In-depth Look At how did somalia became terrorist haven

Part One

Somali society exploded into violence and anarchy, and Siad Barre goverment were forced to flee Somalia in January 27, 1991. Long before the government collapsed, however, the armed forces, the police force, the People's Militia, government ministries, and institutions such as the People's Assembly, schools, and health facilities, for all practical purposes, had ceased to operate. Siad Bare administration fled Mogadishu, and, after a stay in Kenya, ultimately sought refuge in Nigeria. The USC announced the formation of a provisional government in February 1991, with 'Ali Mahdi Muhammad of the Hawiye clan as president and 'Umar Arteh Ghalib, of the Isaaq clan, asprime minister. However, former army commander General Muhammad FarahAidid opposed Muhammad's presidency and eventually split off to form hisown USC faction. In the Mogadishu area, each of the opposition groups drew support from particular sub-clan and each resorted to arms to further its claims. The result wasdisintegration of government, civil society, and essential services by September1991 if not earlier. Serious fighting in Mogadishu began in September 1991, intensified in November, and by the end of March 1992 was estimated to havecaused 14,000 deaths and 27,000 wounded. Ali Mahdi Muhammad, a member ofthe Abgaal sub-clan of the Hawiye clan and leader of one USC faction that hada force of about 5,000 fighters, gained control of northern Mogadishu. He waschallenged primarily by Farah Aidid, of the Habar Gidir sub-clan of the Hawiye,who led a USC faction of about 10,000 guerrillas that advocated cooperation withthe SNM. During 1991 and 1992, outside parties, such as Djibouti, the Leagueof Arab States, the Organization of African Unity, the Organization of IslamicConference, and the United Nations made numerous unsuccessful attempts toend the fighting in Mogadishu.

The USC's establishment of a provisional government angered otheropposition groups who felt they had not been consulted. In the subsequentclashes, the SSDF and the SPM aligned themselves against the USC. In thecourse of the fighting, control of various towns such as Kisimayu and Baidoachanged hands several times. A number of cease-fires were announced betweenearly April 1991 and the latter part of 1992, but none remained in effect long.Meanwhile, in the north the SNM refused to participate in the unity talksproposed by the USC. In May 1991, the SNM proclaimed the Republic ofSomaliland as an interim government, pending 1993 elections, and decreeingthe shari'a as its legal base. The formation of Somaliland occurred as a result ofthe settlement of issues between the Somali National Movement (SMN) and thepro-Siad Barre Gadabursi Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA). Although de factoindependent and relatively peaceful compared to the tumultuous south, it hasnot been recognized by any foreign government. Thus, instead of peace, Somalia experienced a power struggle among various clan- and region-based organizations: the Somali National Movement (SNM, Isaaq-affiliated); the SSDF (Majeerteen); the Somali Patriotic Movement(SPM, Ogaden); Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA, Gadabursi); and the SomaliDemocratic Movement (SDM, Rahanweyn). Lineages and sub-lineages, fightingover the spoils of state, turned on one another. The state collapsed and Somalisociety splintered into its component clans.

The collapse resulted from certain features of Somali lineage segmentation.Somali clan organization is an unstable, fragile system, characterized at alllevels by shifting allegiances. This segmentation goes down to the householdlevel with the children of a man's two wives sometimes turning on one anotheron the basis of maternal lines. Power is exercised through temporary coalitionsand ephemeral alliances between lineages. A given alliance fragments intocompetitive units as soon as the situation that necessitated it ceases to exist.In urban settings, for example, where relatively large economic and politicalstakes are contested, the whole population may be polarized into two opposingcamps of clan alliances. To varying degrees, the poles of power in the politics ofindependent Somalia generally have tended to form around the Darod clan anda confederacy of the Hawiye and the Isaaq clans.

Two features of lineage segmentation require further comment. First, thesystem lacks a concept of individual culpability. When a man commits a homicide,for example, the guilt does not remain with him solely as an individual murdereras in most Western societies; the crime is attributed to all of the murderer's kin,who become guilty in the eyes of the aggrieved party by reason of their bloodconnection with the perpetrator. Members of the aggrieved group then seekrevenge, not just on the perpetrator, but on any member of his lineage theymight chance upon. In the Somali lineage system, one literally may get awaywith murder because the actual killer may escape while an innocent kinsman ofhis may be killed. Second, the system is vulnerable to external manipulation by,for example, a head of state such as Siad Barre, who used the resources of thestate to reward and punish entire clans collectively. This was the fate of the Isaaqclan and Majeerteen sub-clan, which suffered grievous persecutions under SiadBarre's . In a syste administration m of lineage segmentation, one does not have a permanent enemyor a permanent friend - only a permanent context. Depending on the context,a man, a group of men, or even a state may be one's friends or foes. This factpartially explains why opposition Somalis did not hesitate to cross over toEthiopia, the supposed quintessential foe of Somalis. Ethiopia was being treatedby the Somali opposition as another clan for purposes of temporary alliance inthe interminable shifting coalitions of Somali pastoral clan politics.Lineage segmentation of the Somali variety thus inherently militates againstthe evolution and endurance of a stable, centralized state. Although exacerbatedby Siad Barre's exploitation of inter-clan rivalries, institutional instability isactually woven into the fabric of Somali society. The collapse of the Siad Barreregime in early 1991 led to inter-clan civil war that has been continuing eversince.Thus, the severe fighting that broke out in Mogadishu in September 1991and spread throughout the country in the following months with over 20,000people killed or wounded by the end of the year led to the destruction of theagriculture of Somalia, which led to starvation in large parts of Somalia. Theinternational community began to send food supplies to halt the starvation.However, vast amounts of food were hijacked by Aidid's personal militia andbrought to local clan leaders. The hijacked food was routinely exchanged withother countries for weapons. An estimated 80% of the food was stolen. Thesefactors led to even more starvation of which an estimated 300,000 people diedand another 1.5 million suffered from between 1991 and 1992.The situation in the country as a whole deteriorated rapidly, as a result notonly of the civil war but also of the drought in central and southern Somaliathat left hundreds of thousands starving. By August 1992 Somali refugees werereliably estimated at 500,000 in Ethiopia, 300,000 in Kenya, 65,000 in Yemen,15,000 in Djibouti, and about 100,000 in Europe.

The civil war destroyed Somalia's infrastructure and brought all economic

Activities, apart from minimal subsistence agriculture, herding, and internal trade,

To a virtual halt. Following an official visit to Somalia in early August 1992 by Muhammad Sahnoun, theUN Special Representative, and Bernard Kouchner,

The French minister of health and humanitarian affairs, an estimate was released

That approximately one-fourth of the population, about 1.5 million people,

Was in danger of death by starvation - other estimates ran as high as one-third

Of the population. The problem of food distribution to the starving was

Aggravated by armed bandits.

These bandits, who recognized no authority except occasionally thatof local warlords, looted warehouses in Mogadishu and other major centersas well as shipments of food to the interior. The rise of local warlords, whocontrolled the cities, including harbors and airports, as opposed to traditionalclan leaders, clan councils, and clan-recruited militias in the hinterland, was arelatively new phenomenon in Somali society. Their rise has been attributed tothe breakdown of central government authority and the lack of strong, well organizedopposition parties. The availability of vast quantities of arms in the country from

Earlier Soviet and US arming of Somalia (between the early 1980sand mid-1990,

The US provided Somalia with US$403 million in military aid), from the large

Caches of arms gained in gray and black markets, and from the cross-border trade, particularly in ammunition, as well as the military training that the Said Bare government

Required all school and college graduates and civil servants to undergo further facilitated the rise of warlords.

Following the eruption and escalation of the civil war in Somalia in 1991, theUN and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) strived to abate the sufferingthat was caused as a result of the high-intensity conflict. The UN was engagedin Somalia from early in 1991 when the civil strife began. UN personnel werewithdrawn on several occasions during sporadic flare-ups of violence. A seriesof Security Council resolutions (733 , 746) and diplomatic visits eventuallyhelped impose a ceasefire between the two key factions, signed at the end ofMarch 1992. These efforts were aided by other international bodies, such as theOAU, the Arab League, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference.The UN, with the active support of all rebel faction leaders, felt that somesort of peace keeping force would be required to uphold the ceasefire and assistthe humanitarian relief effort, in conjunction with other relief agencies andNGOs. By the end of 1992, the Security Council adopted resolution 751, whichprovided for the establishment of a security force of 50 UN troops in Somalia tomonitor the ceasefire. This detachment would be known as the United NationsOperation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and it existed at the consent of those partieswho had been represented in the ceasefire. The resolution also allowed for anexpansion of the security force, with a number of around 500 troops initiallydiscussed. The first group of ceasefire observers arrived in Mogadishu in earlyDespite the UN's effort, all over Somalia the ceasefire was ignored, fightingcontinued, and continued to increase, putting the relief operations at great risk.The main parties to the ceasefire, General Muhammad Farah Aided and AliMahdi Muhammad, once again showing the difficult and troubled relationsbetween the warlords, proved to be difficult negotiating partners and continuallyfrustrated attempts to move the peacekeepers and supplies. In August 1992, theSecurity Council endorsed the sending of another 3,000 troops to the region toprotect relief efforts. However, most of these troops were never sent.Over the final quarter of 1992, the situation in Somalia continued to getworse. Factions in Somalia were splintering into smaller factions and splinteringagain. Agreements for food distribution with one party were worthless whenthe sores had to be shipped through the territory of another. Some elementswere actively opposing the UNOSOM intervention. Troops were shot at, aidships attacked and prevented from docking, cargo aircrafts were fired uponand aid agencies, private and public, were subject to threats, robbery andextortion. Meanwhile, hundreds, if not thousands of refugees were starvingto death every day. By November 1992, General Muhammad Farah Aided hadgrown confident enough to formally defy the Security Council and demandthe withdrawal of peace keepers, as well as declaring hostile intent against anyfurther UN deployments.

In the face of mounting public pressure and frustration, UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, presented several options to the SecurityCouncil. Diplomatic avenues having proved largely fruitless, he recommendedthat a significant show of force was required to bring the armed groups to heel.Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations allows for "action by air, sea orland forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace andsecurity". Boutros-Ghali believed the time had come for employing this clauseand moving on from peacekeeping. Significantly, this invocation of Chapter VIIwaived the need for consent on the part of the state of Somalia; effectively, it wasthe first time ever that the UN secretariat had endorsed such an act (See on-lineat: http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm).

However, Boutros-Ghali felt that such an action would be difficult to applyunder the mandate for UNOSOM. Moreover, he realized that solving Somalia'sproblems would require such a large deployment that the UN secretariat did nothave the skills to command and control it. Accordingly, he recommended thata large intervention force be constituted under the command of member states, but authorized by the Security Council, to carry out operations in Somalia. Thegoal of this deployment was to prepare the way for a return to peacekeepingand post-conflict peace-building.

Following this recommendation, on December 3, 1992, the Security Councilunanimously adopted Resolution 794, authorizing the use of "all necessarymeans to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarianrelief operations in Somalia". The Security Council urged the Secretary-Generaland member states to make arrangements for "the unified command andcontrol" of the military forces that would be involved (the full text of Resolution794 can be found online at:http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/ N92/772/11/PDF/N9277211.pdf?OpenElement). Prior to Resolution 794, already in November 1992, the US had approached the UN and offered a significant troop contribution to Somalia, with the caveat that these personnel would not be commanded by the UN. Resolution 794 did not specifically identify the US as being responsible for the future task force,but mentioned "the offer by a member state". On the evening of December 4, 1992, President George Bush made an address to the nation, informing themthat the US would send troops to Somalia. Known as Operation Restore Hope, the mission would formally become UNITAF. The first elements of UNITAFlanded on the beaches of Somalia on December 9, 1992. Thus, UNITAF wasauthorized to utilize "all necessary means" to ensure the protection of the reliefefforts. Accordingly, the Security Council suspended any further significantstrengthening of UNOSOM as UN affairs in Somalia were subsumed byUNITAF. With only a handful of the 3,000 plus troops envisaged for UNOSOMever put in place, the Security Council left it to the discretion of the Secretary-General as to what should be done with the abortive mission.UNITAF was comprised of forces from 24 different countries, with thevast bulk contributed by the US. UNITAF soon secured the relief operationswhich were being coordinated and carried out by UNOSOM, which wasalso attempting to negotiate a political end to the conflict. Indeed, althoughUNOSOM had been replaced by UNITAF, it was technically still in operationand would remain ready to resume its function when UNITAF had met its goalsof creating a secure environment for humanitarian relief.

United States forces and those of their allies gradually branched out fromthe airport and harbor of Mogadishu to the surrounding area. In successionthey secured the Soviet-built airport at Baled ogle (halfway to Baidoa), Baidoa,and then kisimayu, Baardheere, Oddur, Beledweyne, and Jalalaqsi. The planentailed setting up food distribution centers in each of the major areas affectedby the famine and bringing in large quantities of food so as to eliminate lootingand hoarding. By doing so, the operation would ensure that food was no longera "power chip," thereby eliminating the role of the warlords. As the provisionof food to southern Somalia reached massive proportions, however, it becameclear that as a result of the August rains and resultant domestic crop production,it would be necessary to sell some of the donated grain in local markets at asuitable price in order to safeguard the livelihood of local farmers in thehinterland.

The question of the security of food shipments proved a difficult one withrespect to disarming the population. The commander in chief of the United StatesCentral Command, Marine General Joseph P. Hoar, announced on December14, 1992 that the United States would not disarm Somalis because the carryingof arms was a political issue to be settled by Somalis. However, by January 7, 1993, after completing the first stage of Operation Restore Hope, United Statesforces began to pursue "technicals" and raid arms depots in order to safeguardthe operation and protect US and allied personnel and Somali civilians.Meanwhile, on the political level, in an effort to further reconciliation, Aidedand Muhammad met several times, as arranged by former US ambassadorto Somalia, Robert B. Oakley, who served as special presidential envoy. OnDecember 28, 1992, the two Somali leaders even led a peace march along theGreen Line separating the two areas of Mogadishu controlled by their forces.Yet, there were other factors complicating a political settlement. These were thecontrol of Baardheere by Muhammad Said Hersi Morgan, the son-in-law of SiadBare and leader of the Somali National Front, a Mareehaan-based organization; and the control of Kisimayu by Colonel Ahmad Omar Jess, a leader allied withthe SDM and the Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM). Jess was reliablyreported to have killed between 100 and 200 individuals whom he regarded aspotential enemies before United States forces reached Kisimayu.As a symbol of support for United States forces and their efforts in Somalia, President Bush arrived on New Year's Eve for a one-day visit and receiveda warm welcome from Somalis. In contrast, the UN Secretary-General facedan angry reception from Somali crowds on January 3, 1993. The Somalisremembered Boutros- Ghali's former cordial relationship with Siad Bare whenBoutros-Ghali served as Egyptian minister of foreign affairs. They also faultedthe UN for its long inaction in relieving the starvation in Somalia; voluntaryorganizations, particularly the International Committee of the Red Cross, hadproved much more effective than the UN in sending food to Somalia and insetting up kitchens to feed hundreds of thousands daily. Despite this negativereception, on January 4, 1993, the leaders of fourteen Somali factions attendedmeetings in Addis Ababa chaired by the UN Secretary-General, at which the USwas also represented. After considerable discussion, on January 15, the factionleaders signed a ceasefire agreement and a disarmament pact and called fora national reconciliation conference to be held in Addis Ababa on March 15.Despite the ceasefire, fighting and instability in Somalia continued to exist inlate January.Thus, on March 3, 1993, the UN Secretary-General submitted to the SecurityCouncil his recommendations for effecting the transition from UNITAF toUNOSOM II. He noted that despite the size of the UNITAF mission, a secureenvironment was not yet established and there was still no effective functioninggovernment or local security/police force. The Secretary-General concludedtherefore that should the Security Council determine that the time had comefor the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II; the latter should be endowedwith enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to establish asecure environment throughout Somalia. UNOSOM II would therefore seek tocomplete the task begun by UNITAF for the restoration of peace and stability in Somalia. The new mandate would also empower UNOSOM II to assist the Somali people in rebuilding their economic, political and social life, through achieving national reconciliation so as to recreate a democratic Somali state.UNOSOM II was established by the Security Council in Resolution 837 onMarch 26, 1993 and formally took over operations in Somalia when UNITAF was dissolved on May 4, 1993. UNOSOM II was the second phase of the UN activeintervention in Somalia. The objective of UNOSOM II was to initiate "nation building" in Somalia. This included disarming the various factions, restoringlaw and order, helping the people to set up a representative government, andrestoring of infrastructure. UNOSOM II had 28,000 personnel strength, drawnfrom 26 countries.On June 5, 1993, 24 Pakistani troops were assassinated and more than 80 werewounded by Somali militia members while inspecting an arms depot belongingto Muhammad Farah Aided, the most powerful of the Somali warlords. It waswidely reported that the bodies of the UN peacekeepers had been mutilated.Some were even skinned. Aided and his followers were accused of being behindthis massacre. On June 12, US troops started attacking targets in Mogadishurelated to Aided, a campaign which lasted until June 16. On June 19, a $25,000warrant was issued by US Admiral Howe for information leading to the arrestof Aided, but he was never captured.

Thus, the hunt for Aided characterized much of the UNOSOM II activity.The increasing tempo of military operations carried out in Mogadishu beganto cause civilian casualties and affected the relationship between the foreigntroops and the Somali people. The UN troops were easily portrayed as evilforeign interlopers by the militia leaders, particularly after incidents of civilian casualties caused by wholesale firing into crowds.On July 12, 1993, a US-led operation was launched on what was believed to be a safe house in Mogadishu where members of Aidid's Habar Gidir subclanwere supposedly meeting to plan more violence against US and UN forces.In reality, elders of the sub-clan, and not gunmen, were meeting in the house.According to UN officials, the agenda was to discuss ways to peacefully resolvethe conflict between Aidid and the multi-national task force in Somalia, andperhaps even to remove Aidid as leader of the sub-clan. During the 17 minutecombat operation, US cobra attack helicopters fired 16 TOW missiles andthousands of 20-milimeter cannon rounds into the compound, killing morethan 50 of the sub-clan elders. It would also lead to the deaths of four journalists, who were killed by angry Somali mobs when they arrived at the scene to coverthe incident. This attack turned many Somalis, including moderates and thoseopposed to the Habar Gidir sub-clan, against the US and UN, and helped toraise the Somali nationalist spirit against foreign intervention.

Paradoxically, Somalis disappointed by the failure of the UN to disarm thewarlords in Mogadishu actually began to support those same warlords in an "usversus them" mentality. The specter of radical Islam also began to rise, as militialeaders sought to use religion as a rallying point for anti-UN sentiment. As theAmericans became more insular, the warlords began to reassert control of manyMogadishu districts. With each failure to apprehend Aidid, the militias grewbolder. Serious rifts between nations contributing to UNOSOM II also began todevelop, with Italy in particular being a major critic of the American methods.On August 8, 1993, Task Force Ranger was deployed. It was composed ofDelta and Ranger forces not under UN control and so able to conduct more aggressive operations. Fighting between Aidid forces and UNOSOM II forcesescalated until the battle of Mogadishu, or for Somalis, "The Day of the Rangers",that was fought on October 3 and 4, 1993, in Mogadishu. The assault force ofthe task Force Ranger was composed of nineteen aircrafts, twelve vehicles, and160 men. During the operation to capture several Aidid faction leaders, two USMH-60 Black Hawk helicopters were shot down by rocket-propelled grenades,and three others were damaged. Some of the soldiers were able to evacuatewounded back to the compound, but others were trapped at the crash sites andcut off. An urban battle ensued throughout the night. Early the next morning,a joint task force was sent to rescue the trapped soldiers. American Rangerand Delta Force were rescued by the 10th Mountain Division, who was partlyhelped by UN troops, notably those of Malaysia and Pakistan. Somali casualtyfigures are unknown, but American estimates are that between 1,000 and 1,500Somali militiamen and civilians lost their lives in the battle, with injuries toanother 3,000 – 4,000. Eighteen American soldiers died, while two of them hadtheir bodies dragged through the streets, and 73 were wounded. Among UNforces, one Malaysian soldier died and seven were wounded, along with twoPakistanis.

Following the Battle of Mogadishu, the 1st Battalion, 64th Armored Regimentof the 24th Infantry Division, based at Fort Stewart, Georgia, was sent to restoreand maintain order in Mogadishu. This deployment, under the name TaskForce Rogue, established Victory Base in the west of the city in October 1993.With the use of heavy tanks and a strong overt military presence a semblance oforder was maintained in Mogadishu until President Clinton, under pressure ofAmerican public opinion and Congress, ended the US deployment in Somalia,setting a deadline of March 31, 1994 for their complete withdrawal.Other nations – such as Belgium, France, and Sweden – also decided towithdraw at this time. In early 1994, the Security Council set a deadline forthe mission of March 1995. Various reconciliation talks were carried out overthe next few months providing for a ceasefire, the disarmament of militiasand a conference to appoint a new government. However, preparations forthe conference were repeatedly postponed and many faction leaders ignoredthe agreement at will. So, with no real progress occurring and a dwindling ofsupport from member states, UNOSOM was disbanded in March 1995.Thus, the first US and UN intervention in the Somali civil war ended in failure,especially due to the shift in these forces' objectives from merely peacekeepingwork and assisting the humanitarian relief work, which might have beenwelcomed by Somalis, to a much more aggressive policy aimed at initiatingnation building in Somalia, including disarming the various factions, restoringlaw and order, helping the people to set up a representative government,and restoring of infrastructure. This, together with the occasional targeting ofcivilians during its actions, helped to raise the Somali nationalist banner againstwhat was perceived as an aggressive foreign intervention in internal Somaliaffairs that could be settled only by the Somalis themselves. So, the US and UN

Forces left Somalia to its destiny for the time being

Part( 2) the birth of al Shabaab

I. INTRODUCTION

Since the mid-1990s, three extremist groups operating from Somalia have chalked up a deadly track record.The most dangerous -- and most wanted by counterterrorism agencies -- is an al-Qaeda cell composed of militants responsible for the 1998 bombing of theAmerican embassy in Nairobi, the 2002 bombing of atourist hotel on the Kenyan coast and the simultaneous attempt to shoot down an Israeli charter aircraft.The second includes leaders of al-Itihaad al-Islaami, a Somali Islamist and nationalist political grouping with some long-standing links to al-Qaeda that aimed to establish an Islamic emirate in the Somali-inhabited territories of the Horn of Africa.

1. During its heyday inthe early 1990s, al-Itihaad had a militia more than 1,000strong and was funded in large part by Islamic charitiesfrom Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. It established military training camps staffed by foreign jihadis.

including members of al-Qaeda, and in the mid-1990s was implicated in several terrorist attacks in Ethiopia.Following Ethiopian retaliatory raids on its Somali basesin early 1997, however, al-Itihaad's military and political architecture was dismantled and the movement formally disbanded. Some leaders remained active and may haveplayed a supporting role in the 1998 Nairobi embassy bombing.Since 2003,

2 .a third group has also emerged: a small bu truthless independent jihadi network based in Mogadishu and with links to al-Qaeda.The notoriety and effectiveness of these militants has contributed to perceptions of Somalia as a breeding ground for Islamist extremism and a hub of terrorist activity. AMarch 2005 UN report portrayed Somalia as home to an"army" of jihadi fighters supported by a network of at least seventeen terrorist training camps.

3 In reality,jihadism is an unpopular, minority trend among Somali Islamists. Al-Itihaad's military wing has been largely dismantled, the new jihadi network's effective membership probably is in the tens rather than the hundreds, andranking al-Qaeda operatives in Somalia probably numberless than half a dozen. Several Western countries host larger and more sophisticated jihadi networks.What makes Somalia an object of special concern is it slack of a functioning central government, which rendersthe country a "haven for terrorist groups"

4. In theabsence of functioning police, immigration, customsand intelligence agencies, foreign security services --pre dominantly from the U.S. -- have taken up the challenge of countering terrorism in Somalia. An American military presence -- the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn ofAfrica (CJTF-HOA) -- was established in neighbouringDjibouti in 2002 to coordinate and underpin regional counter-terrorism initiatives. But for many of the same reasons that Somalia is a focus of concern, it is unlikely ever to become a refuge for al-Qaeda on a par with Afghanistan under the Taliban: there is no sympathetic authority to provide protection; the flat, open terrain offers few opportunities for concealment; and a rich oral tradition makes it difficult to maintain secrets.Over the years, Somali leaders have, nevertheless,attempted to exploit the small jihadi presence for their own political ends. After 9/11, faction leaders queued upto declare their country a potential haven for terrorists.

5 Ethiopia backed these claims and denounced theTransitional National Government (TNG) as a front forIslamist groups and terrorists.

6 In 2001, Addis Ababa backed formation of a coalition of opposition factions,the Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council(SRRC), which soon set to work providing "intelligence"about the TNG and its supporters. SRRC reports included lengthy lists with names of its political rivals and their alleged affiliations with various "extremist" groupsincluding al-Itihaad and a shadowy group with Egyp tian origins, Takfir wa'l-Hijra.

7 Some leading TNG figures were indeed associatedwith al-Itihaad and the more progressive Islamistmovement, Harakaat al-Islax, but the claims wereabsurdly exaggerated: much of the TNG cabinet andthe nucleus of Mogadishu's business elite were alleged to have extremist affiliations, as well as their sponsorsand business partners in Djibouti.Concerns about the TNG's Islamist ties and the threat ofter rorism provided much of the impetus behind an initiativeof Somalia's neighbours, acting within the framework ofthe regional Inter-Governmental Authority on Development(IGAD),

8 to replace the floundering TNG with a morereliable partner. In October 2004, peace talks conductedin Kenya under IGAD's auspices established a TransitionalFederal Government (TFG) for Somalia, based in Kenya,that was headed by President Abdillahi Yusuf, a central figure in the SRRC, and dominated by his clan andfactional allies.

9 Yusuf earned his credentials as anti-Islamist campaigner by fighting and defeating al-Itihaadmilitarily in northeast Somalia in 1992 and has lived onthis success ever since.

10 As president of the regional government of Puntland, he cooperated closely with the Ethiopian and American intelligence services, andmany observers expected him to win the enthusiastic endorsement of both governments. Addis Ababa did back Yusuf to the hilt but Washington -- like many othercapitals -- remained noncommittal because it harboured deep reservations about his ability to build consensus among the Somali actors and lead a continued reconciliation process.International concerns appeared justified when Yusuf appealed for a 20,000-strong multinational military forceto return his government to Somalia and later announced he would relocate his government not to Mogadishu butto the towns of Baydhowa and Jowhar. Unpersuaded bythe request and over stretched by commitments else where,including the Sudanese region of Darfur, the African Union(AU) vacillated, prompting IGAD member states to propose their own intervention force of 10,000. Although routinely described as a peace keeping mission, the operation was in fact proposed as peace enforcement,involving "all measures necessary" against any party deemed to threaten the process: precisely the kind of mission that brought U.S. and UN forces into conflictwith Somali militias in the early 1990s. The original concept also included a reference to counter-terrorism,indicating that peace keeping was not the only consideration of Somalia's neighbours.11These critical issues polarised the TFG between Yusuf's SRRC wing and a coalition of mainly Mogadishu-based faction leaders. The transitional parliament dividedsimilarly, with one wing -- led by Speaker Sharif Hassan --returning to Mogadishu, while the other, led by PresidentYusuf and Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Geedi, remainedin Nairobi. The Mogadishu-based group rapidly set towork, galvanising a coalition of civil society organisations,women's groups and former military and police officersin order to restore security and stability to the capital, in the hopes of demonstrating it was a suitable location forthe TFG, and no foreign troops were required. Yusuf'swing continued to insist that Mogadishu was too insecure,and foreign troops were essential. The impasse threatenedto fracture the TFG into hostile armed camps, derailing the fragile peace process and plunging Somalia back intocrisis. .... stay toon ... next week