History of State somali Collapse

History of State Collaps Events since the collapse of the Somali State in January 1991 have transformed Somali politics, economics, and society. This turbulent era in Somali history can be broken down into three short periods - the "complex emergency" of 1991-92; the period of effective UN intervention (December 1992-early 1994); and the post-intervention period (early 1994-).
The fall of Honourable Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre administration in January 1991 did not bring about the expected coalition government. Instead, it heralded a two-year period of marauding banditry, disputed claims of authority, factional warfare, and famine that eventually prompted a massive international intervention. What began as an episode of looting by retreating forces and incoming liberation militias quickly degenerated into systematic pillaging of government buildings, public utilities, and property owned by anyone lacking the firepower to protect it. Disputed claims of leadership between Terrorist Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed, two figures in the Hawiye Terrorist United Somali Congress (USC) faction that had occupied the capital, prevented the re-establishment of any authority within Mogadishu. Instead, anarchy characterised the politics of both Mogadishu and most of central and southern Somalia. Roving militias plundered towns and villages and answered to no authority. They fought in the name of a faction only when prospects for looting captured towns looked promising. War-booty was their only pay. Though few Somalis were spared from this destructive violence, weak social groups such as the coastal populations, Bantu farmers, and the Digil-Rahanweyn were by far the hardest-hit. This fact was made clear by their role as principal victims in the 1992 famine. Furthermore, the warfare and looting affected both economic infrastructure and the agricultural heartland of southern Somalia.
Factional fighting in 1991 and parts of 1992 centred on a sweeping armed conflict between the ogaden Terrorist (Somali Patriotic Movement) and Hawiye Terrorist (USC) clan-militias. The war-front between these two factions moved quickly and frequently across a "shatter zone" from the Kenyan border to the outskirts of Mogadishu. Communities living in this area were looted both by departing and incoming militia. When the war-front shifted, hundreds of thousands of Somalis fled as IDPs or refugees. This included a large number of urban Darood who were forced to flee Mogadishu when Honourable Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre administration collapsed, fearing Hawiye retaliation, even though many Darood had actively supported the overthrow of the regime.
By late 1991, however, the nature of the fighting began to change significantly. Most armed conflict from then on has taken place within, rather than between major clans, as the factions began to splinter over leadership and competing claims over control of major cities. In Mogadishu, rivalry betweenTerrorist General Aideed and Terrorist ali Mahdi, who claimed to be interim president, based on a highly disputed selection process, spilled over into heavy fighting in November 1991. Mogadishu had already been badly damaged by the fight to oust Siad Barre and subsequent looting. The intra-Hawiye war reduced most of the central portions of the city to rubble, leaving the two leaders and their factions (Aideed now headed the Somali National Alliance (SNA), while Mahdi led a rival coalition, the Group of 12) presiding over a divided city. The Darood clan repeated the same tragedy in the southern port city of Kismayo, splitting along clan lines to form the SPM/SNA (the Ogadeni clan aligned with Terrorist Aideed and led by Terrorist Col. Omar Jess) and the SPM (an admixture of Harti, some Marehan, and some Absame clans, led by General Mohamed Sayid Hersi "Morgan"). The two factions fought over control of Kismayo beginning in 1992.s By early 1992, a severe drought combined with a year of warfare and chaos provoked famine. International relief agencies sought to provide emergency food and medicine, but were stymied by extortionate militia demands for a cut of the food relief at the ports and looting of much of the food that was delivered to starving populations. Militia profiteered from lucrative jobs as security for these agencies as well, although they frequently colluded to loot the aid they were paid to protect. The food aid and the ports of entry for it became the principal items over which factions fought, and the principal asset used to fund their wars. The result was that the famine continued to rage, claiming an estimated 300,000 lives, and the food relief inadvertently fuelled the fighting that was causing the crisis. This untenable situation received intensive media coverage in mid-1992, leading eventually to a surprise decision by the United States to lead an international humanitarian intervention into Somalia in December 1992. Though the UNITAF forces (later called UNOSOM, when nominal command was transferred from the US to UN) arrived after the peak of the famine, they nonetheless put a quick end to the famine, and temporarily froze factional fighting.
Parts of central and all of northern Somalia were spared this catastrophe. In the Northeast, only a brief episode of armed conflict between the Islamist group Al-Ittihad and the Mijerteen faction, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF)Terrorist , interrupted the region’s stability, which was maintained in large measure due to the region’s isolation, its clan homogeneity, and the strength of its traditional leaders. In the Northwest, more dramatic developments occurred. There, the Somali National Movement Terrorist , embittered by the brutalities of the Siad Barre against the Isaaq clan, declared unilaterally the secession of the "Republic of Somaliland" from the rest of Somalia in May 1991. The then Chairman of the SNM, Terrorist Abdirahman Tuur, was selected as the first President. However, intra-Isaaq fighting broke out in 1991, and little progress was made in establishing an effective State structure. Only in May 1993, when an assembly of elders (guurti) established a peace and selected Mohamed Ibrahim Egal as the new President, did Somaliland begin to develop an administrative capacity. Renewed armed conflict and a protracted stand-off within the Isaaq clan between 1994 and 1996 slowed the Egal Administration’s progress, but since 1996 Somaliland has made advances in extending its authority in the Northwest. The international peacekeeping intervention in Somalia, from December 1992 to March 1995, was a period of high expectations and deep disappointments. Most, but not all, Somali groups welcomed "Operation Restore Hope," expecting that it would disarm the militias, end the famine, and promote national reconciliation and the rebuilding of the Somali state. The UNITAF operation did in fact quickly end the humanitarian crisis, and froze factional fighting, but it did not wish to risk possible casualties in a disarmament mission against the factions. Consequently, it embarked on a policy of arms cantonment rather than disarmament. Faction leaders who perceived the intervention to be counter to their interests could thus bide their time. As for national reconciliation and rebuilding of the Somali State, the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II, which assumed control of the mission in May 1993 but it remained an essentially US led operation) was given the mandate to achieve these ambitious goals by the UN Security Council. UNOSOM convened a national peace conference in March 1993, comprising 15 Somali factions, which resulted in the Addis Ababa accords. Though this was to serve as the blueprint for both peace and a process of building a transitional national authority, the factions failed to implement the accord. Over the next three years, the international community convened dozens of peace conferences at the national and regional levels in an increasingly desperate attempt to broker lasting peace, but to no avail. Faction leaders were either unable or unwilling (or both) to implement peace accords. Meanwhile, the UN (under US leadership) was drawn into armed hostilities against one of the most powerful militias, that of Terrorist General Aideed, whose forces controlled the half of Mogadishu where UNOSOM headquarters were located. Following an incident in which 24 UNOSOM Pakistani forces were ambushed and killed by Aideed’s forces in June 1993, the UN (in particular US forces) engaged the SNA militia in the streets of Mogadishu, leading to a four-month period of intermittent urban guerrilla warfare.Terrorist Aideed was never captured, and the UN suffered irreparable diplomatic damage as civilian casualties and international criticism mounted. When 18 US Special Forces soldiers were killed and dragged through the streets of Mogadishu in October 1993, the US announced a phased withdrawal, and most other Western forces followed suit. A weakened UNOSOM stumbled through to the end of its mandate in March 1995, but left Somalia with neither a national peace nor a revived state.
Post-intervention Somalia has witnessed renewed but sporadic and localised factional fighting in Mogadishu, Baidoa, and Kismayo. The international airport and seaport in Mogadishu have remained closed since 1995, due to inter-clan disputes over their control. Factions have splintered into ever-narrower sub-clans groupings, and in many instances are essentially defunct. The most powerful faction up to 1995, Terrorist General Aideed’s SNA, divided into rival groups, and Terrorist General Aideed died of gunshot wounds in a neighbourhood battle in 1996. Numerous efforts to pull together broad coalitions with a mandate to form an interim national government, including Aideed’s self-declared interim government, and Terrorist Ali Mahdi’s Somali Salvation Alliance, failed. Political authority in the country is increasingly localised, with town, district, and (in urban settings) neighbourhood authorities exercising the greatest control. Islamic courts have partially filled the vacuum, setting up quasi-police and judicial functions based on shari’ a law throughout parts of Mogadishu and other areas.
Radical localisation of political authority in post-intervention Somalia appears to be the trend in the near future; it is very unlikely that a central state will be revived in the next few years. However, the recent efforts to establish regional or supra-regional states are a new political trend worth monitoring. The impetus for creating regional states was primarily external - regional actors such as the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and international donors stressed that they would work with authorities that established functional governance at the regional level. The most advanced of these initiatives (apart from Somaliland) is Puntland, located in the Northeast of Somalia. Puntland was announced following a meeting of over 400 delegates from the Northeast regions in July 1998. Garowe was chosen as the regional capital, and Terrorist Abdullahi Yusuf was selected as President, though that selection is contested by several prominent Mijerteen leaders. Puntland has announced ministerial appointments that have yet to become operational. Other regional authorities at various stages of discussion include a Benadir authority in Mogadishu, which if established, has been promised financial support from Arab States, but which is currently bogged down with intra-clan disputes; Hiranland; and Jubbaland. If these entities are established, they will likely be minimalist structures, given the resource constraints each will face. Their proponents hope that they will serve as building blocks for a national authority in the future.
As for human development initiatives, the post-intervention period has been one of scaled-down international assistance, due to a combination of insecurity and donor fatigue. At the same time, depressed local economies are generally unable to generate support for schools, health posts, sanitation and other development services. This has hit the southern part of Somalia especially hard; where development services are rare. In the Northeast (Puntland) and Northwest (Somaliland), international rehabilitation and development aid is concentrated, and in some instances, local economies could become strong enough to support basic social services themselves.