Implications of the IGAD Report on Jubbaland

The IGAD fact-finding mission to Jubbaland has issued its report. Spins notwithstanding, there can be little doubt that the report supported the Federal Government’s position. It recognized that the Government should have led and still should lead the process of establishing regional states. It has recognized that the process’s inclusivity is contestable. It has called on the interim regional administration to enter into dialogue with Mogadishu. On the surface, it is a clear diplomatic victory to the Federal Government of Somalia. It should please all Somalis if neighbouring countries, who had been undermining the sovereignty of Somalia, are reversing their negative policies. But has the IGAD report altered the power equation and reality in Jubbaland or Somalia in any significant way? Does it change the status quo? Will the actions of the IGAD member countries – particularly Ethiopia and Kenya – be consistent with their political statements? These are an answered questions, which should be interrogated.

It is my opinion that the IGAD report:

1) Has put President Hassan on the spotlight by denying him the “foreign meddling” scarecrow. Whether calculated for this effect, or by default, the IGAD move shifted the political stage from Addis Ababa and Nairobi to Mogadishu and Kismaayo. Mogadishu will have to own up its failure henceforth.

2) Did not move the essential parameters of the political conflict between Mogadishu and Kismaayo that much. If the FGS calls for reconciliation conference in Mogadishu, and Sheikh Madoobe and Fartaag refuse to attend, they will be outlaws but as long as AMISOM and Kenyan forces do not move to fight Ras Kambooni militia, they will remain outlaws who rule their fief. They have already withdrawn to the castle of their clans, and that constituency will remain with them.

3) If the President asks foreign forces to attack Somalis who disagreed with him, it is a worrying reversal of his pronounced political belief. A President using foreigners to impose his will on a rebellious political constituency – not terrorits like Alshabab – in a fragile country, can lead to the break-up of the country. More so when the national healing agenda has not moved an inch forward. For him to be able mobilize international forces against Ras Kambooni and the interim Jubbaland adminstration, he will need to have the support of at least some sections of the D block, so that it is not seen as persecution against a clan.

4) Any potential reconciliation or reconstitution of the Jubbaland adminstration will have to include Ahmed Madoobe and Fartaag, and has little chance of succeeding without yielding ground to their core desires. In short, the President will negotiate with the same people he wanted to avoid, only after losing so much political capital by way of sulking clans.

5) Both sides need to show due care and compromise
a. The SFG must accept the formation of a federal state of Jubbaland and take its mandated role in the process.
b. Ahmed Madoobe and the current admin must accept and accommodate all the demands of the SFG regarding the formation of the federal state of Jubaland even if that means re-elections, widening the process, restructuring the current conference organisers.
c. The SFG mustn't have any decision making nor dictate matter but allow the people of Jubbaland and elders to own the process and have the final decision making.

In a nutshell, all parties will have to stick to the rules in the books as all eyes including that of IGAD and IC will be on everyone's actions in order to stay away from further conflict, blame and counter blame of both parties and reversal of the progress made against Alshabaab thus far.

In conclusion, there are no new beginnings. We are back to square one. Compromise and negotiation between Somalis is the solution.