribe and clans. To him inclusivity starts with Damuljadid and ends with SIMAD factory. But today I display with care President Hassan's hateful towards Daarod tribe. Before Hassan moved in to Villa Somalia the total number of employees were 350 members consisting number of clans including high number of Daroods, specially in the security departments(80 members). Today, Darood members working in Villa Somalia is reduced to one non essential staff member from 80 plus. Whilst, new pay roll ballooned to 450 members; mostly recruited from SIMAD factory.

Other clannish deliberations include:

a. Hassan's unforgivable negative behavior towards the formation of Jubbaland. At one point calling Mr. Ahmed Madobe and Gen Darwish surrogates and non Somalis. He trenched heels until Ethiopia cajoled him to accept what JRA offered from the get go.

b. Removing 12 foreign service staff all belonging to Darood sub clans including Ambassadorial post. Replacing in their posts anew cadets from SIMAD factory.

c. Replacing two Majeerten Director Generals from their posts out of 25 ministerial portfolios. Today in the largest cabinet ever assembled, MJ has no sitting DG in the government. While Hawiye DGs are 10 out of 25 posts. This ill is mentioned not to be associated to Hawiye clan as a whole but to demonstrate this administration's unfairness and clannish despotism.

d. Supporting Somaliland claim over Sool and Sanaag in the expense of Puntland and Khatumo. President Hassan never exercised his constitutional duty to keep Somali territorial integrity intact by adding his voice against SL aggression towards Khatumo and Puntland. Through the Ministry of National Security, President Hassan sanctioned a group of pseudo elders to participate 18 MAY Somaliland celebration. A sad day to which the Somali unity received its most painful injury. Please watch this humiliatingvideo link depicting to a man who claimed to be the chief elder and chair for the Somali elders council. He was financed by none other than his Minister Mr. Abdikarim H. Guled. Here is the link: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bve0pnLNlqc

e. Hassan's sheer contempt ignoring the issue of land and property restitution. Calling occupiers and thugs to Someone else's HERO!

Like any other major tribe, Darood and their sub clans are indispensible for the nations unity and its political organization. No clan is dispensable from the national discourse. Let alone major clans that hold a big sway. Whether it was miscalculation on his part or reviving the failed USC-SNA anti Darood sentiments. This President has failed to unite to the already fragmented nation by sowing a new clan based conflict. For this I call President Hassan to be removed.

Finally, this thesis may be hard on the ears of the President to be reminded who we really think he is. But it is not meant for Hawiye vs Darood conundrum. In fact, many Hawiye clans are suffering from President Hassan's sheer maltreatment including Abgsal sub clans outside of his Ali Gaaf sub sub clan. Furthermore, look what his incoherent policies are doing to Digil and Mirifle beltway. First, he encouraged and supported the 6 region state formation. Now, he is on the side of the 3 region state.

The two main opposition camps against President Hassan are led by Hon Abdulkadir Osoble organizing his removal from the Parliament chambers. At the outside and at the civil society corridors is led by Dr. Abdirahman Baadiyow. Both are from Abgal clan. These two fine men are working hard to show the true character of Hassan Sheikh, a one of deceit, corruption and poor leadership.

Therefore, it should not interpreted ala Somali fadhi ku dirir scorn against any particular clan. Rather to put emphasis to one man's arrogance and the danger his actions may cause to the already fractured Somali kin. 

President Hassan Sheikh must go...now!

Abdullahi Sh. Moallim

Somali Scholar and Journalist

Doha, Qatar

SOMALIA ON THE VERGE OF REVERTING TO THE 1991 BLOODY SITUATION PART TWO.Profiling Tribal Entities, Forecasting The Next Big Somali War

Terror Free Somalia investigates the impact of the establishment of mini-states on the country’s fragile stability.

 Part #1  SOMALIA ON THE VERGE OF REVERTING TO THE 1991 BLOODY SITUATION 

In many ways, Somalia appears to be slowly recovering from two decades of civil war. One long-standing obstacle to the recovery process has been all but eliminated with the dramatic decline in the popularity of the al-Shabaab terrorist organization. As Somalia makes territorial gains against al-Shabaab and plans for national elections in August, many predict that Somalia is close to returning as a viable state. But for Ahmed Sheikh Ali, a lawyer and a former president of Somalia’s Court of Appeal, the country is far from standing on its own two feet. He is skeptical about the increasing semi-state phenomenon, describing it as "a war in waiting."

Mr. Ali, a veteran judge, is extremely frustrated by the increasing development of the system of mini-states in Somalia, which was introduced in the 2004 National Charter of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Based on his extensive experience with the Somali cultural and judiciary systems, Sheikh Ali said the union of mini-states cannot bring Somalia peace, offering his opinion that “the mini-state style of government will reignite hidden clan conflagrations.”

His observations on this matter have indeed become increasingly clear. At least thirty semi-regional states have been announced in Somalia since 2006. They all have self-nominated presidents mand many go so far as appointing foreign, interior and defense ministers. They are also increasingly creating their own identities, to include flags, state anthems and websites. Former Prime Minister of Somalia Ali Khalif Galaydh said such culture was recently in practice when Somalia President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed visited Puntland. According to Mr. Galaydh, “There are often different national anthems, flags, protocols and in some ways, for outside observers, it appears these are two governments, two states that are meeting." The most negative aspect of this development is that the mini-state appears superior to the central government, as in the case of Somalia’s TFG and Puntland, semi-autonomous, potentially complicating national reunification.

The mini-state phenomena in Somalia has become a rare window of political opportunity for power-hungry politicians and businessmen and women who organize the establishment of mini-states in as cities across Europe, United States, and in some Arab and African states, though not in Somalia, according to Mr. Ali. The majority of these self-proclaimed mini-state "presidents" are part of various Somali diaspora living internationally though most, unfortunately, cannot return to the areas they claiming to govern. Some of these officials paid their flight ticket back to Somalia with contributions from the Somali communities in the West.

“It could be understood as a shortcut of becoming a president by mobilizing kinsmen,” said Mr. Ali. Mohamed Ali, a researcher and analyst in Mogadishu, believes that the increasing phenomena of mini-states in Somalia could jeopardize national unity. “It could even lead to confrontations among Somalia’s mini-states and the federal government, particularly among the mini-states themselves who could have confrontations on the borders dividing them," Mohamed Ali told terror free somalia   .

“Every single clan and even sub clan will proclaim a mini-state and then may try to claim their share of the resources and power in the federal government. This could be further exacerbated by hundreds of sub-clans,” he explained.

Proclaiming a mini-state and then going to Mogadishu is now becoming a way for individuals to quickly appear on the national stage. “Just go to your clan elders and convince them that you are lobbying for your clan’s political rights in the federal system and they will accept. The government should stop this practice because it adds more fuel to the ongoing Somali conflict and no one will be able to stop it,” he warned.

Dalmar Haji, a Ph.D. candidate in Peace and Conflict Resolution and Somali National Party member, expressed concern about the existence of more than fifty mini-states in a small country like Somalia. He says that it could a big obstacle in bring Somalis together or even under one central government. “It can increase a clan conflict among clans in same region and even border conflict between the mini-states,” said Mr. Dalmar.

Despite the warnings, the TFG showed no signs of abandoning the recognition of mini-states. Somali President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed officially recognized the newly formed state of Khatumo, formerly part of the breakaway region of Somaliland. Somaliland, whose forces fought against militias loyal to Khatumo state in Buuhoodle, rejected the offer from the TFG to legitimize Khatumo, accusing President Ahmed of conspiring against “unity of Somaliland."

In Mogadishu this March, TFG security forces disbanded a meeting by the Ex-Banadir state for the establishment of a parliament of the state citing that the meeting was illegal and was not approved by the TFG Interior Ministry. “We have sent the Interior Ministry a request letter for holding the meeting but they replied with refusal and we cannot accept this because all other clans had their own states and nobody discarded it," said Salah Fuleyl, member of the organizers of the meeting.

Hassan Isak, a member of parliament, he said that although the National Charter allows the formation of the mini-states, he disagrees with the interpretation of it. “It was not formed in a good way and could lead to further conflicts. It does not lead to a solid federal system, but to a less fragile one than we imagined,” he added. Isak calls for the TFG to end the process of recognizing of the mini-states. “Just as greediness cannot be not be tolerated, the TFG should restrict it,” he commented.

The concern is not only about the increasing mini-states, said PhD candidate Dalmar Haji. “It is all about ratifying the draft federal constitution of Somalia because the federal government is not suitable to solve conflicts in Somalia, but instead it refuels the conflict,” he said.

Dalmar says power struggle among clans is negatively contributing to the civil war in Somalia. He stated that “now the federal system is immediately and unexpectedly creating and reemerging clan conflicts in the country. Look at what is happening in Galgadud, Hiiraan, Jubba and everywhere in Somalia. Clans within same regions each have a president of their own semi-autonomous state.”

Former Prime Minister of Somalia Ali Khalif Galaydh (who also advises for the newly founded Khatumo state), however, sees the increasing number of mini-states as potentially positively because it could produce local credible leadership and also contribute to the reemergence of Somalia. “These are all attempts to get out of the mess. At the same time it is out of frustration when things don’t happen in Mogadishu. I mean people are just fed up with the chaos and lack of movement or motion out of the center, the capital,” said Mr. Galaydh. “It could be of course more of an obstacle than facilitating or helping the mechanism."

About the draft federal constitution. Mr. Galaydh says it is a technical document that requires the attention of the Somali people. “What was needed and is still needed is for the Somali people to be aware of the draft and to be on board in terms of what it outlines. The Somali input in this whole exercise is not up to the government and the population will be unhappy with their lack of input,” he added.

Like Ahmed Sheikh Ali and Dalmar Haji, many Somalis are worrying the increasing number of mini-states in Somalia could be the beginning of land grab in Somalia. “This could be a lose-lose land grab for all Somalis,” said Ahmed Sheikh Ali, “If the TFG can't exercise its authority over all the mini-states and clan militias, it could end up with another horrific twenty years and possibly more - a 'war is in waiting' since some mini-states would try to form their militias which could weaken any agendas of rebuilding national army in Somalia," he stated.

The following list is intended to provide an accounting of many of the mini-states located throughout Somalia.

Mini-states in Galmudug  just a tribal enclave of hawiye.

Profiling New Face of  hawiye criminal warlords

Galmudug, which claims to run a combination of the Mudug and Galgadud regions, was first to test this theory of mini-state in 2006. Since that time, it has become a kind of role model for many mini-states claiming to govern areas over which they actually have they have little or no control.For detailed report please see  about "  Galmudug 

Himan and Heeb just a tribal enclave of hawiye.
was established in 2008 and mainly covers parts of the Galgudud regions. One of the oldest of the regional states proclaimed in Somalia, it is dominated by the Saleeban sub clan of Habar Gidir. Himan and Heeb was presumably a direct answer to the Sa’ad dominated Galmdug administration. The two homogenous clans of Galmudug and Himan and Heeb are the most influential and had some permanent presence in Galkacyo and Addado, and a technical presence beyond these two towns. Officials from both Galmudug and Himan and Heeb made efforts to unite the two administrations but failed as neither leader wanted to lose his government position. Mohamed Abdulahi Ticey serves as president.

Gal-Hiran and Haradhere wants control of Galgudud region and parts of Hiran. Its supporters are mainly part of the Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jaama (ASWJ) and the main cities in this state include Dhusamareeb, Guri-cel, Marer Gur and Haradhere town which are considered to important pirate strongholds. Abdilqadid Mohamed Bahdoon is the president of the state, which is dominated by Ayr, a sub clan of Habargidir. The state was founded on September 23, 2010 and has relations with the TFG.

El-Bur State was created in London on June 5, 2011 to run the El-Bur district in the Galgagud region of Somalia. El-Bur was formerly the capital of the Galgaduud region and once served as a local commercial hub. Abdillahi Malim Asparo is the president of El-Bur state, though al-Shababa and Ahlu Sunna are currently fighting over El-Bur. It is located approximately 375km north of Mogadishu.

Mareeg is a region in Galgadud based on the Ajuuran sultanate in the Middle Ages. It was established in April 2011 and exists in the Galgudud and Mudug regions. Its main administrative area is between Haradhere and Budbud towns and includes approximately 250km of seashore. Dayib Mohamed Sheikh serves as president of Mareeg. Its leaders have called on Somali businessmen to build a new port and roads linking the state with the other parts of Somalia, with the purpose of encouraging regional development.

Somali Central state was established in 2011 and claims control over parts of Galgudud and Mudug regions and has links with Himan and Heeb. The center of the regional state is Abudwak and is dominated by the Mareehan clan. It does not yield much political power and has been overshadowed by disagreements with ASWJ, which is currently the most powerful force in Abdudwak. Mohamed Hashi Abdi is the president. He was arrested in Abdudwaq by ASWJ militia forces.

Galgaduud state was formed in Dubai in April 2011. Its goal is to run the entire Galgadud region, despite the fact that the states of Galmudug, Himan and Heeb, Mareeg, El-Bur, Gal-Hiiran and Somali Central state all intend to run their own regions. Abdirashid Mohamed Dirir is the president of Galgaduud state.

Waax and Waadi was established in Bristol, Britain in March 2011 to govern Harardhere, Mareeg, El-Dher, Masagawa and Galad in Galgadud and the Juba Valley, particularly Turdho and Kowsar. Nor Ali Omar akas Dubad is the president of this administration.

Dooxo state was reportedly established in 2011. Its goal is to govern parts of Galgadud and possibly the Mudug regions. Bashir Abdulahi Abshir is the president of Dooxo. Little is known about this state.

Bila Quban state was created in April 2011. It wants to govern the area from Fah, located 30km from Haradhere district, north to the Hurow, which is located 1km from the Hilawe Gab village in southern Somalia.

Mini-states in Jubba

Azania was established on March 20, 2011 in Kenya and is supported by Kenya, which is interested helping develop a regional administration and establish a buffer zone against threats from al-Shabaab. Azania state is led by Mohamed Abdi Gandhi, a former Somalia defense minister. He is an educated man who has personal contacts with the governments of both Ethiopia and Kenya. The regional state works in Gedo and Lower Jubba regions, and its capital is Bu'aale town.

There are significant disagreements between Gandhi and Ahmed Madobe, leader of the Ras Kamboni group, and Hizb al Islam a pro-government militia supported and trained by Kenya. Ethiopia, however, supports ASWJ and is unhappy about the Azanai initiative. This is due to the possible threat from the Ras Kamboni group dominated by Ogeden fighters who could support Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) fighting against the Ethiopian government over the disputed Ogaden region. President Gandhi enjoys close contact with government military officers since most of the Somali in the area were trained under Gandhi's authorization in Kenya when he was minister of defense.
Jubbaland  was established in January 2012 is considered a rival regional to the state of Azania. Jubbaland desires to rule Lower Jubba, Gedo and Middle Jubba. Mohamed Farah Du'aaleh is the president, but is not as well known as Mohamed Abdi Gandhi, the leader of Azania, who has links with Ethiopia and Kenya. Jubbaland has no direct contact with these countries who support pro-government militias including the ASWJ and Ras Kamboni fighting against al-Shabaab in lower Jubba and Middle Jubba. Unlike Azania, Jubbaland has the support of the local people in the regions who are reportedly suspicious of Azania's links with Kenya.
Jubba and Shabelle was founded on July 5, 2011. It wants control of the Jubba regions in the south and parts of the Bay region. The supporters of this regional state are the Somali Bantu or Jareerweyne commnunity and those of Digil and Mirifle. Abdi Osman Omar is the president of this regional state.
Jubba-Ras was created January 8, 2011 in Scandinavia. It claims to have a legitimate right to govern the Lower and Middle Jubba regions of Somalia. The supporters of this administration are the Biyo-maal community. Abdi Qadir Mohamud Yusuf is the president of Jubba-Ras state of Somalia. Little is known of Mr. Yusuf other than he is young and calls himself "Engineer" (though it is not known if he has earned this nickname through legitimate academic studies, or if he simply prefers the name).
Jubba-Jasiira's formal founding date is unknown; however, the Nairobi-based community from Shiiqaal held a welcoming party for Jubba-Jasiira's president Abdi Ahmed Osman on January 3, 2011. It wants to administrate the Jubba regions in south Somalia.
Greenland state was founded in Kenya’s little Mogadishu district of Eastliegh in Nairobi in November 21, 2010. Like Jubba-Jasiira, Greenland state wants to rule in Jubba regions of Somalia. Dr. Mohamed Ibrahim Afkule is the president of this administration.
Dooxada Cagaaran state was created in Mogadishu in May 8, 2011. Ali Mohamed Ibrahim is the president of this administration, which, like the two states described above, also wants to control Jubba regions of Somalia.
Udubland state was established on February 17, 2011 by President Ibrahim Abdullahi Addo. It claims to represent the communities of Lower Shabelle and the two Jubba regions and wants to govern these three combined regions.
Shabelle-Jubba state was formed in Columbus, Ohio on April 6, 2012 by Dr. Abdikadir Noor Awo. It appears this state wishes to govern more than six regions (Shabeelaha Hoose, Jubada Dhexe, Jubada Hoose, Gedo, Bay and Bakool) though each of these already has its own mini-state.
South West state was initially formed in November 2002 in Baidoa (capital of the South West state) to govern Bay and Bakool regions but it is renewed in April 2011. It currently wants to control the Gedo, Bay, Bakool, Middle Juba, Lower Juba and lower Shabelle regions in southwest Somalia. Sayid Ali Sheikh Mohamed is the president of this administration.
Koofur-Galbeed - During the course of this research, Somalia Report discovered another South West state, called Koofur-Galbeed also claiming to adminster the same area of Sheikh Mohamed’s South West state. The president of this administration is Dr. Ali Abdi Baab. It is unclear whether one replaced the other but it is possible they are independent.

Mini-states in Hiran.. just a tribal enclave of hawiye.

Hiran (Hiiraan) state was established on August 10, 2010 and seeks to rule the entire Hiran region. This region has a strategic significance as it links southern regions to central Somalia. It is also of strategic importance to Ethiopia, which wants to use the region as a buffer zone to control the movements of the radical Islamists of al-Shabaab and ONLF. Hiran state is led by Mohamed Abdi Gab and is set against Gal-Hiran state and Shabelle Valley Administration (SVA) which also claim to be the legitimate states in the region.
Dooxada Shabelle or Shabelle Valley Administration (SVA) wants control of the central regions and Hiran and maintains an unspecified number of armed militia. It was founded on April 13, 2011, apparently in reaction to the establishment of Hiran state in September 2010, which is dominated by the Hawadle and Jijeele clans, including Gaal Jecel, while some of Gaal Jecel are opposed to this new state. Abdifitah Hassan Afhrah is the president of SVA and recently rejected the TFG’s plans for creating an administration in Beledweyne after a bitter disagreement between ASWJ and SVA over the control of Hiran region. This comes after Ethiopian troops backed by SVA forces and ASWJ seized Beledweyne from al-Shabaab forces in December 2011. It should be noted that the Somali government nominated Abdifatah Hassan Afrah to be governor of Hiiran region.
Hiranland state was founded in September 2010. It maintains no armed militia and its influence has been overshadowed by armed conflict and the power struggle between the SVA and ASWJ. The group is led by diaspora including its president Mukhtar Sheikh Abdirisak.
Hiiraan and Midland state was established June 2010 in London. Abdiqadir Adan Abdi is the founder and the president of this administration.

Mini-states in Shabelle and Banadir just a tribal enclave of hawiye.

Shabeelaha Dhexe state or Middle Shabelle state was formed in January 2009. It wants to manage the Middle Shabelle region in Somalia. Ali Madahey Jawle is the president of this mini-state.

Banadir was established in 2011 and represents the minority Banadiri community, which is made up of mainly Arabs from Oman and Yemen. The supporters of this regional state do not belong to the armed clans and are considered to the "others" group who receive half due the power sharing formula of 4.5. Banadir state could have influence on supporters living mainly in the districts of Hammerwein, Shingani districts of Mogadishu and in Marka and Brava in Lower Shabelle region. Abba Awow Haji is the president of Banadir.

Ex-Banadir state of Somalia was also created in Mogadishu in March 2012 to run the Banaadir, Middle Shabelle, and Lower Shabelle regions. Somalia government soldiers intervened and stopped the formation party of this administration but its president Mohamed Abdirahman Ali claims a legal right to manage the three regions of Somalia. The Banadir region “Mogadishu” has already has a TFG-formed administration. Mogadishu will be the headquarters for the administration.

Jiin-webi was founded on October 1, 2011 and is supported by the Somali Bantu or Jareerweyne communities, a minority group that descended from tribes in East and central Africa. These communities include the Wagosha communities and are discriminated against by tother Somali clans. This group is mainly made up of peasants living Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle, Lower Jubba, Middle Jubba and Hiran. They joined with the .5 of the 4.5 clan sharing formula in parliament; therefore, they are not well represented. Mohamed Ahmed Hussein is its president.

Banaadirland was established in Nairobi, Kenya, in December 2011. It wants to run the Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle and Banadir regions. Engineer Abdulle Hassan Nurrow is the president of Banaadirland administration. Mogadishu will be headquarters for the administration. Xamar iyo Xamr daye state wants to run Mogadishu’s Banadir region and middle Shabelle. This administration is established in Nairobi on May 15, 2011. Jibril Haji Mohamud is the president of this administration.

Wargaadhi State was formed May 2011 in Nairobi. It seeks to run the Middle Shabelle region. Yusuf Hundubay is the president of Wargaadhi State of Somalia.

Hir iyo Maanyo was established in 2011. It wants to administrate the Lower and Middle Shabelle regions of Somalia. Engineer Ahmed Bajuu is the president of this administration.

Abweyn State was formed in September 2011. Its goal is to rule the Banadir, Lower and Middle Shabelle regions of Somalia. Abdullahi Abdi Mohamed is the president of this administration.

Mini-states in One-Clan secessionist Enclave. aka Somaliland  aka  isaaq clan

Saylac and Lughaye state of Somalia was formed on February 7, 2012 to govern parts of Somaliland as a member of the federal government in Somalia. Mahad Abib Mohamud is the president of this administration, which includes clans from Somaliland, Saylac, and Lughaye located northwestern of Somalia. Somaliland has been controlling itself since its breakaway.

Awdal is clan based division based on a 16th century sultanate in the westernmost region between Somaliland and Djibouti inhabited by Gadabursi subclan of the Dir. Somaliland and Adwalland are vying for control of this region. Awdal State of Somalia wants to be part of a federal government of Somalia. Its second anniversary took place in Switzerland on March, 20, 2012. The closest that Rashid Aw Nor Hirsi, the president of Awdal State of Somalia, can travel is Mogadishu and the areas where Somaliland army have no presence.

Khaatumo was announced in January 2012 after a meeting in Taleh town of Sool and it comprises the Sool, Sanaag and Eyn regions. Khatumo was established during a conference known as Khatumo2 and supports TFG rather than Somaliland. The Dhulbahante clan, a sub clan of Darod clan, is dominant in the regions of Sool, Sanag and Eyn and has maintains the SSC militia fighters who fought against Somaliland in Buuhoodle. Major politicians including Ali Khalif Galeyr, a former Somali prime minister and lecturer at US universities, backed the conference. The Khatumo state of Somalia will have three presidents, rotating on a six month basis, and a supreme council comprising of three members, and a cabinet of six members. The three routine presidents are: Ahmed Elmi Osman (Amed Karash), Mohmaed Yusuf Jama (Indhasheeel) and Nur Elmi (Biindhe). In March of this year, the TFG officially recognized Khatumo. In March 2012, the TFG recognized the state, but rescinded this few days a later.

For a more detailed look at Khatumo, please see  Khatumo?".

Mini-states in Puntland

PUNTLAND: SOMALIA’S PIRATE STATE

Ras-Aseyr state was established on April 17, 2011 and is dominated by the Siwaqroon clan in the Bari region of Puntland. It was founded in Bargaal, the capital of Bari region and its president is Mohamed Farah Doxa-joog. This regional state has contacts with Maakhir, Mareeg, ASWJ, the TFG, and Khatumo, but almost has no contact with Puntland authorities. Ras-Aseyr claims they were forced to declare their own state, which lies within Puntland borders, after Puntland failed to develop their area and even neglected the needs of its people. Puntland, furious over its formation, has battled with the group for control of Bargaal, an eastern coastal area of Puntland driven by the Siwaqroon sub clan of the Majerteen.

Karkaar state shares its name with the mountain rage which runs through it and is mainly the southern area of Bari region of Puntland.

Maakhir was established in June 2009 after a dispute with Puntland authorities over a range of issues, including mining and oil resources. The biggest cities in the Maakhir state are Las Qoray, Badhan, Hadaaftimo Hingalol and Erigavo. Maakhir state was established by the Warsengeli sub clan of Darood and is not recognized by the government of Puntland. Jibril Ali Salad is the president of Maakhir state and maintains a parliament and a cabinet of ministers.

Dark Day .history of Somalia .January 26, 1991.Collapse of the somali nation( Key Players )