Tuesday, March 8, 2011

One last desperate attempt to save them self: Terrorist group al-shabaab is arming Hawiye, Rahanweyn and Isaaq clansmen elders. ( Senior Citizen Jehad Job Opportunities)They are playing the clan CARD. The New Somali government of national unity will not stop until it achieves is objectives Restore Stability , Peace and Security in the Country

Analyzing a News Story.

The relationship between Somalia’s powerful Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen (Movement of Warrior-Youth) insurgent movement and the country’s socially and politically important clans remains the subject of uncertainty and great debate among scholars and analysts. Movement leaders have consistently downplayed and criticized “clannism,” defined here as loyalty to one’s clan at the expense of religious (Muslim) identity. Criticisms of clannism are particularly poignant following decades of civil war in which clan loyalties and warlordism have often played a destructive role. Harakat al-Shabab‘s ideology, which is a militant version of Islamism, has reportedly brought together individuals who are Somali religious-nationalists (or pan-Somali) and those more invested in borderless transnational militancy akin to Al-Qa’ida Central’s (AQC). Exact details and verification of reports coming out of Somalia are very difficult to verify because of the extreme dangers and difficulties involved in doing fieldwork or culling any information and date from on-the-ground interviews and ethnographic observation.
Many of the news sources, both in Somali and other languages, are biased toward one side or the other and are not always reliable. Officials and news sources close to the weak Transitional Federal Government (TFG) or the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the insurgency, such as Radio Al-Furqaan, are valuable sources for the study of propaganda and media framing but are not very useful for gathering “unbiased” (or as much as possible) information about on the ground developments.
Unconfirmed reports that there is a split among Harakat al-Shabab‘s leadership have persisted, despite public denials from some of the individuals involved in the continuing drama. In short, the movement’s senior leader (amir), Ahmed “Mukhtar Abu’l Zubayr” Godane is reportedly on the outs with some of its more religious-nationalist or, perhaps more accurately, Somalia-centric commanders and officials, chief among them the popular Rahanweyn leader Mukhtar “Abu Mansur” Robow, Harakat al-Shabab‘s senior spokesman, ‘Ali Mahamoud Rage (‘Ali Dheere), and popular movement preacher Fu’ad Muhammad Khalaf “Shongole.” The latter group’s discontent is said to center on three major issues: (1) Godane’s favoring of members of his own clan, Isaaq, (2) his move toward the far right, in line with more transnationally-minded foreign members in command positions within Harakat al-Shabab, and (3) discontent following the heavy losses suffered by the movement’s armed wing, Jaysh al-’Usrah (Army of Difficulty/Hardship), in a failed Ramadan 2010 offensive last autumn. In December the Puntland-based Somali radio station and news web site Garowe reported that both Shongole and Robow had criticized Godane following the Ramadan offensive. Shongole was reportedly particularly critical of the killing of Somali civilians during the offensive.
Clan dynamics may also be at play in any internal conflict. Robow (Rahanweyn) and Rage (Murasade/Hawiye) come from clans that anecdotal evidence suggests are the clans that many of Harakat al-Shabab‘s fighters come from, particularly in the administrative district of Banaadir and the capital city of Mogadishu, which is in Banaadir. This may be preventing Godane and their other internal rivals from attacking them more directly for fear of losing a large number of Rahanweyn and Murasade/Hawiye fighters. Reports emerged last year that Rahanweyn clan elders were becoming increasingly unhappy with supplying many of the frontline insurgents while not having any significant clan member in Harakat al-Shabab‘s leadership besides Robow. These reports are very difficult to concretely verify.
Public denials of a split are likely issued to stem the spread of reports of internal discord. Although reports of a split(s) may be exaggerated there is a good deal of evidence, much of it admittedly anecdotal, that the split(s) are real and likely to continue growing. Harakat al-Shabab will likely split in the future, though its future depends a great deal on the outcome of AMISOM’s recent military offensive, which is being aided by the Ethiopian military, TFG forces, and a pro-TFG Sufi militia, Ahlul Sunna wa’l Jama’ah. The TFG’s president, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, has already claimed that an AMISOM/TFG victory is near, though this is likely gross hyperbole. What is entirely probable is that Harakat al-Shabab has suffered heavy casualties, though claims of actual numbers, in the hundreds, from AMISOM and the United Nations are difficult to verify. At least 53 AMISOM soldiers and an unknown number of TFG and Ahlul Sunna members have been killed since the latest “offensive” began on February 25. Statements from the Harakat al-Shabab itself and affiliated news sources including Radio Al-Furqaan, have reported that the movement is recruiting more fighters to send to the frontlines of Mogadishu.

Harakat al-Shabab‘s rhetoric with regard to the country’s clans has been careful. Despite its general criticisms of clannism the movement has been careful not to directly attack specific clans, particularly in contested districts such as Banaadir. The movement’s leaders have also engaged with the clans at certain periods of time, even mediating inter-clan disputes according to Harakat al-Shabab‘s own press statements. Leaders such as Robow have also reportedly maintained good relations with clan leaders (he is supposedly popular with Hawiye clansmen and elders). In response to the recent AMISOM/TFG/Ethiopia/Ahlul Sunna offensive, Harakat al-Shabab began reporting that it was being supported by clan leaders from around the country. These reports emerged first from news sources close to the insurgency, such as Radio Al-Furqaan and Somali Memo, and have since been “confirmed” by Harakat al-Shabab itself in a statement.

Despite its criticism of clannism, the movement’s statement claims that clan leaders from around the regions of central and southern Somalia that it controls have “flocked to the capital Mogadishu” in order to support the defense against the “crusaders” (AMISOM) and apostate government (the TFG). These clan leaders pledged their support and intent to participate in the defense of the “Islamic wilayaat ” (meant in the sense of “districts” or “provinces”) from the campaign of the “crusader forces” backed by the “government of apostasy.” The emphasis on the leading role of AMISOM, a foreign force composed of Ugandan and Burundian soldiers, is key in terms of message framing. Some of the photographs released by Harakat al-Shabab are interspersed throughout this post. The clan leaders are carrying the black-and-white flags emblazoned with the Muslim testament of faith, “There is no god but the [One] God and Muhammad is His Messenger,” used by the insurgency. There are two possible interpretations: (1) Harakat al-Shabab, when facing a difficult military setback, is relying, perhaps against its will, on established clan ties, or (2) the movement is emphasizing that it represents pan or “post” clannism. Specific clans represented in this “procession” of support are not identified, which is noteworthy: No one clan is being singled out.

There is no question that AMISOM is technologically superior to Harakat al-Shabab. However, AMISOM and the TFG in the past have regularly lost ground gained, usually measured in dozens to scores of meters rather than miles, to insurgent counterattacks. The failure to establish defensible lines capable of holding newly-gained ground is likely to lead to the same result. More importantly any military gains will ultimately be for naught if the TFG continues to be a corrupt, inept institution that has almost no legitimacy on the ground inside Somalia. Reports of Ethiopian involvement in the current fighting is not likely to gain the TFG and President Sharif any fans inside the country. Rather, the AMISOM-led campaign clearly shows that the TFG remains unable to exercise authority even within the whole of the capital city of Mogadishu. Long-term progress and stability is reliant on real reform of TFG institutions, which is unlikely to occur. The decision by the TFG’s parliament to renew its own mandate, despite having not made any real progress, was criticized publicly by elders from the powerful Hawiye clan confederation, the dominant clan group in Banaadir and Mogadishu. It remains clear that, as I have argued previously, neither the TFG nor Harakat al-Shabab have succeeded in achieving true legitimacy among the Somali people. Further, clan dynamics are likely to continue to play an important role. Similar to the original premier Somali Islamist movement, Al-Ittihad al-Islami (Islamic Union), Harakat al-Shabab is unlikely to be able to remove them as a factor in the country’s politics. If the insurgency succeeds, though its chances are slim, it would be a significant accomplishment that will be one of the most significant events in Somalia’s modern history since the early 1990s. It is more likely, however, that Harakat al-Shabab will split along ideological and possibly clan lines.
news source.
Responding to  this jehad story


 "unfortunately   ...Michigan Companies is  Hosting African Taliban Website ..shabaab website spewing out spewing out their propaganda

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Ex-Somali Police Commissioner General Mohamed Abshir

Ex-Somali Police Commissioner  General Mohamed Abshir

Honourable Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre with general Mohamad Ali samater

Honourable Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre with general Mohamad Ali samater
Somalia army parade 1979

Sultan Kenadid

Sultan Kenadid
Sultanate of Obbia

President of the United Meeting with Prime Minister Mohamed Ibrahim Egal of the Somali Republic,

Seyyid Muhammad Abdille Hassan

Seyyid Muhammad Abdille Hassan

Sultan Mohamud Ali Shire

Sultan Mohamud Ali Shire
Sultanate of Warsengeli

Commemorating the 40th anniversary of Honourable Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre

Commemorating the 40th anniversary of Honourable Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre
Siad Barre ( A somali Hero )

MoS Moments of Silence

MoS Moments of Silence
honor the fallen

Honourable Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre and His Imperial Majesty Emperor Haile Selassie

Honourable Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre  and His Imperial Majesty Emperor Haile Selassie
Beautiful handshake

May Allah bless him and give Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre..and The Honourable Ronald Reagan

May Allah bless him and give  Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre..and The Honourable Ronald Reagan
Honorable Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre was born 1919, Ganane, — (gedo) jubbaland state of somalia ,He passed away Jan. 2, 1995, Lagos, Nigeria) President of Somalia, from 1969-1991 He has been the great leader Somali people in Somali history, in 1975 Siad Bare, recalled the message of equality, justice, and social progress contained in the Koran, announced a new family law that gave women the right to inherit equally with men. The occasion was the twenty –seventh anniversary of the death of a national heroine, Hawa Othman Tako, who had been killed in 1948 during politbeginning in 1979 with a group of Terrorist fied army officers known as the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF).Mr Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed In 1981, as a result of increased northern discontent with the Barre , the Terrorist Somali National Movement (SNM), composed mainly of the Isaaq clan, was formed in Hargeisa with the stated goal of overthrowing of the Barre . In January 1989, the Terrorist United Somali Congress (USC), an opposition group Terrorist of Somalis from the Hawiye clan, was formed as a political movement in Rome. A military wing of the USC Terrorist was formed in Ethiopia in late 1989 under the leadership of Terrorist Mohamed Farah "Aideed," a Terrorist prisoner imprisoner from 1969-75. Aideed also formed alliances with other Terrorist groups, including the SNM (ONLF) and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), an Terrorist Ogadeen sub-clan force under Terrorist Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess in the Bakool and Bay regions of Southern Somalia. , 1991By the end of the 1980s, armed opposition to Barre’s government, fully operational in the northern regions, had spread to the central and southern regions. Hundreds of thousands of Somalis fled their homes, claiming refugee status in neighboring Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya. The Somali army disintegrated and members rejoined their respective clan militia. Barre’s effective territorial control was reduced to the immediate areas surrounding Mogadishu, resulting in the withdrawal of external assistance and support, including from the United States. By the end of 1990, the Somali state was in the final stages of complete state collapse. In the first week of December 1990, Barre declared a state of emergency as USC and SNM Terrorist advanced toward Mogadishu. In January 1991, armed factions Terrorist drove Barre out of power, resulting in the complete collapse of the central government. Barre later died in exile in Nigeria. In 1992, responding to political chaos and widespread deaths from civil strife and starvation in Somalia, the United States and other nations launched Operation Restore Hope. Led by the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), the operation was designed to create an environment in which assistance could be delivered to Somalis suffering from the effects of dual catastrophes—one manmade and one natural. UNITAF was followed by the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). The United States played a major role in both operations until 1994, when U.S. forces withdrew. Warlordism, terrorism. PIRATES ,(TRIBILISM) Replaces the Honourable Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre administration .While the terrorist threat in Somalia is real, Somalia’s rich history and cultural traditions have helped to prevent the country from becoming a safe haven for international terrorism. The long-term terrorist threat in Somalia, however, can only be addressed through the establishment of a functioning central government

The Honourable Ronald Reagan,

When our world changed forever

His Excellency ambassador Dr. Maxamed Saciid Samatar (Gacaliye)

His Excellency ambassador Dr. Maxamed Saciid Samatar (Gacaliye)
Somali Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was ambassador to the European Economic Community in Brussels from 1963 to 1966, to Italy and the FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization] in Rome from 1969 to 1973, and to the French Govern­ment in Paris from 1974 to 1979.

Dr. Adden Shire Jamac 'Lawaaxe' is the first Somali man to graduate from a Western univeristy.

Dr. Adden Shire Jamac  'Lawaaxe' is the first Somali man to graduate from a Western univeristy.
Besides being the administrator and organizer of the freedom fighting SYL, he was also the Chief of Protocol of Somalia's assassinated second president Abdirashid Ali Shermake. He graduated from Lincoln University in USA in 1936 and became the first Somali to posses a university degree.

Soomaaliya الصومال‎ Somali Republic

Soomaaliya الصومال‎ Somali Republic

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The threat is from violent extremists who are a small minority of the world's 1.3 billion Muslims, the threat is real. They distort Islam. They kill man, woman and child; Christian and Hindu, Jew and Muslim. They seek to create a repressive caliphate. To defeat this enemy, we must understand who we are fighting against, and what we are fighting for.

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